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CHAPTER I :  INTRODUCTION 
The Development of a Problem and Hypothesis 
Moving to Chicago from a predominantly non-
urban and rural background made me very sensitive to 
the problems of our urban communities ; perhaps more 
so than one who has gradually been exposed to the urban 
environment from birth and s ubsequently has grown ac-
cus tomed to its problems o Doris B. Holleb in her book 
entitled Social and Economic Information for Urban 
Planning lists seven general common problems of our 
major cities . My awareness focused mainly on the first 
five . 
1 .  Insufficient housing and public services 
as illustrated by exis ting s lum areas . 
2 .  A poverty cycle kept in motion by a 
decrepit educat ional system. 
3 .  Pollution. 
4 . Transportation congestion. 
5 .  Persis tent racial discrimination. 
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My awareness of the last two problems mentioned by 
Holleb did not evolve until I sought answers to certain 
questions concerning the first five . The last two 
are : 
6. Irrationalities in land use. 
7. "The diffusion of governmental respon­
sibility in urban areas , the fiscal 
inadequacies of local authorities ,  and 
the complexity of narrowly conceived , 
federal ass istance programs which often 
work at cross purposes with localities . "b/ 
An awareness of the existing s ituation led to 
the question of what is being done about our urban prob-
lems . Seeking an answer to this question, I found through 
literary researchg/ that the major impetus behind rehabil­
itating our cities is urban renewal and the more recent 
(1968) Model Cities Program . These programs are such 
that government funds are rewarded to communities that 
can develop a definite program that fits basic govern­
mental requirements .  This policy of filtering funds and 
decision-making from the federal level of government down 
lnoris B. Holleb, Social and Economic Information 
for Urban Planning. (Chicago, 1969), p .  20. 
2 (The bulk of which comes from government pam­
phlets received from the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development ,  the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare , the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations , and United States Congress ional Records ) 
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to the citizens of local communities is a decentralized 
process .  At this point I can s tate my research problem 
as , "What are the effects of a decentralized decis ion­
making process on urban redevelopment? "  
The next question I felt should be answered was 
whether or not the decentralized approach to urban prob­
lems was effective. Socio-economic s tudies of citie s ,  
such as New York, Boston, Atlanta, and Chicago, as well 
as smaller communities that have approached their pr0b­
lems through existing urban renewal or model cities pro­
grams , indicate that the system is not effect ive . 
Having learned that the decentralization approach 
did not work positively , my next natural question was t o  
learn why. The biggest problem has been that communities 
are unable to develop complete programs ; and this inabil­
ity is due largely to a lack of compromise among influ­
entials within the community . In the cases where programs 
were produced, it was found that many of the most needed 
changes were compromised in order to prevent a loss of 
funds ;  or that those most affected by the changes remained 
passive or unapproached as a s ignificant decision-making 
body. 
My problem can now be narrowed down to the follow­
ing guiding hypothesis : Local community interest groups 
inhibit the effectiveness of decentralized Federal policy 
in implementing programs of urban social change . 
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Isolated case studies do not , however ,  provide 
ample grounds for generalizations . Subsequently the next 
question to be answered was whether or not there was any 
systematic consistency between interacting community 
groups which could add justification to using the findings 
of the case studies herein as poss ible referents of the 
failure of decentralization. Many theorists who write 
of community power or conflict such as James Coleman, 
c. Wright Mills , Marvin Olsen and Pareto indicate that 
members of certain interest groups (as illustrated by 
Pareto ' s  non-ruling elite ) are very powerful people who 
exercise a great deal of influence over the political 
system and whose f'oremost loyalty is to their own par­
ticular interests . Our socio-political economic system 
is s uch that the most powerful interest groups are those 
with monetary wealth and those with monetary wealth are 
not those in the greatest need.  Marvin Olsen makes this 
point quite clear with his strong emphasis on resources 
as the greatest determinents of social power. 
A great deal of recent literature by social 
planners and urban sociologists is available that is com­
plimentary to the well established theories on community 
power . This current literature also indicates that there 
is a systemic linkage between interacting community groups 
which serves to alienate the poor from community decision-
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making -- thereby defeating the purpose of decentral­
ization methods of urban rehabilitation . Many of the 
current prominent urban sociologists and social planners 
s uch as Edward c. Banfield go beyond community power 
theory by making the direct association between urban 
renewal failure and decentralization. It must be empha­
sized , however, that this study does not lend itself 
toward testing decentralization as an internally reliable 
policy for decis ion-making. What is being tested is 
whether or not decentralized decision-making as opera­
tionally defined herein has been implemented in urban 
renewal after several years of attempting to do so .  If 
it has not been implemented,  why has n ' t  it and what are 
the poss ibilities of it being implemented in the future? 
It appears , therefore , from what has been dis­
cussed so far that the problem we have developed is a 
workable one and that the proposed hypothesis does have 
poss ible avenues of verifiability. Hence, two categories 
allow us to generalize from urban case s tudies : one is 
community power theory as represented most characteris­
tically by Marvin Olsen, and the other is the works of 
social planners and sociologists who assume the nature 
of community power structure to be such that cecentral­
ization is ineffective . My intention is to support the 
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latter by reference to the former whereby rendering both 
as effective grounds for testin6 my 5uiding hypothesis . 
O�erational Definitions of Terms 
--
The terms below are defined in such a way so as 
to  clarify their usage throughout the following pages of 
this manuscripto 
Local Communit� Interest Groups : Interest groups 
that have influencing power over local politicians and/or 
a s ignificant portion of public sentiment within a commu-
nity. 
Decentralized Federal Policy : Providing commu-
nities with funds to  s olve their own problems with their 
own plans , thereby having those most affected by decis ions 
making them. In urban renewal the decis ion makers should 
be the bottom rung of the ladder, i . e . ,  the urban poor , 
since it is they whom urban renewal is overtly geared 
toward . 
Urban : 11 • • • a relatively large, dens e ,  and 
per�anent settlement of s ocially hetergeneous individ­
uals .  "l/ 
3Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life , "  in 
Urbanism in World Perspective : A Reader,  ed.  Sylvia Fleis 
Fava , New YorK, I9b8, �. qg. 
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Urhan Social Ch�n3e: Change that will benefit 
the poor most effectively, not exclusive of all other 
interrelatine factors . 
Metropolitan Area :  Any central city and imme-
dintely surrounding areas that are either depended upon, 
or dependent upon an exchan3e of services with that cen-
tral city. 
Poverty: Federal standard of $3,000 or less 
annually. (Recently changed to  $3,968 for a family of 
four ) .Y Annual income is a very general way of discrim-
inating between the poor and non-poor and is useful in 
making concise s tatistical reference to poverty. It 
must be pointed out , however, that in a s tratified s ociety 
such as ours , poverty as defined by income is relative to 
the existence of people with higher incomes and the een­
eral standard of livingo Hence, when "poverty elimin­
ation" is eluded to in this study, the author is not sug-
gesting the ultimate form of classlessness but more real-
istically every urban individual havin3 an equal opportuni-
ty to aspire to the maxi:-?!Um phynica.l and mantal health 
4when the research for this s tudy was completed , 
the poverty level income was still $3,000 annually. Con­
sequentl-y, my reference to and statistical exam1.les con­
cernin� poverty are all based on the $� , 000 leve l .  Con­s idering the recency of the chan�e to �3 , 968, finding 
replacement statis tics based on published research would 
be an imposs ibility. 
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s tandards presently possible . Reaching this s tandard is 
not necessarily determined by equal income because one 
can have an income more than s ufficient to afford him the 
just mentioned opportunity. On the other hand adequate 
social planning might afford an individual access to max-
imum physical and mental health without necessarily af­
fording him the additional luxuries of a higher income 
person . One must keep in mind that low income is just 
one of many ways of identifying poverty. 
Planned Change : Deliberate manipulation of re­
sources so as to attain predetermined political, social , 
or economic goal s .  
Central City: The boundaries with which a city 
is legally and politically defined.  
Migration: Movement of family residence from 
one area to another in the United States . 
Immigration: Movement of family residence from 
another country to the United States . 
Automation : "In the most general sense,  the 
subs titution of machine power for manpower; more specif-
ically, the use of -- and the whole trend toward the use 
of -- automatically controlled mechanical and electronic 
devices • • •  112/ 
5Thomas Ford Hoult, Dictionary of Modern Sociol­
�, New Jersey, 1969, p .  24 . 
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Substandard Hous ing: Living quarters that do 
not meet the American Public Health Association require-
Ments for livin� as given below or other�ise indicated 
by authors referred to throuGhout this �aper. 
"Living q1..1arters must provide adequate 
heat (and coolr.e$s ) ,  purity of air, il­
lumination, and protection from excessive 
nois e .  There must be provision for individ­
ual privacy. A room of one ' s  own is ideal; 
at most, it should te shared with another 
person of the same sex or with one's spous e .  
Adequate space is requiredo There must be 
proper facilities for homemaking and clean­
line3s , safe water, sanitation, and refrig­
eration. Protection must be affordeq a6ainst 
accident, fire , and e lectric shock . 119./ 
Social Power :  As generally defined by Marvin 
Olsen, social power is an energy like phenomenon which 
affords a social actor (s ) the ability to affect social 
life . 
"Social power" ,  though very abstract in itself,  
can be and usually is the result of an imbalance of tan-
gible resources which can empirically affect decision-making 
and future application of additionally available resources . 
A decentralized decis ion-making policy perpetu.a.tes tangible 
resources as the major determinants of social power because 
of its inability to accurately legitimatize powe r ,  i . e . ,  
hold accountable one body of people for the overall balance 
and quality resulting from the decisions made . Wnen intan-
6Alvln Lo Schorr, Slums and Social Insecurity, 
(Washingto�,, D.C., 1963), p .  51. 
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gible resources , such as knowledge and objectivity, can 
be the de terminants of social power,  the chances are better 
of gett ing intan3ible results such as the just mentioned 
quality and balance . Hence, though the essence of s ocial 
power does not necessarily change , its strength and the 
results of its application are very much affected by the 
ability of the decision-making policy to  control the re­
s ources that determine the power.  
Method , Data and Purpcse 
There has been much literature written on power 
theory as well as various subcategories of power theory 
s uch as those mentioned above , i . e . ,  conflict theory and 
elitest theoryo There have also been many community 
power studies done , most of which are based on e ither 
the decision-makine technique or the reputational tech­
nique (as developed by Floyd Hunter ) which either im­
pl�mented a form of power theory or attempted to add 
credence to a particular theory or theoris t .  Surpris ­
ingly enough, we can also find numerous case s tudies of 
urban renewal .  To this writer's knowledge , however, there 
has been very little application of power theory to urban 
renewal -- in theory or practice . One of the closest to 
filling this description is a quantitative study done by 
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Amos Hawley whereby he hypothesized an association between 
managerial and public official ratios and urban renewal 
success . Hawley ' s  study, though a major contribution to  
the area of  community power, does not cover the scope nor 
fulfill the purposes of the s tudy herein. 
A major purpose of this s tudy is to show the 
relevance of power theory as a theoretical base for de-
veloping future urban planning trends and decision-making 
procedures .  With this as an over-all goal ,  several sub-
goals are brought into play in order to fill the gaps 
between levels of abstraction. By this is meant that 
unless a gradual incline is developed between the prac­
tical realities of everyday plannin3 and the very high 
level of theor�1, one can only make suggestions that are 
purely philosophical in nature and which would mos t likely 
have li ttle value in an area that is already well stocked 
with prominent theorists. From a purely step-by-step point 
, 
of view, one can recognize the various levels just mentioned 
above from the chronological progression of the s tudy it-
self. It be�ins with a somewhat theoretical and histor-
ical causal explanation for our urban problems , first 
focusing specifically on housing. Next is the planned 
reaction to housing as an urban problem and the subse-
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quent additional programs .  Following a brief s urvey of 
the programs is a look at the results of the proBrams 
through several case studies of urban renewal . To sup­
plement the urban renewal case studies and to add an 
additional link between urban renewal and power theory, 
community power studies are also referred to.  And finally, 
urban renewal is evaluated in terms of s ome of the most 
basic power theory concepts as they apply to the general 
findin3s of the case studies . 
Though the above broad steps �ive the format of 
this study and demonstrate the progress ion of different 
levels t oward its most general goal s ,  they do not rep­
resent the method nor the more specific sub-goals that 
must be approached before broader generalizat ions can be 
provided . 
The method used in this study is libra�y research 
for the purpose of bringing together the quantitative and 
qualitative research of others who have done work in one 
of various inter�elated areas . It should be pointed out 
that this is intended as a pilot stud y  to be useful for 
researchers doing work t oward interrelating empirically 
the various areas herein. 'The study itself is not inten­
ded to be empirical and therefore any conclusions that 
are made must be cons idered as highly tentatbe guidelines . 
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The value of this method is in the s cope it allows the 
researcher to cover : the synchronization of, and credit 
given to, more specific , and quantitative works ; and , 
the ability afforded the researcher to overlap and in­
terrcla te the empirical world as portrayed by quantita­
tive methodologists and theoretical abstractions of the 
world as portrayed by various theorists . Any s ignificant 
amount of verification attributable to this study can 
only be derived from the researcher ' s  ability to inter­
pret and synthesize the findings of others in a meaning­
ful and perhaps useful way. Analogous to fitting a 
puzzle, the writer has put together various pieces which 
appear to create a total picture . Admittedly there are 
many pieces unaccounted for which when fit into their 
proper place might distort the entire image . It is the 
author ' s  contention that the logic employed in inter­
relating the various sources of this study does purport 
sufficiently valid arguments toward a degree of veri­
fiability of the proposed guiding hypothes is . 
By es tablishing and overlapping the following s ix 
items or s �b-goals , the author will attempt to develop a 
descriptive but nevertheless integrated chain of assump­
tions which when adequately demonstrated will add subse­
quent support to his hypothesis . The items and sources 
t o  be used for each are as follows : 
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l .  Our major metropolitan areas have certain 
problems in common. 
Substandard housing and avoidable ill­
nesses are two of the major problems which 
will be illustrated by use of statistics 
from the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, the Department of Health, Ed­
ucation, and Welfare and other interpretive 
secondary sources using these statistics 
such as Doris Holleb ' s  Social and Economics 
Information for Urban Planning and Alvin 
Schorr1s Slums & Social Ins ecurity. 
2. These problems are directly related t o  
poverty. 
A great part of this material will come 
from a study done by Lansing, Clifton, and 
Morgan entitled New Homes and Poor Peoele ; 
and various other sources which show the 
relationship qetween poverty and substan­
dard housing.� 
3. Our present national policy toward dealing 
with urban problems is one of decentraliza­
tion. 
Congressional Records w ill be used along 
with information received from the Depart­
ment of Housing and Urban Development , the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 
and other works such as Scott Greer ' s  Urban 
Renewal in American Cities , all of which will 
s tate the procedure that is followed before 
urban renewal programs are implemented . 
4. Decentralization of funds and decision-making 
has not been an effective means for implement­
ing programs of s ocial chan�e (as operation­ally defined for this s tudy). 
This is demonstrated by sources which point 
out present housing shortages and the amount 
of poverty that still exists as evidenced by 
6As pointed out quite generally in pages 23-25 
and 35-40 there are numerous interrelating factors that 
are all symptomatic of poverty. The author has used s ub­
standard housing, however, as the main empirical referent 
of poverty because it is housing that our urban renewal 
programs have most directly focused on. 
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income and infant mortality rat e s .  Also, 
an analysis of several follow-up studies 
on urban rene�al will be made to determine 
what the pro3rams set out to accomplish,  
how well the goals were attained , and just 
as important whether or not all the require­
ments were in actuality fulfilled--mainly 
active c itizen part icipation, which is the 
ma j or argument used in favor of a decentra­
lized urban policy. 
5 • . Decentralization is implemented by local 
decision-making authorities . 
This w ill be illustrated (as ide from by mere 
definition of decentralization ) by a combina­
tion of references used in three and four 
ab9ve , i . e., specifications for program approv­
al and special committees and political figures 
instrumental in makin� decis ions in urban areas 
thus far. Additional reference will be made 
to the development of the more permanent . 
local organizations such as the Chicago Hous ­
in3 P.uthori ty. 
6 .  Local community power s t ructures control local 
decision-making authority. 
Power theory and community studies will  be 
used to further verify and interpret the find­
ings of the various urban renewal case studies. 
7. The poor are the least powerful of all seg­
ments of the community . 
References will be made t o  Olsen's po�er 
theory, i . e . ,  the lack of resources on the 
part of the poor prevents them from being 
powerful and subsequently inhibits their mo­
bility, i . e . ,  perpetrates the poverty cycle . 
One can readily see what this all leads to: 
since decis ions are affected greatly by local community 
power structures and the poor are the least powerful of 
all local structure s ,  it logically follows that it ·is they 
who least determine their own fate through urban renewal. 
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The keystone to this entire study is item four above,  
which for the most part is  represented by Chapter IV of 
the text . Clearly, since so few renewal case s tudies 
have had any s ignificant active citizen participation in 
their decision-making processes , urban renewal as a means 
of helping the poor help themselves is held to serious 
question and the hypothesis proposed at the onset of this 
study is afforded a great deal of support : Local commu-
nity interest groups inhibit)the effectiveness of decen-
__ __ / , 
tralized federal policy in implementing urban change . 
The content of Chapter IV which is a survey of 
renewal case studies in twenty-four cities would be con­
s idered the most significant portion of the data used in 
this study; though in a qualitative study of this nature 
the entire manuscript is composed of various data from 
� 
various sources . 
The procedure involved surveying all sources for 
case studies on decis ion-making or citizen participation 
in urban redevelopment and objectively evaluating the 
decision-making proces s .  For the purpose of conserving 
time and space and avoiding much repetitious reading, 
only twelve of the twenty-four cities surveyed will be· 
discussed . For the convenience of the reader the author 
has devised an evaluative chart of the t welve cities not 
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discussed which can be found in Appendix A .  The chart 
is divided into certain categories which were found to 
be prominent throughout the various case studies . 
The author refers to essays and s tudies by urban 
planners and the findin3s of the controversial Bosselman 
Report to demonstrate the feas ibility and need for a 
more centralized form of decision-making in urban planning. 
As with most studies of this type , the reader should be 
warned of various cautions to be taken before drawing any 
conclus ions of his own or accepting any conclusions drawn 
by the author. Firs t ,  the reader is reminded that ,  al­
thou3h objectivity has been a major goal throu�hout this 
study, there is no way of being certain that the findings 
of others are equally objectiva. Secondly, there is a 
great deal of material published that may contradict the 
findings cf this research which are not dealt w ith in­
dividually at any s ignificant length in this s tudy . It 
might also be pointed out , however, that though the case 
studies 1.n this report are taken from secondary sources , 
it is of s ome value that they are representative of a 
wide variety of authors whereby tbey are jus t as likely 
to be biased in favor of present renewal policies as 
against them. For obvious reasons , politicians are always 
anxious to have success stories published on their behalf.  
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It appeared, however, that sources that were seemingly 
intended to make certain urban renewal programs look 
good, were in effect self-defeating and very few in 
number. 
Finally, the s tudy covers too wide a scope to 
be accepted without a great deal of equivocation and 
further inves tigation through either quantitative re­
search or other sources . It is the author ' s  hope in 
having this inves tigation to initiate or perhaps in some 
small way add stimulation to a closer working associa­
tion between what has been revealed through the works of 
power theoris ts ,  through the quantitative findings of 
com unity power s tudies,  and through our past and present 
experiences in urban renewal s o  that an urban policy can 
be developed that will truly activate the resources 
available to us . Aware that such a wide area has been 
covered, the reader should realize no one particular por­
t!on of this area could be covered extensively within the 
time afforded the researcher to complete the s tudy itself. 
CHAPTER II :  COMMON METROPOLITAN PORBLEMS 
Anyone who bas ever spent a day in the inner 
city of one of our major metropolitan areas could very 
easily experience many of our major urban problems . 
Perhaps an example of a purely hypothetical but highly 
possib le routine of events on a typical Chicago day 
will illustrate my point . 
You ' ve just moved to the far Northwest side of 
Chicago. You ' ve been in the Loop (downtown business 
district) once , two days ago for a job interview; it 
was the middle of the afternoon and since you live just 
off the Kennedy Expressway the ride took only fifteen 
minutes . Today you are beginning your newly acquired 
nine-to-five job and you decide to leave at 3:30 t o  
impress your boss by getting t o  work fifteen minutes 
early. As you enter the Kennedy you suddenly realize 
that the sixty miles per hour of two days ago has been 
reduced to a meager bumper-to-bumper five miles per hour 
and sometimes a dead standstill--it ' s  rush hour and 
what ' s  more there ' s  a stalled car in one of . the lanes . 
At 9:45 you pull into the underground parking trying · 
to think of what you are going to say to your boss and 
consequently forget to mark the location of your car . 
After work you spend about an hour and a half trying to 
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locate your car unaware of the fact that you are not in 
the correct underground level let alone the proper sec-
tion. In your frustration and confusion .you decide to  
take the "L" home . Upon receiving only fifty cents 
change you ask the cashier if perhaps he has short-
changed you and he assures you that he has not .  Never 
having been' on the "L" before, as is quite common for 
beginning commuters you get on going the wrong direction. 
Being very tired you fall as leep. Waking up a half hour 
later , you peer out your window at a small portion of 
the decrepitness of the south s ide . Whether or not you 
get mugged,  whether or not you ever see the Cabrini 
homes just east of the Kennedy or go far enough south 
to really learn what pollution smells like , you've had 
' a very educational day. You've experienced the time 
consuming struggle of rush hour traffic congention and 
most likely a great deal of the exhaust that goes with 
it .  You ' ve experienced the exhorbitant prices of public 
transportation upon which the poor depend a great deal 
for inner city mobility. You've seen at least . a part 
of the south s ide , its poverty and perhaps even noticed 
a school building or two with their boarded up windows ; 
and unless you are blind you certainly noticed that the 
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south s ide consists of black people only--a world apart 
from your northwest s ide middle class neighborhood where 
everyone is white . 
What is the seriousness of these problems , and 
just how real and widespread are they? In 1965, in 
certain blighted areas of our cities , infant mortality 
ratios were over forty per t housand as compared to ten 
in many of our better neighborhoods and twenty-four and 
seven-tenths nationw ide .I/ A great percentage of this 
infant mortality is black , not only because they cannot 
afford the proper care , but because there are still many 
cases of discrimination against them whereby services 
that should be granted everyone are denied them on the 
basis of so  called "hospital policy11 or 11regulations " .  
As a child grows up he i s  cast into an educa­
tional s ystem that badly lacks the facilities needed 
to adequately provide him with the educational stimulus 
that is vital for survival in our present fast moving 
complex society . 
11 • • • educational expenditures of central 
cities are considerably below those in 
suburban towns , not only on a per capita 
basis but on a per pupil basi s .  Yet, the 
local tax burden in the central cities ,  
7noris B .  Holleb, Social and Economic Infor­
mation for Urban Planning, (Chicago, 1969), p .  20. 
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measured against �ncome, is more than fifty 
percent greater than in the suburbs.11§/ 
That our city is plagued with compounding prob-
lems is nothing new . Ernest Erber quotes J .  L .  Sert 
who wrote Can Our Cities Survive? twenty-eight years 
" . o • the ci t�r is breaking up o Such dis-
pers ion of great cities knows neither control 
nor planning. It is provoked by urban chaos 
itself, and is facilitated by modern means 
of tra:-1sportation .. "2/ 
Today our complex expressway systems have de-emphasized 
the importance of public transportation. The expressway 
system has not, however, stifled the dispersion of the 
city. To the contrary, it has increased it and brought 
with it the additional problems of increased pollution, 
displaced people because of land usage , higher inner 
city transit fares, and with the continued migration of 
the middle class whites out of the city (made possible 
by expressway transportation) ,  a lower inner city tax 
base. The author is not proposing transportation as our 
major source of urban problems . He is merely emphasizing 
the fact that though the problems of the city were recoe-
nized and written about by men such as Sert, nothing has 
been done in a comprehensive manner to solve these prob-
8Ibia, p .  33. 
9Ernest Erber, Introduction, Urban PlanninB in 
Transition, (New York, 1910), Po xiv. 
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lems . In the words of Doris Holleb:  
"At the Metropolitan level,  which is  one 
'Comprehens ive ' in a geographic sense, the 
range of planning activities is usually 
narrowo It has been largely confined to 
what is generalt� 1called ' functional ' planning o • • 1112..r 
The following section will reaffirm the fact 
that our metropolitan areas have problems and will show 
the relationship of many of these problems to their most 
deeply rooted source--poverty. 
Automation, Migration1 and Poverty: 
Theoretical and His torical Background 
Contrary to what many people may believe, inad-
equate housing is certainly not a twentieth century 
phenomena . Some authors trace housing problems back to 
the early settlements when people had no housing at all 
and had to build lean-tos for temporary protection from 
the weather. The major concern of this study, however, 
is urban housing , and again it must be stated that it 
is not a recent problem. Eighteenth century residents 
of major cities such as Philadelphia, New York, and 
'Boston were already moving out of the city toward what 
we know today as the suburbs. Glenn Beyer in his book, 
Housing and Society, speculates that they were at that 
10noris B. Holleb, Social and Economic Infor­
mation for Urban Planning, (Chicago, 19b9), p.lO. 
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t ime beginning to move for many of the same reasons 
that people today flee from the central cities . Nine­
teenth century industrialization made migrating expla-
nations more obvious . With the expanding and over­
crowding of the cities, more and more people sought ref­
uge in the suburbs to escape the rapidly growing deplor­
able conditions . The multi-directional flux of people 
beginning with the massive growth of Nineteenth century 
industrialism, made adequate housing facilities at that 
time an almost impossible reality. Foreigners were 
either being repelled by some adversive force in their 
own country or attracted by the promise of opportunity 
afforded them by industrialization ' s  demand for labor 
in the large cities of the United States . Eventually 
rural people also began to migrate to�ard the large 
industrial areas in hope of finding work. Between 1910 
and 1920, the United States passed the mid-point toward 
being more urban than rural.!..!/ From 1820 to 1950, 
forty million immigrants found their way to the United 
States;  the overwhelming majority of which settled in 
the larger industrial citie s .  As new generations of 
American born people were added to the population growth 
lla1enn H .  Beyer , Housing and Societi, 
(New York, 1965) ,  p. 33. 
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and immigration began to taper off, the amount of for­
eign born people in the United States decreasedo In 
1920 , one out of eight Americans were foreign born, in 
1940 one out of eleven and in 1960, one out of every 
fifteen.!,g/ These statistics might lead one to believe 
that the pressure was finally being taken off the in-
credible housing demands of our cities . Unfortunately, 
the statistics are somewhat deceptive in that respect , 
for though the amount of immigration began t o  decrease,  
the amount of American born people was increasing in 
number and rate.  More important still was that the 
rapidly increasing automation of agricultural and mining 
areas stimulated a new wave of migratory trends toward 
the low income, already overcrowded, areas of the city. 
As Shannon and Shannon point out in their, The Assimi­
lation of Migrants to Citie s ,  the effects o f  rural t o  
urban migration in this country are far from insignifi­
cant grounds for intensive obs.ervation and study of 
migratory trends . 
"Quite apart from either real or per­
ceived benefits ,  or added life burdens for 
individual migrants ,  the nature of contact 
and interaction between either new arrivals 
and members of the urban society, or between 
different ethnic and racial groups within 
12Lyle Wo Shannon and . Magdaline Shannon, 
The Assimilation of Migrants to Cities , ed . Schoore Fagin, 
vof.1, pp. 49-75, (California, 1967), pp. 49, 50. 
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urban society, indicates that far reaching· 
public consequences of both earlier and 
latter-day populat t �� movements are contin­
uing to generate . "Th 
The authors make more explicit their emphasis 
of the poor s outhern whites , blacks and Mexican-Americans 
movement to the urban areas when they state: 
·�ere one selecting a laboratory for the 
study of migration, and the process of ac�· 
culturation and assimilation in individuals 
and groups that takes place as a consequence,  
there would be  no better setting than Northern 
industrial cities , the way stations to which 
migrants first move , a�g 1the depressed areas from which they came.11:.::::.1 
The overemphasis on efficiency and capital gains 
by the large land and mine owners epitomized the need 
for controlled change through social planning--an area 
to be dealt with more specifically in a later chapter 
of this study. The additional burden of the rural migrant 
to the cities has had devastating effects on the migrant 
as well as the urban area to which he migrateso 
"Modern agriculture is indeed a proud 
accomplishment, but it has left a s ocial 
skeleton in the closeto In the United States 
the rapid growth of productivity per acre and 
per man s ince the 1930 ' s  has cut in half the 
number of far.ms , 
• • o 11!2/ 
13Ibid . ,  p .  50. 
14Ibid . ,  p .  51. 
15Kenneth R .  Schneider, Destin� of Change , 
{Chicago, 1968) , p .  29.  
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The above quote could just as well have been 
said in regard to mining automation. During the 1950 ' s  
the deep .coal miners of the Appalachian areas (such as 
parts of Pennsylvania and Virginia) were being either 
automated or replaced by strip mining. Thousands of 
people were forced to give up the only type of work 
they had known for the greatest part of their lives and 
search for industrial jobs in the city . Consequently, 
many of the mining towns were deserted and taken com-
pletely out of the housing cycle, creating a new demand 
on housing needs . 
Kenneth Schneider in Destiny of Change takes a 
seemingly cold but most likely realistic point of view 
concerning the plight of the rural-urban migrant . 
Schneider believes that the decision of the farm worker 
to move to the city was one of choosing the worst of two 
evils. He terms the movement of the agricultural worker 
(similarly applicable to the miner) as one of "premature 
migration" and explains his choice of terminology as 
follows: 
"If a rural person is underemployed but 
requires very little in paid •services• he 
is not much of a burden on the resources 
applicable to development . But if he mi­
grates to a city and is unemployed there , 
where he must be sustained by more complete 
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and sophisticated services , he becomes a 
heavier drain upon the small and struggling 
modern sector of the economy . "1§/ 
Schneide r ' s  assessment of the rural to urban 
migratory consequences may or may not be empirically 
accurate . It is not likely, however, that an individ-
ual would leave his familiar environment and the only 
life he knows without good reason. His existing situ-
ation must have been such that even a long move to an 
unfamiliar place seemed worth taking a chance . Hence, 
the value in Schneider ' s  statement lies in his inad-
vertent criticism of the general lack of perception and 
control in regard to innovative and technological change . 
Bernard Weissbourd openly criticizes our lack 
of foresight (possibly concern) when he s tates "The 
disproportionate amount of the federal budget alloted to 
agriculture has helpGd bring about the mechanization of 
the farm and speeded up the migration of both Negro and 
white farm labor to the city. "11/ 
Another noteworthy result of technological change 
was the effect that it had on the upper class of the 
urban areas . With the influx of migrants and immigrants ,  
the upper class city dweller who maintained his business 
16Ibid . , p .  173 . 
17Bernard Weissbourd , "Segregation, Subsidies , 
and Megalopolis , "  in Urbanism in Worl'd Perspectives: 
A Reader, ed .  Sylvia Fleis Fava (New York, 1968} , p .  547. 
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affairs in the city was forced to either be a part of 
the overcrowded, rapidly degenerating city or move to 
the outer fringe . When migration first started toward 
the suburbs , only a select wealthy few were able to 
afford the expenses of transportation. 
''Residence in the early suburbs was lim­
ited to those who could afford to live away 
from the city and were financially able to 
maintain some means of transportation between 
the city and their homes. As railroads or 
trolleys came to be provided, wealthy citi­
zens built estates within driving or walking 
distances of them. "!§/ 
Technological advancements made migration to the suburbs 
available on a wider scale for the upper and upper middle 
class people . Innovation such as the septic tank to 
replace the cess pool made sanitation possible on a larger 
scale . More efficient house building played an important 
role in meeting the suburban housing demands . Construe-
tion companies found it most profitable and convenient 
to build several homes in a particular area at the same 
time . Techniques in building massive highway systems 
and the mass production of the automobile alleviated the 
expensive transportation problem. Though many people 
believe that the extensive use of the automobile for com-
muting purposes is currently more of a problem than the 
1801enn H. Beyer, Housing and Society, 
(New York) ,  p .  360 .  
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problem it alleviated, there is little doubt that it 
was extremely instrumental in freeing the upper middle 
class whites from the central city . To quote Glenn 
Beyer: "The automobile was very likely, the one techno-
logical improvement that made living in suburbs feasible 
for large numbers of people . "12/ 
Beyer quotes Martin Meyerson, Barbara Terreth, 
and William L .  c .  Wheaton ' s  book, Housing, People, and 
Cities, to point out that though many people consider the 
move to the suburbs an additional luxury, it is believed 
by some that it was s imply . the result of choosing the 
lesser of the two evils , i . e . ,  commuting everyday from 
the distant suburbs or living in the rapidly changing 
overcrowded city . gg/ Eventually, there was an addition-
al incentive given to the middle class whites to leave 
the central city, which added additional ramifications 
to the plight of the poor. 
" • • •  federal housing subsidies, which, pur­
ported to be neutral, have in fact subsidized 
low-density middle income living in the sub­
urbs and have thereby financed the flight of 
white populations from the city."g_lj 
19Ibid .,  Pe 362 .  
20Ibid .. 
21Bernard Weissbourd, "Segregation, Subsidies, 
and Megalopolis,"  in Urbanism in World Perspectives: 
A Reader, ed .  Sylvia Fleis Fava (Ne� York, I968) , p. 540. 
-31-
This phenomena added a fresh spin to the poverty cycle 
for with them, in their flight to the suburbs , the 
middle class whites took their tax revenues, thereby 
depleting considerably the inner city tax base. As the 
situation evolved the old song phrase "the rich get 
richer and the poor get poorer"  became a living reality 
as exemplified by the following quote from Hans Blumenfeld : 
"A family with an · annual income of $3 ,000 is likely to 
pay 6 percent of it for real estate taxes , one with a 
$30,000 income , about 2 percent of its income . "W' Thoi.:gh 
a greater portion of the lower income family 's  pay is 
taken (6%) as compared to the upper middle class family 's  
(2%) ; the lower income family contributing much less to 
the services of his community--$180 as compared to the 
$600 contributed to the community in which the upper 
middle class individual lives . The true paradox of this 
entire phenomenon lies in the obvious fact that "Poor 
people can pay only little in taxes and need many services. 
Wealthy people pay higher taxes and need fewer services. "23/ 
As was earlier pointed out by the quote from Doris Holleb, 
education is no exception to the consequences of the de-
22Hans Blumenfeld,  "The Rational Use of Urban 
Space as National Policy, " in Urban Planning in Trans­
action, ed . Ernest Erber (New York, 1976), p .  9b . 
23Ibid.  
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manding inner city tax bas e .  The importance of education 
in our s ociety I am s ure must be realized by all ,  espe-
cially those who have little of it . The less education 
one has today, the less are his chances of finding a job . 
One can easily see the cyclical consequences of this phe­
nomenon . With little education and training upon entering 
the city the poor cannot obtain jobs . Without jobs they 
become dependent upon the welfare system and inner-city 
low income housing which subsequently immobilizes them . 
With the increasing amount of s lums , the middle class es-
cape to the s uburbs causing the inner-city tax base to 
decrease considerably . The poor who for the most part are 
the only remaining source of revenue cannot adequately 
provide a revenue base s ufficient for their needed services , 
foremost of which is education. A s  the educational system 
depreciates s o  do the chances of each s ucceeding generation 
of getting a good job and gaining the mobility that their 
parents lacked .  Chester Hartman s uggests there are twelve 
million United States families living below acceptable 
standards : 
"It is absolutely clear to  all but the 
most resistent that the vast majority of 
these twelve million families are not going 
to secure decent housing through the pro­
cess of • normal ' mobility, and that existing 
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government programs to aid this sector 
of the population are hopelessly inade­
quate to the task, qualitatively as well 
as quantitatively . 1124/ 
In addition to the lower inner-city tax base ,  
mobilization of the middle class caused massive rush 
hour transportation problems s ince the middle class con­
tinue to hold inner-city business and office jobs . While 
expressway transportation allowed for the es cape of thG 
middle class from the s lums, it also allowed for their 
escape from pollution which, due to old and massive 
industrial techniques ,  is concentrated within or close 
to the inner-city. The expressway transportation not 
only left the poor to wallow in the already existing 
pollution but added an additional source of pollution . 
The following flow diagram roughly illustrates the above 
described cycle of which urban poverty is the base or 
independent variable with automation, industrialization 
and migration as anticedent conditions. The latter men-
tioned variables are anticedents s imply because putting 
an end to them will not necessarily alter s ignificantly 
the already existing cycle . 
24Chester W .  Hartman, "The Politics of Housing , "  
in Political Power and the Urban Crisis , ed .  Alan Shank . 
(Boston, f969) , p .  434. 
(The programs loosely referred to in this section will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter III. ) 
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Hence , we have briefly explored the various 
migratory trends that brought the poor to their still 
existing predicament in the inner-city. The important 
thing to remember from this section is that automation 
sent thousands of people sc�rrying to the cities in search 
of jobs where few jobs were to be had that fit the agri-
cultural worker or miners ' qualifications . Without an 
adequate income , these people could not afford to buy or 
rent a decent home and were forced into overcrowded sub-
standard conditions . 
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As Clifford Jansen points out in his book, 
Raacings in the Sociology of Migration, there are two 
major causes of geo�raphical population movements : 
1 )  a need to leave in spite of or beyond economic fac-
tors (e . E . ,  political or relieious reasons ) ,  2 )  economic 
factors .� The latter category is the dominatin5 force 
behind the bulk of the internal migration of the United 
States . The southern farm worker or miner who is left 
' 
without a job as a result of automation is being both 
pushed by the lack of economic opportunity at his present 
location and pulled by the possibility of higher welfare 
payments and/or finding industrial work in the city. 
Unfortunately , the latter possibility is not a very bi� 
one and with each additional mierant ,  it becomes notice-
ably smaller . For according to Dick Netzer in Economic 
and Urban P�oblems, since 1950 ninety percent of all 
employment opportunities in the United States has been 
in white-collar posit ions . g,§/ Training programs such 
as the Job Corps have attempted to alleviate the problem 
of unskilled or limited skilled unemployed workers . 
Success, however, has been rather modest in comparison 
to the perpetual job demands that continue to arise . 
25c11fford Jansen, Readin�s in the Sociology of 
Mieration, (New York, 1970 ) ,  p .  39. 
26Dick Netzer, Economic and Urban Problems , 
(New York, 1970 ) ,  p .  1 1  • 
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Another recent attempt to find a place for the poor has 
been in the form of mediators between profess ionals and 
their clients . This is an effort to provide communication 
between the highly professional and non-professional and 
at the same time provide an additional employment oppor­
tunity .gz/ Again, the results are far from being realized 
as a viable solution to hard core unemployment . 
"Differences between the urban North and 
rural South and Southwest have been accen­
tuated over a period of time. The transi­
tional process from labor -- intensive 
production with skilled or unskilled labor, 
to mass production and assembly lines ,  and 
finally to automation, has had as its con­
sequences for urban dwellers , a rather 
continuous upward movement in the occupational 
hierarchy. Traditionally this has left posi­
tions at the lowest level for new arrivals , 
but the lowest levels have also been moving up 
in terms of the years of formal education re­
quired for a regular place in the economic 
order.  This also means that the proportion 
of workers that can be absorbed into the eco­
nomy as comgletely unskilled laborers is de­
creasing. "g§/ 
While migration is a consequence of economic 
factors , overcrowded , s ubstandard housing is a conse­
quence of both economic factors and migration. There 
is somewhat of a parallel between housing and the above 
stated quote which will be illustrated in the forthcoming 
27 charles Grosser, William E.  Henry, and James G. 
Kelly , Nonprofessionals in the Human Services,  (San 
Francisco, 19o9). 
28Lyle W .  Shannon and Ma�daline Shannon, "The 
Assimilation of Migrants to Cities , "  e d .  Schoore Fagin, 
vol . 1 .  pp. 49-75, (California , 1967) ,  p. 35. 
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sections on housing sequences .  Statis tically, however,  
there is more than just a parallel between economic 
status and subs tandard housing; there is a direct cor­
relation. 
Substandard Housing: Limited Housing Seguences 
The quote toward the end of the preceding . section 
pointed out that in theory when economic opportunity has 
upward mobility those filling the new , top pos itions 
should be leaving vacancies for advancement on down the 
income scale . In reality, however , those at the bottom 
of the income scale are stagnating because of the constant 
influx of young, better educated men who by their own 
credentials raise the standards of the position they fill 
thus making it even more difficult for less educated, 
lower income people to advance to that position or one 
s imilar to it . 
Lansing, Clifton, and Morgan in their book enti­
tled New Homes and Poor People describe hous ing as a 
s imilar sequential phenomenon . One might logically ratio­
nalize s ince 70 per cent of all people who move, move into 
more expens ive homes,  that when a man with a $20 ,000 
annual income builds a new $30 , 000 home he is leaving an 
indefinite chain of vacancies on down the income scale 
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each of which when filled will represent a move upward 
in the quality of housing. The following hypothetical 
flow diagram where each capital letter represents a· home 
illustrates the thinking behind the above statement : 
DIAGRAM B 
New 
A --- B ---i> C ---'> D ---=.> E ----4F 
30,000 25,000 20, 000 15, 000 10 , 000 5 , 000 Cost 
As one can see , the new home owner of (A ) 
caused a vacancy when he moved out of (B) and the person 
moving into (B) made (C) available and s o  on down the 
line with each less expensive house being available to 
a lower income person. 
The chart below, followed by three general rules 
for buying a home , will be an aid in ·explaining the 
error involved in Diagram B.  Chart A indicates the 
percentage distribution of homes among varied price 
ranges in each of six or more sequential positions . 
0 
0 
z 
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Glenn Beyer, in his book entitled Hous inG and 
Society, suggests the following: 
1 .  A home buyer should pay no more than two 
or two and one-half times his annual 
income . 
2 .  One month ' s  house expenses should not 
exceed one week ' s  pay, or between twenty 
and twenty-five percent of his monthly 
income . · 
3·. One week ' s  pay should equal or.e pe:;.,.,cent 
of the price of the house 1  i . e . ,  $60 a 
week· for a $6,ooo house ,  �100 for a 
$10 , 000 house .� 
According to these standards , a person making 
five thousand dollars annually or less would be in the 
market for a home worth approximately ten thousand 
dollars o As is evidenced by Chart A ,  there is a low 
percentage of housing available at that price range in 
any position in the sequence and the mean price for homes 
for the sequence pos itions below the fifth is $17, 300--
a considerable amount more than the. ten thousand afforded.  
In most metropolitan areas (these statistics were taken 
from seventeen major United States metropolitan areas ) 
not only are there few homes available in the ten thousand 
dollar bracket , but the quality of a home in that price 
ran6e is extremely questionable in itself . Accordir.g to  
29a1enn H .  Beyer, Housing and Society, (New York, 
1 965 ), p. 67 . 
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the 1960 census , eighteen percent of all occupied housin� 
is substandard. 
" • • •  Based on a definition which would 
count almost any watertight building with 
indoor plumbing as standard . An additional 
8 percent were described as ' deteriorating' 
and were for the most part barely livable ; 
12 percent had more than o�e person per 
room and were so overcrowded that tr.eir 
occupants were undeniably ill-housed . "lQ/ 
It can also be seen from Chart A that very few new homes 
are built under a cost of $15 , 000 (also note the mean 
cost of new homes is $25, 900) . Consequently, people who 
have an income which affords them a home for less than 
$15,000 are dependent on the lower sequence positions , 
i oe . ,  the 101/ler the income , the lower the sequence that 
one must depend on for a home . This phenomenon might not 
be so strikingly important if there indeed were a con-
tinuous number of positions made avail.able by each new 
sequence.  Unfortunately, this is not the case .  It was 
found that out of a sample of 1 , 000 new home owners , 
2 3 . 8  percent , i . e . ,  238 of the 1 , 000 left no vacancy 
behind when they moved into their new home . When the re­
maining 762 vacancies were filled, only 554 remained . The 
last of the (for the most part) short-lived sequences 
30Robert Taggart, III, Low-Income Housin3: A 
Crit ique of Federal Aid, (Baltimore , 1"970), p .  �. 
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(i . e . ,  close to 70 percent ended at the fifth pos ition) 
ended at the nineteenth pos ition. Only 18 .2  percent 
remained by the s ixth position. The following chart 
illustrates the complete res ults of the sample .31/ 
Sequence 
Position* 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 . 
7 
8 
9 
r 
I 
! 
I 
; 
Houses 
Available 
1 , 000 
762 
554 
372 
260 
182 
127 
89 
62 
Chart B 
-
Sequence 
Position 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
I .  
I 
I 
I I 
Houses 
Available 
30 
21 
15 
10 
7 
5 
3 
2 
1 
I 
I 
10 43 . 
__ _,_ ___ J --1 
20 I 0 
1 i -� 
3 1John .B. Lansing, Charles Wade Clifton, and 
James N .  Morgan, New Homes and Poor Peo2le, (Michigan, 
1969) , p .  14 .  
*Sequence position equals the group of houses made av­
ailable by people moving into the next lowest group. For 
example,  position 1 equals 1 , 000 new homes and position 
2 equals 762 homes vacated by the people moving into the 
1 , 000 new homes . 
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Chart A points out that the greatest percentage 
of houses in most sequences including the s ixth and below 
are in the $15, 000 - $20 , 000 bracket which according to  
Beyer ' s  standards is  equivalent to a $7, 000 - $10, 000 
income . It was pointed out earlier that circumstances 
would be extremely difficult for a person making $5, 000 
annually to  find adequate housing within his range . Ac­
cording to the President ' s  Committee on Urban Housing of 
1969, "There are approximately 7 . 8  million households 
unable to afford decent housing, even after giving account 
to existing s ubsidized units . "Jg/ Of the. 7 . 8  million, 
about 50 percent make under $3 , 000 annually, (which unt il 
recently was considered to  be the federal poverty leve l ;  
now it i s  $3 , 968 for a .family o f  four ) . If decent housing 
is difficult to  find for someone with a $5,000 income , 
consider the problem that the millions making under $3, 000 
annually are faced with. Since poorer people have more 
difficulty in finding adequate housing, they invariably 
wind up living in a terribly decrepit or overcrowded 
home as indicated by the 7 . 8  million who are poorly housed 
or by going way beyond their means to afford a more ade­
quate living unit .  Consequently, it is not uncommon to  
find people who can least afford high housing costs paying 
32The President ' s  Committee on Urban Housing, 
A Decent Home , (Washington, D . C . �  1969) , p .  50. 
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well beyond 30 percent of their monthly income for housing 
as opposed to the recommended 20 to 25 percent . The just 
mentioned phenomenon in hous ing is described by Glenn 
Beyer when he refers to what is known as Schwabe ' s  Law : 
" • • •  expenditures for hous ing increase with increases 
in family income , but at a slower rate as income in­
creases . "ll/ The key to this statement is "s lower rate " 
as exemplified by Beyer in the following s tatistics from 
upstate New York between 1957 and 1962 : the median price 
paid for a house for a family with an annual income of 
$3 , 500 was $10,320, which is about three t imes the income . 
On the other hand , the median price paid for families with 
an annual median income of $15 ,000 was $29, 000 which is 
about 1 . 7  times the income .� Hence , one can see through 
this example of housing, a very common consequence of 
poverty, i . e . ,  the · smaller the total income the greater 
the percentage of that income that goes ' into a fixed cost 
which still typically yields substandard results . A very 
close parallel can be drawn between housing costs and the 
inner-city tax bas e .  Although, as noted previously, the 
lower income inner-city individual pays a greater per-
33a1enn H. Beyer, Housin� and Society, (New York, 
1965 ) ,  p .  67 • 
34Ibid . ,  p .  362 
-45-
centage of his income for taxes than the s uburbanite, he 
pays much less in actual tax dollars ; thus , there is less 
money available for services despite the fact that his 
needs are greater than those of the s uburbanite . 
As indicated by Chart B, one of the major housing 
problems of the poor lies in the fact that too many 
housin� sequences end before they are extended into the 
lower income person ' s  price range . What are some of the 
causal factors that explain the shortness of most hous ing 
sequences? According to  Lansing, Clifton, and Morgan, 
there are two main reasons for a sequence coming to an 
end : 1 )  the housing unit may be removed from the stock 
of housing, i . e . ,  it may be destroyed, turned into a ware­
house ,  s ummer cottage , etc . ;  2 )  people moving into the 
last opening may not leave another opening (young people 
leaving home , etc. ) .  A third category, not quite as 
s ignificant as the just mentioned categories is that of 
people moving into hous ing from institutions or from 
outside the United States . An outline form breakdown of 
these three categories would be as follows : 
I .  20% removed from housing stock 
a .  1% accidentally (fire or storm ) 
b .  8% deliberately for highways , parks , etc.  
c .  4% remodeled to become part of a larger 
unit 
a .  3% converted to non-residential purposes 
e .  4% seasonal occupancy 
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I I .  63% no vacancy left behind 
III. 
a .  47% newlywens living previously with 
parents 
b.  14% living with other relatives 
c .  2% resir.ents s plit up (e .g . , college 
stu0ents or 0ivorcees . )  
17% came from ins titutions or outs i�e of 
Uniteo States .35/ 
With so many famil�es being displaced,  anc so 
many new families looking for homes , one can see why the 
moderate income quality home is seldom exposed to the 
buying power of the lower income people . The amount of 
housing destroyed alone has a striking effect on the 
extremely lower income family and his ability to find 
housing even of the quality that might be expected from 
his own conceivable price range . 
Housing is s imply not being produced rapidly 
enough to s ufficiently meet the rapidly growing housing 
demands . A projected estimate of housing needs by 1978 
taken from the President ' s  Committee on Urban Hous ing 
is as follows : 
13 . 4  million units for new young families 
8 . 7  million units to  replace or rehabilitate homes 
3 . 0  million units to replace standard units 
�estroyed for land use 
1 . 6  million to allow for vacancies for mobility36/ 
35John B .  Lansing, Charles Waae Clifton, anr James 
N .  Morgan, New Homes anr Poor PeoRle, (Michigan, 1969) , 
pp . 11-13 . 
36The President ' s  Committee on Urban Housing, 
A Decent Home , (Washington, D . C . �  1969) , p .  8.  
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The Hous ing Act  of 1968 set a goal of s ix 
million s ubsidized units to be provided by 1978 . Ac-
cording to Robert Taggart , author of Low Income Housin�: 
A Critique of Federal Aid, however, " • • •  at present 
rates of produc�ion for subsidized units we will be lucky 
to reach half of thj.s total .  "Yl/ If Taggart ' s estimation 
is accurate , then we will be subsidizing half of the goal 
of s ix million, which in the final analysis comes out to  
be less than 12 percent of the President ' s  Committee ' s  
projected 26 .7  million units needed by 1978.  The remain-
ins 88 percent is in the hands of private companies who 
without subsidies will naturally cate� to the middle and 
upper class housing needs . Since there most likely will 
not be nearly enough homes built to  fulfill even the new 
middle and upper class needs , the further sequence po-
sitions will continue to be filled with middle class 
income people, whereby the poor are forced to pay exor-
bitant portions of their income for s ubhuman living con ­
ditions . Fifty percent of all s lum citizens and twenty­
two percent of all other problem housing dwellers pay 
over thirty percent of their income in housing. � 
37nobert Taggart , III , Low-Income Hous ing : A 
Critique of Federal Aid, (Balt imore , !970), p .  570 
38rbia . ,  p .  23 . 
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Hence, the above information illustrates that 
there are many extraneous variables that interrupt the 
expected flow of hous ing sequences as presented in 
Diagram A .  A revised and perhaps s omewhat more accurate 
diagram of a housing sequence might be as follows : 
DIAGRAM C 
New 
A �--- B -<  C <  /I D <  II E 4-,--rt//�- F 
10,000 5,000 30,000 25, 000 20, 000 - 15, 000 
No vacancy � 
college gra0uate l�s 
parents home . 
Cos t 
11B11 moves into 1 1A" which is a new home . 
"C" moves into 11B" left vacant when the family 
moved into 11 A 11 • 11C 11 , however, is still occupied by the parents 
of the just married college gra�uate 
thereby leaving no further vacancies anr. 
stopping the sequence at position three . 
The lack of a vacancy left by 11C 11 is an example 
of many possible Z factors that could bring the sequence 
of vacancies to a halt .  Another example might be : 
A <:--- B �---
DIAGRAM D 
C --- D <:-.J/-- E < If F 
30,000 25, 000 20, 000 15,� 10, 000 5 ,000 Cost 
Hig���y  
Clearance 
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In this particular example , demolition for 
highway clearance destroys the fourth position house and 
the sequence as wel l .  Similar to highway clearance is 
urban renewal clearance where there is many times a several 
year lag between the clearance and the building of housing 
project s .  Many times the housing units are never replaced. 
This section thus far has illustrated the dis-
advantages of a poor person who is seeking a decent home . 
Perhaps an inquiry as to why a poor person needs to seek 
a better home is in order before continuing on to the 
next section, i . e . ,  '�hat does it mean to live in a sub-
standard home ? "  
There are many consequences to . living in over-
crowded substandard housing which probably can only be 
realized by those experiencing them. There remains , 
however, many effects which are undeniably obvious . 
Alvin Schorr in his book Slums and Social Insecurity 
discusses the housing problems that arise for the poor. 
He points out that it is difficult in s ome cases to eval-
uate overcrowded and substandard housing because of ethnic 
differences .12/ Many use ethnic differences as an excuse ,  
however, t o  justify what i s  in actuality substandard 
39Alvin L. Schorr, Slums and Social Insecurity, 
(Washington, D . C . , 1963 ) .  
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housing. For example it is believed that certain groups 
such as the Puerto Ricans enjoy closer living quarters 
more than most other groups . While this may be true to  
a certain extent because of previous conditions that they 
are accustomed to ,  it cannot be denied that they too 
s uffer the same cultural deprivation as anyone else under 
the same conditions . When any group of people immigrates 
or migrates to another country or culture the dominant 
culture exerts a great deal of pressure upon the minority 
group to become assimilated.  What usually takes place 
when a group moves to  a more advanced culture is that the 
minority group usually becomes ass imilated in aspirations 
long before it becomes assimilated in actual behavior. 
This is due in large part to the strong visual stimulus 
of such things as big cars and fancy homes which are the 
general results of a very complex and lengthy s ocializa­
tion process .  When a minority child goes to school in 
the United States , he learns more about what he does n ' t  
have (in relation t o  what is standard for most people ) 
than how to go about attaining the things he doesn ' t  have . 
Most likely people have some awarenes s  of the fact that 
they could be living a healthier life or they would not 
move to begin with. However, to be s urrounded by a higher 
standard of living with additional s ocial pressures and to  
aspire to  those standards without having the individual 
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means to  do so can be much worse than having the same 
individual means within a culture of lower expectations . 
One of the most fundamental results of inade-
quate housing is poor. health conditions . Schorr points 
out that unsanitary conditions due to inadequate plumbing 
and garbage disposal are contributing factors toward high 
amounts of disease .±Q/ Many times the diseases con­
tracted due to unsanitary conditions result in death 
because of inadequate health facilities and an inability 
on the part of the poor to afford treatment . As men­
tioned in the previous section, infant mortality ratios 
in s lums are clearly disproportionate to  the other areas 
of our cities and the nation as a whole . Poorly insu­
lated and poorly heated units represent additional health 
hazards in that occupants are unable to  experience suffi­
cient warmth during winter months . Mental health can 
also be affected by one ' s  housing situation .  Overcrowding 
can challenge one ' s  sense of individuality. It is be­
lieved by many that one needs to have the opportunity to 
be alone if he so desires in order to better assert him­
self as a total and . separate being. By s o  doing, one also 
is able to recognize and respect the individuality of 
-52-
others . As Schorr puts it ,  a child ' s  illusions about 
other people are challenged by overcrowding. Schorr 
also points out that clinical research has shown that 
overcrowded conditions present a challenge to any 11-
lusions a child may have about sex . By this is meant 
that sex is only understood on the. phys ical level when 
overexposed to a child who cannot recognize the poss ible 
emotional and psychological aspects of it . It is also 
difficult for one with an extremely limited environment 
to develop an objective understanding of the world and 
its problems . i!/ It seems entirely poss ible that a 
person overcome by constant inadequacies and limitations 
in his own life would have little desire to  even think 
about things that do not directly involve his personhood .  
There are different interpretations that involve 
different standards for the term "overcrowded housing " .  
In terms of space, Schorr presents three different means 
of determining overcrowdedness : 
1 .  Count of pers ons per bed (used in Great 
Britain during the nineteenth century ) .  
2 .  Four hundred square feet for one person, 
seven hundred and fifty for two, and one 
thousand for three, etc.  (Public Health 
Association, years ago) . 
41Ibid . 
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3 .  One and five-tenths or two persons per 
room or/bedroom is another early s tan­dara . 42 
Aside from crowding as it is measured in terms 
of space , there is also crowding in terms of usage, 
i 11 i II . e . ,  use crowd ng • "Use crowding" refers to  a sit-
uation where a room designated for a specific function 
or as a specific type such as a living room is out of 
necessity used for some other purpose . A common example 
of "use crowding" would be us ing a living room also as 
a bedroom. Whatever the type, overcrowdedness can lead 
to a general lack of rest whereby a person ' s  health is 
not only endangered but also his interpers onal relation-
ships with his family due to a resulting irritability. 
As was previously suggested, though some resi-
dents may not consider themselves to be overcrowded they 
still may be experiencing without realizing it ,  detri­
mental effects of their living conditions . Studies of 
people who move into more spacious housing have indi­
cated that noticeable changes occur within their families , 
i . e . ,  changes in their needs and inter-relationships . 
"This material suggests that it is not only social inter­
action that is influenced by a family ' s  location but the 
42rbia . ,  pp. 14-18. 
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nature of family relationships flow together; change in 
one changes the other. "!±1/ The author does not have the 
specific data which Schorr is eluding to  in the just 
given quote . It should be pointed out , however, that the 
results of such studies are tenuous unless all possible 
intervening variables are controlled such as change in 
social circles and income . 
Some people , however, are afraid to  move even if 
given the opportunity to  improve their conditions . For 
some there is a fear of being disoriented, out of place 
or unwelcome which in actuality are many times the results,  
particularly for black people . Old people have neighbor­
hood ties that have carried over s ince childhood and are 
especially fearful of having their neighborhood torn down 
for highrise buildings . "Thus , a categorical choice be­
tween space familiarity may elude us . Yet it becomes 
clear that one cannot assume that all families wish or 
should wish to move . This is in fact the policy issue at 
which the argument is usually : Renewal and relocation 
policies need to  take account of the families who do not 
wish to move . "� Many old neighborhoods that appear to 
be s lums are s imply run down and could be rehabilitated .  
43Ibid . ,  p .  28. 
44rb1a . ,  p .  22 . 
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By reviving a nei3hborhood rather than destroying it , 
the inhabitants can be spared the trauma of dislocation, 
disorientation and separation from friends and loved ones o 
If there is any way that adequate housing can be provided 
without changing the overall neighborhood , it should be 
given primary consideration . Schorr describes the sit-
uation as follows : 
"There is considerable attachment to 
the place itself . Relationships are iden­
tified with locality and it is difficult 
to conceive them separately. • • It is 
evident that, if they are moved,  many of 
these families would find it difficult to 
maintain their patterns of relationship . 0 
As locality and the extended family are no 
longer possible to be neighborhood centered 
and extended family centered at once . 112/ 
No longer being neighborhood centered and family 
centered at the same time means that old people whose 
primary relationships ·were with their families all of 
which were a part of a specific neighborhood, when forced 
to relocate must create new primary tie s .  Ole people 
are forced to mix more with other old people s ince their 
families can only visit them occasionally from other 
parts of the city. 
The poor are who Schorr refers to as "Block 
Dwellers " ,  and not really a part of the whole city . They 
do not feel comfortable anywhere but in their own small 
neighborhoods . 
451b1a . ,  pp. 28-29. 
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"The block dweller doesn ' t  cross the 
railroad tracks , let alone go up in the 
air, and never sees the mode l .  Conse­
quently, renewal brings to his neighbor-
hood not only change , in itself upsetting, 
but a wholly offensive arrangement of s pace-­
towering structures ,  streets that become 
public pathways and resist efforts to  posess 
them, but inside the houses privacy at any 
cos t . "� 
In s ummary, adequate hous ing and the facilities 
and services that should go along with it are extremely 
important for the well-being of any individual in our 
s ociety. We must also realize ,  however, the importance 
of neighborhood ties and an individual ' s  right to  choose 
where he wants to live . Most middle class white people 
are not threatened by the need to move because it is most 
likely that the place they are moving to is little dif­
ferent than the place left behind . This is not true of 
the poor, for they are in a unique neighborhood setting 
and any move out of that setting could mean having to 
change one ' s  total life s tyle . 
"In a sense ,  one can distinguish 
between the poor and the middle class 
by describing their competence to manage 
change . Those who are poor are more 
often at the mercy of events : They do 
not have the money, the contacts ,  or the 
attitudes which make it possible to bend 
46 8 Ibid . ,  p .  3 .  
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events to  their will.  Poor people are 
most often affected by housing change 
and least often in a position to influ­
ence it . "� 
Much has been done in the name of helping the 
poor, but the results clearly indicate that there have 
been ulterior motives involved whereby helping the poor 
has only been a guise for capital gains . The next sec­
tion deals with the progress ion of legislative changes 
that have taken place s ince early recognition of the 
problem of housing the poor . What follows is not in­
tended as an in depth s tudy of housing legislation but 
as a general outline to indicate that though legislative 
changes have been heading basically in the right direc­
tion, they are still slow and ineffective in determining 
adequate planned change . 
47Ibid . ,  p . 55. 
CHAPTER III : PLANNED URBAN CHANGE 
TO THE PRESENT : AVOIDING TiiE POOR 
Progress in the direction of hous ing the poor 
has oeen very s low . In fact , a socially conscious indi-
victual concerned with doing something for those who 
cannot help themselves today may find that his efforts 
are little more effective than they woula have been one 
hundred years ago .  The following two quotes illustrate 
my point : 
" • • •  the evils of the sys tem, due to 
forgetfulness of the poor, and the absence 
of sanitary regulations and advice , wers 
constantly increasing . Among s uch evils it 
enumerates filth, over-crowding, lack of 
privacy and domesticity, lack of ventila­
tion and lightin�, absence of s upervision 
and of sanitary regulations , a growing ten­
dency to build to greater height in stories , 
to build more rear houses , back to back 
with other buildin�s , to encroach further 
upon courts and alleys , narrowing them into 
unventilated , unliehted damp and well-like 
holes between the many storied front and 
rear tenement s .  The plans , construction 
and management of these houses had been left 
almost exclusively to the caprice and self­
ishness of men whose sole object had been 
to make small investm�mts and a borrowed 
capital pay enormous advances ,  without re­
gard to the tenants ' welfare or the uublic 
safety o "� • 
48Marcus T .  Reynolds ,  The Housine; of the Poor in 
American Cities,  (College Park, Maryiand, Id93); 
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"To destroy the homes and neighbor­
hoods of thousands of poor families in 
order to replace them with s o-called 
middle class housing is a crime little 
short of genocide . Tpere is no secret 
about the motives for this crime . They 
are spelled out in many urban renewal 
reports .  The purpose is to  improve the 
finance of the -city . "49/ 
The first quote given above was taken from a book 
written in 1893 called The Housing of the Poor . It was 
a comment on the 1863 Council of Hygiene and Public Health 
report . The second quote written by Hans Blumenfeld in 
1970 is indicative of the lingering lack of genuine com­
mitment (on the part of those in effective positions ) 
to�ard helping people in the greatest need of help . Most 
of the conditions described in the first quote above still 
exist today. Though legislation has provided some benefits 
for the poor, for the most part, it has merely provided 
new tools to be manipulated by politicians and private 
investors for the seeking of capital gains . 
Most of what was done in the way of housing did 
not involve the Federal Government until World War I when 
housing units were needed for war-workers . In 1918 two 
agencies known as the United States Shipping Board and 
the United States Housing Corporation in the Department 
49wentworth H .  Eldrid�e ,  "Toward a National Policy for Planning the Environment , in Urban Planning in 
Trans ition,  ed . Ernest  Erber (New YorK, I916J , p .  4. 
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of Labor built 16, 000 units to provide housing for 
people needed to work on war m�terials . Eventually, 
these units were bought by private owners and it wasn ' t  
until another major crisis that Federal attention was 
brought to  housing needs . The Great Depression precip-
itated the Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932 
and the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 . The 
first provided hous ing through Federal loans to corpora-
tions and the latter initiated s lum clearance and low-
cost housing. At about the same time , the Public Works 
Administration of the Department of the Interior attempted 
to stimulate housing by subsidiz ing private builders . 
When this failed, however,  it built some 20, 000 units 
distributed among fifty projects in thirty different 
cities . "P .W . A .  policies were sharply criticized by 
people who believed that , although it ought to be subsi­
dized by the Federal Government , public housing should be 
controlled locally. Eventually most of the P .W . A o  housing 
projects were deeded to local housing agencies . "2.Q/ 
This criticism of P .W . A .  for taking too direct of an 
approach to the housing problem may have changed the 
course of all subsidized housing legislation. The in-
fluence of the change forced upon P .W .A .  can still be seen 
50Martin Meyerson, Edward c. Banfield , Politics , 
Planning and the Public Interest ,  (New York, 1955), p .  I7 . 
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today in legis lators seemingly desperate attempts to 
maintain a politically decentralized approach to urban 
rehabilitation. 
The National Hous ing Act of 1934 ,  passed to 
stimulate construction and employment during the depres­
sion " • • •  created the Federal Housing Administration 
to  insure large-term, low downpayment mortgages to private 
individuals making home ownership poss ible for families 
of moderate income . "2l/ The Federal Savings and Loan 
Insurance Corporation was also established under this 
Act along with the Federal National Mortgage Association 
which were to  facilitate loaning institutions (the former) , 
and private mortgages in areas without institutions (the 
latter ) .  "All of these measures were intended to  increase 
and more equally distribute the flow of private funds 
into housing and to extend the poss ibility of home owner­
ship to moderate income families . ".2,g/ 
The Housing Act of 1937 is considered by many t o  
be the first true s ubsidy program. One thing seemingly 
apparent is that it offered s ubstantial evidence that the 
criticisms toward P . W . A .  were having a lasting effect . 
51Robert Taggart ,  III, Low-Income Hous in�: A 
Critique of Federal Aid, (Baltimore, 1970), pp. l-12 . 
52rbid . ,  p .  12 . 
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It " • • •  encouraged the creation by communities of 
independent , special purpose authorities chartered by 
the states and empowered to receive Federal grants and 
to build and manage housing . "2j/ This Act marks tr..e 
official beginning of a problem that is still very much 
a �art of our Urban Renewal Policies of today, i . e . ,  
local politicians and interest groups fighting over Fed ­
eral funds that are "supposed " to be for the benefit of 
the poor . The overall intentions behind this Act seemed 
to be geared primarily toward slum clearance . Unfortu-
nately in its fury to clear slums , the Act allowed very 
little provis ions for additional housing aside from what 
it attempted to replace . Eighty-nine percent of the 
activities resulting from this Act were on slum sites 
and only eleven percent on land already vacated . 2!±/  The 
Housing Act of 1937 subs idized public housing s o  that 
the tenants of housing built by local agencies could pay 
less rent . Such housing was so limited, however, in 
terms of the demands , that it was restricted to the 
"depression poor " ,  i . e . ,  those with temporary low incorr.es 
due to the extreme slowdown of the economy. The hard 
core poor or what Robert Taggart refers to as the "per-
53Martin Meyerson, Edward C .  Banfield, Poli tj_cs , 
Plannin3 and the Public Interest,  (New York, 1955), p .  I8 .  
54 Ibid . ,  P o  19 .  
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manently disadvantaged "  were in many cases only affected 
by being left homeless by s lum clearance . "Equivalent 
elimination" as it was called was to provide a one-to-one 
replacement of all s lum units . Between the time of 
clearance and rebuilding, however, many people were dis-
placed .  
The Veterans Administration also catered to  the 
middle and upper income families when it introduced its 
long-term, no downpayment mortg�ge plan in 1944 . But 
five years later the Housing Act of 1949 authorized 
810,000 units to be built over a s ix-year period. This 
is considered by s ome authors to  be the beginning of 
Urban Renewal . "Cities were given grants and loans fol"' 
urban renewal, with stress on improving the total envi­
ronment as well as building new housing. "2.2/ Federal 
aid was given to local authorities to · clear and redevelop 
entire areas . Unfortunately, with the bulk of the avail-
able energy being directed toward redevelopment, too 
little was done in the way of rehabilitating salvageable 
neighborhoods .2.§/ The success of the 1949 Housing Act 
55Robert Taggart , III, Low-Income Housin�: A 
Critique of Federal Aid,  (Baltimore , 1970), p .  13 • 
.. � 
' 
56Alvin L .  S chorr, Slums and Social Insecurity, 
(Washington, D . C . J  1963 ) ,  pp. 55-56. 
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Title I was also stifled by the opposition it met in 
many of the project s ite communities . 
"Between the passage of the Act (1949) 
and February , 1954, in at least 70 com­
munities (most of them small ones ) oppo­
nents of public housing brought the issue 
before the electorate in referenda or 
s imilar measures • • •  Where referenda 
took place, public housing lost in five 
cities for every three in which it won . "21/ 
Consequently, many local public authorities determined 
to assure their locality of the available federal funds , 
set out to  devise ways of circumventing their opposition. 
In many cases the local public authorities combined with 
the politicians such as the mayor to develop plans in­
tended to improve business or beautify the city. An 
example �f this is the A . B . C . D .  (Action for Boston Com­
munity Development ) .  City planners and the mayor of 
Boston anticipating oppos ition to  their proposals created 
their own opposition, i . e . ,  the A . B .C .D . , which they could 
indirectly manipulate to suit their own purposes .2.§/ 
Hence, the criticism of the centralized authority of the 
P .W . A . , which initiated a decentralization of power to 
local authorities in subsequent legislative acts may have 
been instrumental in causing a major setback for housing 
57Martin Meyerson, Edward c .  Banfield, Politics , 
Planning and the Public Interest ,  (New York, 1955), p .  24 . 
58stephen Thornstrom, Poverty, Plannin�, and 
Politics in the New Bos ton: The Origin of A.E.C.D. ,  
(New York, Ig55), p .  16b .  
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the poor. For now the actual goal of providing adequate 
housing was distorted and twisted by the various conflict­
ing interests of the local communities and the local 
authorities . One of the oldest local public authorities # 
the Chicago Housing Authorities ,  started in 1937 is a 
good case in point . 
"The Commiss ioners included a Jew , a 
Catholic ,  a Negro, a small businessman, a 
big businessman, a labor leader, and a 
social worker-intellectual • • •  the Com­
missioners were in varying degrees self­
conscious representatives of interest 
groups concerned with public housing . "59/ 
In 1945 Miss Wood , one of the original C .H .A .  Commiss ion­
ers , made the following speech which began by pointing out 
that : 
"Our principal goal should be to pro­
vide wholesome neighborhoods for the poor : 
You do not make plans that show the blighted 
area rebuilt for the purpose of restoring 
purchasing power to the central business 
districts . • • You do not make plans for 
the purpose of restoring municipal income . 
You do not draw plans for the purpose of 
giving private enterprise new areas in 
which to operate its business .  The plans 
cannot be directed or prejudiced by any 
s ingle wish or objective , however respect­
able and right that wish may be . They must 
be related to the realities I have describea . "§2/ 
59Martin Meyerson and Edward C .  Banfield , Politics, 
Planning and the Public Interest,  (New York, 1955 ) ,  
pp. 49-50. 
60Ibid . ,  p. 156. 
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After many Urban Renewal failures ,  policy-makers 
began to  recognize the problems that were preventing the 
needed urban changes .  It was obvious that conflicting 
interests  were causing either diffuse power to  the point 
of little or no change, political power-plays whereby 
politicians , local authorities and/or influentials unite 
to overcome opposition, or trickery, tokenism and . manip-
ulation of the rules to get programs accepted for federal 
funds . But rather than going around the conflict , policy­
makers and legislators continually tried various means 
of controlling it s o  a� to preserve the decentralization 
of power to the local authorities .  The Housing Act of 1949 
brought the problem of conflicting interests into full 
light and s ubseqµent acts made for the most part unsuc-
cessful attempts to deal with it . 
The Housing Act of 1954 introduced the highly 
ambiguous term "workable program" .  The requirement of a 
"workable program" was introduced to link public housing 
and urban renewal closer together. Under this 'Act , grants 
would only be given to  communities or local public au-
thorities that could produce evidence that they had devel­
oped a so-called "workable program" .§.!/ According to  
61Robert Taggart, III, Low-Income Housin�: A 
Critique of Federal Aid, (Baltimore , 19·70J, p .  1 .  
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Alvin Schorr, the "workable program" appears · to have 
fallen short in two respects . In at least s ome cases ,  
more likely in  many, the "workable . program" has· provided 
paper assurances that have not been met .  Second, with 
few exceptions , it remained a physical plan that did not 
succeed in fus ing physical and social elements into a 
workable program. §.g/ The Housing Act of 1954 also at-
tempted to put more emphasis on rehabilitating housing 
rather than focusing solely on replacing housing as did 
the Act of 1949. 
A step was made in the right direction when "In 
1959 Congress provided for Federal assis tance to local-
ities to develop a ' community renewal program ' -- a 
comprehensive s tudy of a community to identify its re -
newal needs and resources , and to develop a long-range 
renewal program . "§1/ The difficulty, · as might be expected, 
was in defining the problem once there was a consensus 
that a problem did exist .  The main reason it was s o  
difficult t o  define the problem was because there were 
usually too many people involved in the planning who were 
from various specialized fields . Consequently, they could 
only see solutions that involved their specific training 
62Alvin L.  Schorr, Slums and Social Insecurity, 
(Washington, D . C . �  1963 ) ,  pp. 55-56. 
63Ibid. 
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(physical or social being the two most general cate­
gories of differences ) .  The idea of comprehensive plan-
ning, however, was an important realization on the part 
of the policy-makers that more than just patchwork was 
needed. Unfortunately, there was no politically inde­
pendent control, well trained group to implement the Act . 
The Housing Act of 1959 also was the first to  submit re­
cognition of the specific housing needs of the elderly. 
The ass istance took the form of a direct loan program 
which provided funds to non-profit sponsors of rented 
housing for the elderly. This marked the first use of 
the below-market-interest rate technique .§11 
In the 1960 ' s  subsidy programs became the center 
of federal housing efforts . Cooperative housing, begun 
in America in 1926, also became more widely used in the 
60 ' s  due to amendments in ' 59 ,  ' 61 ,  and ' 62 geared toward 
s�bsidies and insured mortgages for management type 
housing projects 1  including occupancy limited to cooper­
ative members . Glenn Beyer quotes Lewis M .  Isaacs , Jr . 
for his comment on defining cooperative housing. 
"The absence of a precise definition 
as to what is a cooperat ive apartment 
arises because it is not a creature of 
statute but an agglomeration of legal con-
64Robert Taggart , III, Low-Income Hous in�: A 
Critique of Federal Aid, (Baltimore, I976), p. I!. 
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cepts , s ome of which are in essence in­
compatible . It is a fiction which takes 
its existence ·partly from a corporation, 
which is another fiction. It is therefore 
at best an anomaly. The cooperative owner 
is something more than a tenant of his 
apartment and something less than an owner. "§2/ 
Between the years 1950 and 1960, there was a 
29.3 percent urban increase in population. §§/ This rapid 
population increase m�y have been one of the major . if not 
the major initiating factor behind the 1961 Hous ing Act . 
This particular Act established the B o M . I .R .  (Below 
Market Interest Rate)  pro�ram whereby profit-motivated 
private organizations could develop subsidized housing 
at special interest rates .§1/ The Housing Act of 1961 
also authorized F .H .A . to  insure mortgages on s ingle 
family homes in amounts of up to $25 ,000 . Three percent 
of the first $15,000 was required for a downpayment , ten 
percent of the next $5,000 and twenty-five percent of 
anything beyond $20,000. §.§/ Hence, this program made 
it possible for a middle income person making between 
seven and ten thousand dollars annually to put $2,000 
down and build a $25, 000 home in the suburbs at a reduced 
1965 ) ,  
65a1enn H .  Beyer, Housing and Societ�, (New York, 
p .  266. 
66 . Ibid . ,  p .  67 . 
07The President ' s  Committee on Urban Housing, A 
Decent Home , (Washington, D . C . j  1969) , p .  54 . -
68a1enn H .  Beyer, Housing and Society , (New York, 
1965 ) ,  p .  ' 67 .  
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mortgage interest rate .  At the same time , however, it 
stimulated the building of inner-city low income housing 
projects thereby forcing the lower income people to  re­
main in the city where hous ing was available (as dehu­
manizing as it was and still is ) at prices closest to  
what they could afford . For as pointed out in  an earlier 
section of this paper and as most people are well aware , 
it is very unlikely that a person_even in 1961 could build 
a new urban home for $15, 000 . If it could be done on a 
wide scale, a person making $3 , 000 a year could not afford 
it,  nor could a person making $5 ,000 who would be paying 
33 percent of his annual income which at that level would 
leave him too little for other remaining living expenses . 
A person making $3 , 000 a year of which there are presently 
over four million, could not even afford to pay $10 , 000 
for a home without paying over 35 percent of his income 
on housing. Consequently, the poor were bound to the 
inner-city projects and the white middle income people 
began more heavily than ever to  migrate to the suburban 
areas . The effects of this Act and subsequent similar 
housing acts on the central city can be realized in part 
by the following statistics taken from The Report of the 
President ' s  Committee on Urban Housing: §2/ 
69The President ' s  Committee on Urban Housing, 
A Decent Home, (Washington, D . C . J  1969 ) ,  p .  40. 
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Chart C 
(population in central cities in millions ) 
White 45 . 5  47 . 5  46 . 6  46 .1  44 . 9  
Non-white 6 . 3  10.3 12 . 8  13 . 5  18.8  
1959 1960 1966 1968 1978 (Projected) 
As is evidenced by the above chart,  up until 1960 
there was a gradual increase of both whites and non-whites . 
Following 1960, however, there was a gradual decrease in 
the white population while the non-whites continued to  
increas e .  As the white middle and upper middle class 
people fled from the central cities , the inner-city tax 
base was decreased thereby putting more pressure on the 
poor to  finance their own services . With a decrease in 
services such as education the poor ' s  chances of over­
coming their immobility and substandard conditions has 
lessened even more . 
Eventually Below Market Interest Rate programs 
could not keep pace with the amount of borrowing, s o  in 
1965 the Housing and Urban Development Act was passed.  
Originally the B.M. I .R.  was set at whatever the average 
interest on the Federal debt wa� . By 1965, however, the 
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average interest on the Federal debt had risen to above 
four percent thereby forcing legislators to set the 
B .M .I .R .  at three percent to s ustain the program ' s  at­
tractiveness to builders . In an attempt to make up for 
the s till slow rate at which low-income housing was being 
built , the ·1965 Act initiated rent s upplements whereby 
the Federal Government paid any additional rent ov·er 
twenty-five percent of the tenant ' s  income . This seemed 
to be a very viable means of assisting the poor but it 
met a great deal of opposition and consequently was not 
widely used .  The 1965 Hous ing Act  was also respons ible 
for the cabinet-level Department of· Hous ing and Urban 
Development which succeeded the Housing and Home Finance 
Agency. 
As each new program met with dis�ppointment, there 
grew a realization that planning was not taking enough 
variables into consideration. This was exemplified with 
the development of Urban Renewal in 1949 and again, with 
more emphasis , in 1966 with the Model Cities program. 
Through the Model Cities program the Government hoped to  
coordinate both the physical and social elements within 
certain neighborhoods .IQ/ The program maintained,  however, 
70 Ibid . ,  p. 3 .  
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s trong support of the decentralization policy of having 
local authorities develop their own programs . S tricter 
limitations and tighter deadlines were enforced for the 
local authorities to present the various stages of their 
s o-called "workable program" .  Greater emphasis was 
placed on community participation to allow the people 
jurisdiction over the destiny of their own neighborhoods . 
The results of the program, though still not entirely 
known, for the most part seem to be an overall increase 
in trickery, deception and manipulation of the people and 
rules on the part of the local authorities and politicians . 
This rather harsh accusation is supported somewhat by 
Chapter IV of this study where the Model Cities proposals 
of Dayton, Seattle , and Atlanta are briefly discussed.  
The Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan De­
velopment Act of 1966 did initiate home subsidies to 
lower income families which was expanded by the 1968 
Housing Act . Two major programs were expanded by the 1968 
Housing Act : 1 )  Subsidizing loans to the sponsors of 
rental housing for lower income families , and 2 )  assisting 
low and moderate income home buyers . Though the intentions 
behind the Act were at long last directed toward helping 
the poor, there remains still a great deal to be desired. 
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The average family income of 235 recipients was roughly 
$4� 500 after deduction.s which in s ome cases is well over 
the $5, 000 gross income leve1 .Il:/ There is little ques -
tion that people in this income bracket also need assist-
ance , but there are still many people earning below five , 
four, and even three thousand dollars annually that are 
not being helped in any real way. We are hea_ding in the 
right direction as further evidenced by the Housing and 
Urban Development Act of 1969 which increased further 
"public housing s ubsidies so as to lower the rents of 
extremely low-income tenants . "W We are not, however, 
moving at a rapid enough pace . Change where it is most 
needed, on the macro level ,  is being bogged down by the 
local filtering process .  Some success has been met through 
programs such as 235, but we must also recognize the need 
for planning ahead s o  the future generations will have no 
need for individual assistance other than in disability 
cases . 
71Robert Taggart , III, Low-Income Housin�: A 
Critique of Federal Aid, (Baltimore, I97d) . 
72Ibid . ,  p .  15 . 
CHAPTER IV: DECENTRALIZATION: 
A MUJJliI-PAnTISAN APPRC'5AdH 
Until 1968, our major attack on our urban prob-
lems had been the Urban Renewal Program, a continuation 
from the 1949 Housing Act . This program involved ful­
fillment of the following seven requirements (all of 
which are indispensable in order for the program to  be 
a success ) by the local public authority before its pro-
posal qualifies for government assistance : 
l .  
2 .  
3 .  
4 .  
5 .  
6 .  
7 . 
"Adequate codes and ordinances for structure 
and use ,  adequately enforced ;  
"A comprehensive community plan for land use 
and public capital development ; 
"Neighborhood analysis for the determination 
of blight ; 
"Administrative organizations adequate to  an 
all-out attack on slums and blight ; 
"A responsible program for relocation of dis ­
placed families ; 
"Citizen participation in ·the entire program ; 
"Adequate financial resources for carrying out ll ) thru (6) . "7J/ 
The 1968 Model Cities program was supposed to be 
a fresh and more comprehensive approach to solving our 
urban problems . While urban renewal programs prior to the 
Model Cities program were based on decentralization (as 
73scott Greer, Urban Renewal and American Cities , 
(New York, 1965 ) ,  p .  10 . 
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can be readily deduced from the seven s teps listed 
above ) ,  the Model Cities program places even more empha-
sis on decentralized authority. Chester W o  Hartman, in 
his essay "The Polit ics of Housing " ,  describes the Model 
Cities program as simply a "rehash of old proposals " .  
He goes even further and accuses the Model Cities pro8ram 
of being a "gild the ghetto approach to  solving urban 
problems " .I!±./ Though the intention of these proe:rams is 
certainly not to act as a "gild the ghetto approach " ,  in 
terms of actual accomplishment there is  very little evi­
dence to the contrary . 
From the seven steps which constitute a success­
ful proposal ,  we can recoenize the logic used in formu­
lating our present urban renewal programs . It is  one of 
bringing the decisions as close as possible to the people 
being affected by them. Ideally the program probably 
could not be set up better to serve this purpose ;  but the 
purpose itself is too idealistic and overlooks too many 
possible extraneous variables that e ither directly or in-
directly prevent the correct decisions from ever being 
made . Perhaps a brief inquiry into several case studies 
of some of the cities involved with urban renewal will 
clarify this point o 
74chester W .  Hartman, "The Politics of Housing " ,  
in Political Power and the Urban Cris is ,  ed .  Alan Shank, 
(Bos ton, I969) • 
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New York 
A case study of New York written by Clarence L.  
Davies , revealed some astonishing facts concerning our 
urban renewal programs . The entire s tudy is filled with 
cross purposes and compromises that have very little , if 
anything, to  do with helping the poor. The major inter­
action in New York ' s  planning took place between the 
Chairman of the Slum Clearance Committee , Robert Moses 
and the middle class whites who did not want low-income 
housing in their neighborhoods . The poor did not want 
the low-income housing any more than the middle class 
did--most likely because of their awareness of misdealing 
in other renewal cases . Moses was determined, however, 
for reasons that for the most part revolved around econ­
omic and beautification purposes ,  to  clean out the slums 
and consequently created new s lums alohg with many dis­
placed persons . In s ome areas he was forced into a com­
promise of building middle-income housing which created 
even more difficulties for the poor . 
Davies • study covers three separate cases : 
1) Seaside -Hammels ,  2 )  West Village , 3 )  West Side Urban 
Renewal Area . All three were similar in that it was 
white middle class residents who forced any changes that 
occurred o  The differences among the three cases were not 
-78-
in actual decision-making res�lts but in the procedure 
toward anticipating those results . In the first case ,  
there was no plan or outward intention indicated to  in­
clude the citizens who were most directly to be affectea 
in the decis ion-making procedure . In the second , resi­
dents were informed of the program after the completed 
plans had been accepted . Shortly thereafter,  it was found 
that some people in s o-called s lums liked where they were 
living, did not consider their neighborhood a s lum, and 
did not particularly care for the idea of being torn away 
from their previous ties and life-long environment . Pro­
tests were made by _ the West Villagers but to no signifi­
cant avail . Long standing ethnic groups were almost 
completely forced out of Washington Square and the middle 
class white element in the Greenwich Village area led by 
Mrs . Jane Jacobs managed to force a few changes to pro­
tect their interests . The third case (the West Side Area ) 
involved an attempt to include residents in the decision­
making which was later regretted by the local authoritie s .  
It did not take long before a great deal of conflict de­
veloped over who would be the most instrumental partici­
pants . As it turned out, the middle and upper-middle 
class residents took charge by ass uming leadership pos i­
tions to protect their own interests , s uch as Stanley 
Lowell, a retired Depu.ty Mayor and Dr. Thomas Matthew. 
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Both were res idents of the area or at least the nearby 
area and both were eventually leaders of separate in-
terest groups . Also involved in the decision-making 
activities was Jane Wahbery, a s ocial worker who organi-
zed a Tenants Committee, and pastors of two of the 
Catholic churches in the area . Other groups later became 
involved such as the Puerto Ricans , under the Stryckers 
Bay leadership of Father Browne , a liberal priest .  This 
tremendous multiplexity of interests presented much con­
flict and delay . After five years of struggle and at­
tempted compromise there was a minimal amount of rede-
velopment with many of the people still  needing relocation. 
Davies speculates that the reason there was so 
much citizen resistence in the cases where the res idents 
knew about the plans was because " • • •  none of the 
three areas was a 'working-class '  neighborhood . In each 
there was a s ignificant proportion of middle-income re-
s idents ,  a fact that may have led to increased interest­
group activity . "12/ This falls in l ine with many authors 
who stress the point of view that the lower income people 
are less able to activate and organize their own interests . 
As is quite noticeable throughout many of the Renewal 
Case studies , when the poorer groups are organized it is 
75J .  Clarence Davies , Neighborhood Groups and 
Urban Renewal ,  (New York, London, I966j, p .  4. 
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usually under the leadership of educated clergy, pro­
fessionals in the area , or middle-class people from out ­
side the area who possibly empathize for ethnic reasons . 
The point to be made in this particular case ,  however, 
. is the fact that even in areas with a s ignificant amount 
of middle class people only the best organized of the 
middle and the upper-middle class res idents could create 
minimal changes . 
The reason for this was simply that Moses was a 
very powerful man who knew how to maintain either the 
support of, or the control over,  the most powerful peopl e .  
As Jeanne Lowe points out when speaking o f  Moses , "No one · 
else in American history produced so much for local public 
improvement and urban reconstruction--about $5,000 , 000 , 000 
worth by 1960. But no single person contributed more 
through his works and his methods to  New York City ' s  prob­
lems--the remote , factionalized local government ; the 
unplanned private overgrowth; tne traffic congestion; the 
inhumanity and citizen discontents ; the real estate 'pro-
ject ' approach to community building; and the abduction 
of political and business leadership . "7.§/ 
Moses was a manipulator of people and a builder 
of sometimes beautiful , but many times hopelessly useless 
76Jeanne R .  Lowe , Cities in a Race With Time , 
(New York, 1967 ) ,  p .  489  
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and expensive , structures . By controlling and stimu-
lating New York • s  entire planning game , Moses created 
the nation ' s  fastest moving Title I redevelopment pro­
gram, whereby at the end of his reign in 1960 there were 
just as many s lum dwellers (1,000, 000 ) as at the beginning 
of Title I in 1949. 71/ When New York ' s  antipoverty pro-
gram was set up, the dominating forces were Robert Wagner, 
Mayor; Paul Serevane, President of the City Council;  
Adam Clayton Powell, Harlem U.S . Congressman who presidea 
over the House Education and Labor Committee ; and Governor 
Rockefeller. The "social welfare establishment" was the 
most powerful nonpolitical (in a technical sense )  group, 
which consisted f II o • • • a coalition of professionals 
and prestigeous lay leaders who run multimillion dollar 
voluntary agencies . "7§/ Professionals as it is used here 
does not refer to  a group specifically trained for the 
purpose of adding expertise to  the antipoverty program 
nor even a group necessarily with any planning knowledge 
at all. It refers to  a nonspecific group of individuals , 
i . e . ,  professionals in various areas as opposed to non-
professionals . 
77 Ibid . , p .  50 . 
78Howard W .  Hallman, Nei�hborhooa Control of 
Public Programs , (New York, 1970 , p .  12 . 
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Shortly after President Johns on ' s  "War on 
Poverty" declaration, Mayor Wagner appointed his . own 
Council Against Poverty and Poverty Op�ration Board, 
both of which were made up entirely of city officials . 
When they filed for Federal funds,  they were heavily 
criticized by Congressman Powell and other interested 
groups for being solely government officials . So Mayor 
Wagner expanded membership on the. Council Against Poverty 
so that it would include members of specific interest 
groups . When the Council was considered to be too gov­
ernmental to  be a nonprofit corporation, legislation was 
introduced to establish the Council as a public authority, 
hence finding a .way of getting around the technicalities 
involved . Though the State legislature passed the bill , 
it was vetoed by the Governor. Mayor Wagner again tried 
to expand the Council to ' include more interest groups in 
order to get around the various blocs ,  but as the member­
ship grew to incluqe more than eighty members , it was 
unable to function . as an effective Council .  Subsequently 
much of the power had to be delegated to an executive 
committee . 
Neighborhood groups were even more factionalizea 
than the Mayor ' s  appointed Council, with each applying 
separately for funds for their own programs . When Mayor 
Lindsay took office in 1966, there were more than s ixty 
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agencies that reported directly to  him. Mayor Lindsay 
put forth a massive effort to  reorganize the city gov­
ernment but because of the competitiveness between the 
various interest groups much time and money was expired 
before city government was finally "centralized " into 
twelve major agencies , which, though a great deal more 
manageable than s ixty, also presented many difficulties 
to be worked out before anything positive could ever be 
expected to be accomplished .  One of the two major Fed­
eral grants to be won (6 .9  million dollars ) was purely 
the result of a self-selected board called the Bedfort­
Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation which worked together 
with eleven of the top business leaders of New York City. 
Though some success in getting citizens involved 
in renewal efforts was finally attained through a form of 
neighborhood corporations , one need only read Hallman ' s  
report t o  realize that, with so many separate organiza­
tions and agencies pulling in separate directions , more 
time, money and energy is spent in trying to  organize the 
interest groups into s ome feasible governmental framework 
than in actual redevelopment . Some of the more success ful 
agencies such as the Y . I . A .  (Youth In Action) did manage 
to  get funds but many times the resulting programs were 
segmental and ineffective .12./ 
79Ibid . ,  pp. 42-45 .  
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Boston 
Boston ' s  story is very similar to  that of New 
York ' s .  The Mayor of Boston hired a city planner to 
develop programs for urban renewal .  Anticipating oppo­
s ition to many of these proposals ,  the Mayor and city 
planner formulated organizations to formally represent 
their opposition, to which they could yield minor com­
promises and maintain their position on .t he major issues . 
As James Wilson puts it in his essay, "Planning and Pol­
itics , "  "In Boston, for example , eff9rts have been made 
to  stimulate the formation of neighborhood associat ions 
which will provide citizen participation (and citizen 
consent to ) the plans of the Boston Redevelopment Author­
ity (BRA ) . "§Q/ One such organization was called . Action 
for Boston Community Development and was manipulated for 
the most part by the city planner who technically was not 
even a member. 
In ·referring to the North Harvard-Allston area, 
Wilson points out that " • • •  no effort was made to obtain 
citizen participation and the plan was approved by the 
city councii without the consent of the neighborhooa . "81/ 
80James Q .  Wilson, "Planning and Politics : 
Citizen Participation in Urban Renewal , "  in Urban Renewal : 
The Record and the Controversy, ed.  James W .  Wilson, 
L�ambridge, I966), p.  4I6. · 
81 4 Ibid . ,  p .  17 . 
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Tha big man behind Boston ' s  many massive rene�al 
movements was Bdward Logue . Logue waa invited into 
Boston ' s  planning aa a consultant . Having had much e.,_ ....  
parienca 1u the planning gama�· he refused· to take charge 
of Boston 's renewal unless he could be assured or having 
:full control of the programs . From Logue • s  n1na months 
as a consultant evolved a 90 million dollar redevelopment 
program wh1ch entailed extremely radical diversions from 
Boston ' s  existing phys ical appearance .  He also managed 
to restructure �he Planning Board and the BRA by bringing 
them both together under the control of one agency which 
he eventually would head . "Only after a protracted battle 
in the fall and winter or 1960-1961 was LOgue granted the 
enormous power he had demanded . 0§.Y' Logue • s  power was 
the greatest ever granted one s1ngla person tor renewal 
purpo�es . He " • • •  built the BRA into the city ' s  largest 
and most influential public agency through h1a political 
acumen, capacity to draw on Federal resources ,  and support 
from f'J',ayor Collins and Bos ton • s downtown 1nteres ts--the 
f1nanc1al ,  real estate. and newspaper commun1t1ca . "§J/ 
Bos ton ' s  South End : Logue believed in citizen 
participation a.s long as it did not disagree w'ith his 
8�Langley Carleton Kayes , Jr . �  The Rehab1l1tat1on 
Plann1n� Game : A Study 1n the D1vers1ty"of "Ne1�fiborfiood� 
t�isac 1uset£s .-I959j, p. 28. 
83 ' Ibid . ,  pp . 28-29. 
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planning . His obvious ambition to get things done in­
hibited his ability to cater to the desires of the neigh­
borhood residents .  There was almost a total neglect of 
communication between Logue and the community o Good hor­
izontal communication did exist among the various leaders , 
most of whom had known each other from several years of 
working with the South End planning council .  Beyond fill ing 
in two questionnaires , the Urban Villagers , the old ten­
ants , and the resident property owners who were not in­
timately involved with the Urban Renewal Council ,  either 
had not sought or had not been provided with much access 
to renewal negotiations . Most of the residents were to­
tally ignorant of the fact that the rumors involving the 
destruction of their neighborhood were very quickly becoming 
a reality. One interviewee put it this way, '�hen they 
came down here with that plan we had no idea what was going 
on . It was only after the shock of that thing that we 
figured we had better find out what renewal was all 
about . "§:!/ 
After several attempts of his own, Logue called 
in an expert on manipulating interest groups o Logue ' s  
appointee , Green, seemed t o  convince the local people that 
they were developing the plans but in the final analysis 
84 Ibid . ,  p .  62 . 
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the plans were very little different from the original 
plan: "For all the fanfare attendant upon the scrapping 
of the first plan, the product that emerged from the 
U .R .C .  in the spring of 1965 was not radically different 
from its predecessor . "§2/ Of all the techniques for get­
ting around actual effective citizen participation in the 
decision-making process Green ' s  appeared to  be the· smooth­
est .  The same bas ic principles of deceptive tokenism are 
later found to be used in the development of s ome Model 
Cities programs . 
Charleston Section of Boston: The Charleston 
area had had past experiences with redevelopment s o  the 
res idents were on their guard at the first sign of renewal 
coming into their neighborhood. As it is in most neigh­
borhoods that manage to go into the urban renewal game 
with some significant amount of organization, there emerged 
in Charleston an effective leader . Baldwin brought to­
gether the Self-Help Organization Charleston (SHOC ) which 
was simply those residents in the area who were interested 
in having an active voice in any planning that i�volved 
their community . The inevitable conflict between SHOC and 
Logue went back and forth and nothing was accomplished for 
quite some time . Baldwin realized that SHOC lacked the 
type of organization needed to be effective in the renewal 
85 Ibid . ,  p .  82 . 
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meetings s o  he initiated the bringing together of all 
the local organizations into a federation. "Almost one 
year to  the day after Baldwin ' s  proposal for a federa-
tion, the Charleston renewal game was blown to  pieces 
by a public hearing on the night of January 7 , 1963 . At 
that time, 85 percent of the 1 , 000 people present were 
emphatically opposed to the proposals of the BRA sup­
ported by the Charleston Federation. Rather than fa­
cilitating the renewal planning game , the Federation 
brought about the very thing it had been ins tituted to  
prevent , the oppos ition of those with the capacity to 
make their presence felt at a public meeting. "§§/ 
The Federation had become dominated by clergymen 
and their chairman was an individual who was not recog-
nized by some as a member of the community. Leaders of 
SHOC grew more and more dissatisfied with the Federation ' s  
actions and eventually the two organizations polarized 
into opposing interests . The Federation became identi­
fied as being close to the moderators of the community and 
SHOC became identified with those radically against 
Urban Renewal .  The BRA made an all out effort to  combine 
the moderates with the Federation to  overpower the re-
s istance of SHOC and eventually was successful . It is 
86 4 Ibid . ,  p .  11 • 
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important to note that throughout the entire planning 
ordeal in Charleston, SHOC remained the only genuine 
citizen ' s  group represented solely by the residents ' 
interests . 
Boston ' s  Washington Park: Washington Park is an 
area within a larger area known as Roxbury . Roxbury is 
divided into two major areas : Upper Roxbury which is the 
south s ide where the more well-to-do residents live and 
lower Roxbury on the north s ide which was the lower class 
poverty area . Washington Park was the s outh end of the 
north side or to put it in its most significant frame 
of reference ,  the poverty area bordering the well-to-do 
residents ' neighborhood.  110f all the communities under 
study, Washington Park had the most articulate and sym­
pathetic group of prerenewalites before the advent of 
the rehabilitation planning game . "§1/ . The rationale be­
hind this phenomenon is perhaps as typical as it is obvi­
ous : Upper Roxbury repres ented an elite group of Negroes 
who had nice homes and a clean, well-kept neighborhood . 
They didn ' t  want the deteriorating slums close to their 
neighborhood with the ever present possibility of them 
spreading. Urban Renewal was recognized as havin3 great 
value to them if it would be used to clear the area imme ­
diately adjacent to Upper Roxbury ' s  north end . Keyes 
87Ibid . ,  p .  158 . 
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clearly emphasizes this point when he states : 
"If blight could be rolled out of Middle 
Roxbury, the residential areas to the 
s outh would be preserved .  The strategy 
of warring against physical decay dictated 
the terms defining the rehabilitation areas . "§§/ 
For the Washington Park resident s ,  Urban Renewal 
could have meant almost anything. But one thing was 
certain, what they had was better than nothing, a�d 
nothing is what many were left with following Urban 
Renewal clearance . It would only seem logical that even 
the most deteriorated s lum housing should not be des-
troyed unless the inhabitants have some place within 
their means to move to .  But housing was not even a topic 
of discussion at the planning meetings ; for every time 
relocation or housing were brought up they were s up­
pressed or avoided .§21 
"Cons iderations were never raised as to 
the s ocioeconomic capacity of the Wash­
ington Park area to endure the rigors 
of planning an��e,.xecuting a rehabilita­tion project . ";z2/ 
Since the elite Negro population was strongly in favor of 
Urban Renewal for Washington Park, they were considered 
representative of the citizen participation even though 
88Ibid . ,  p .  162 . 
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the clearance affected them only indirectly. The actual 
residents of the slum are� were for the most part unin-
volved and seemingly uninteres ted . Keyes offers a pos -
s ible explanation for this rather common characteristic 
of the planning process which was mentioned in brief in 
the previous section of this Chapter : 
"Whatever the actual breakdown numerically, 
it is safe to say that a large majority of 
the in-migrant Negroes earning less ttllin 
$3 ,000 annually are part of the culture of 
poverty, which combines alienation from 
social institutions , except perhaps � store­
front church, with a day-to-day struggle for 
survival so t ime and enercy cons uming as to 
oreclude concern for an involvement in the demands of the rehabilitation plannin� game o "2l/ 
In the immediately preceding section of this Chapter, 
Clarence Davies s uggests that the reason New York did have 
involvement in the three areas he s tudied was because 
there was a middle-class group in each of these neighbor- · 
hoods whereby had there not been,  the power elements 
would have remained relatively passive . Again it must be 
pointed out that in the few cases where participation by 
the poor has taken place effectively it is usually because 
of the existence of extremely strong and unusual leader-
ship many times from a middle or upper-middle class res i ­
dent . In the Roxbury incident , the middle-class residents 
had interests diametrically opposed to any bargaining 
91rbid . ,  p .  153 . 
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power interests that existed for the hard core poverty 
residents of Washington Park. What is meant by this is 
simply that the only bargaining power that the Park re-
s idents had to assure themselves of adequate relocation 
housing was the fact that as a group they would in an 
organized protesting fashion refuse to let their neigh­
borhood be torn down. Unfortunately, this is exactly 
what the middle-class element of Roxbury wanted in order 
to better protect their own section from deterioration. 
In this particular case the residents of Washington Park 
would most likely be forced to move north and increase 
the overcrowding and deterioration in the already blighted 
area. What takes place many times in renewal is that the 
displaced people are forced to filter into fairly well­
kept neighborhoods which eventually become overcrowded 
and run-down themselves . Hence,  in cases where there 
is no es�ape valve such as there was in Roxbury, it is 
not uncommon to find certain elements of the · nearby middle-
class residents supporting either relocation or rehabili­
tation . if not both. 
"The fact that there were only two 
neighborhood associations actually func­
tioning in the Washington Park project 
area meant there was no systematic way 
whereby the Steering Committee could 
convey what they had learned to a wider 
audience .  However,  while there was a 
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definite lack of communication between 
the Steering Committee and the large 
majority of Washington Park residents , 
the absence of open criticism of the 
group reveals the extent to which those 
with the capacity to object were in ac­
cord with the direction that the renewal 
planning was taking. 11� 
There was a struggle between two of the middle-class 
groups who both had the same general motives which allowed 
the planning to remain virtually the same ; it was s imply a 
matter of who was going to be holding the wheel . Though 
the authorities made some changes of their own, the citizen 
participation remained in the hands of the Upper Roxbury 
elite and not in the hands of the Washington Park resi­
dents who were to be displaced.  
Boston ' s  West End : Not being extremely familiar 
with the geographical make-up of Boston it is quite pos ­
sible that Gans ' s tudy of Boston ' s  West .End could overlap 
into one or more of the areas already discussed above with­
out the writer realizing it .  Neverthele s s ,  Boston ' s  West 
End as s tudied by the renowned Herbert Gans is much too im­
portant to be left out for the mere sake of preventing an 
overlap and will,  therefore , be dealt with as a separate 
case s tudy. 
A rather lengthy, but conclusive , quote from an 
92La.ngly Carlton Keyes , The Rehabilitation Plannin� 
Game : A Studi in the Diversity of Neignborhood, (Massa­
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essay by Walter McQuade serves as a suggestive overview 
of Boston ' s  West End : 
"The West End , an entire neighborhood, 
thirty-eight blocks , forty-one acres , and 
9 , 000 residents in the middle of the city, 
was wiped out--a low-rent , low-rise Italian 
tenement section. With Federal help, the 
land was condemned and bought for $7 . 40 per 
square foot , revalued at $1 . 40 per square 
foot , and leased for a yearly rental ap­
proximating 6 percent of the lower value to 
a syndicate headed by a political supporter 
of the Mayor . The area was ruthlessly cleared 
to make way for a cluster of high-ris e ,  high­
rent apartment houses , a banal grouping of 
blunt , balconied towers on a treeless ,  plain-­
and a bitter warning to all of the timeworn 
Boston neighborhoods of what renewal might 
mean to them too. Skirting this area was 
another of the typical urban scars of the 
1950 ' s  in America, the John F .  Fitzgerald 
Expressway, an eight-lane strand of concrete 
s lashed through the ancient fabric of the city 
like a trail of lava on legs . This state­
built road was the most expensive in the U .S . ,  
costing more than $28, 940, 000 per mile . 11211' 
Here, then, is a good example of neighborhood res idents 
not being able to organize fast enough to defend them­
selves against the ambitions of city politicians . The 
only opposition to the city ' s  plan of tearing down the 
entire West End area to build luxury apartments was the 
"Save the West End Committee , " which was organized under 
the leadership of an upper-class individual from outside 
of the neighborhood . Though he tried to mobilize the 
community, they were aware that he was an outsider and 
93walter McQuade, "Urban Renewal in Boston " ,  in 
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did not feel comfortable supporting him--nor he them. 
Also, the Committee failed to develop positive action 
to counter the city plans --it simply tried to get people 
to stay in the area and attend the meetings . 
One can see how in order for decentralized plan­
ning to work, spontaneous action on the part of the cit­
izens is necessary . This type of action very seldom 
comes about unless unusual leadership and organization 
happens .to . be . immediately avai�able in the neighborhood . 
Gans points out that there were committee leaders 
from the West End neighborhood who also lacked the force 
and ability to organize resistanc e .  He makes a point 
that could very well be applied to most residents of most 
neighborhoods : 
"They were able to' make speeche s ,  and 
to share their anger with an audience , but 
other activities came less easily. Being 
a leader without any proof of results , 
spending time away from family and friends , 
or from second jobs and QEhftr individual pursuits was difficult .  "U . 
Not untypical of renewal planning, there was a 
gross information gap between redevelopment officials and 
the neighborhood committee leaders . The reason as de-
scribed by Gans was quite s imply the fact that the offi-
94Herbert J .  Gans , The Urban Villa�ers , (New York, 
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Cials knew the neighborhood was not in favor of the 
clearance and felt the less they knew the better off re­
development would be . As will be said time and time again 
concerning slum clearance, the residents did not consider 
their neighborhood a s lum. They enjoyed their t ight knit 
ethnic community and did not like the idea of having to 
move . As  one individual stated ,  " It isn ' t  right t·o scatter 
the community to all four winds . It pulls the heart out 
of a guy to lose all his friends . "22/ Undoubtedly, this 
person expressed the feelings of many of the residents 
who were about to be displaced.  At  the same time , however, 
these people were experiencing other feelings--feelings 
of despair and helplessness .  This particular neighborhood 
had additional possible peculiarities which this writer 
has taken the liberty to infer .  Though Italians will not , 
as a rule , hesitate to fight when approached by equals , 
face to face, the persistent authoritarianism which is 
characteristic of the traditional Italian family has seem­
ingly compelled them to look upon authority, especially 
national authority, with awesome respect--not necessarily 
favorably .but , more accurately, as a natural phenomenan 
which cannot be dealt with. If there is a direct corre-
lation between authoritarianism and income, the above 
95 8 Ibid . ,  p .  2 9. 
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speculation may be generalizable to other so-called s lum 
neighborhoods . If so,  it may add to the various expla-
nations offered for the passiveness of so many ne16hbor-
hoods that have been cleared for renewal . Regardless of 
any socio-psychological variables that may be entertained 
the�e are certain concrete realities that cannot be denied . 
As Gans puts it ,  
"The truth was , that saving the West End 
was an overwhelming, and perhaps imposs ible 
tas k .  Indeed, there was relatively little 
the committee could doo  The decis ion to 
redevelop the West End had been made early 
in the decade , and it had received the 
bless ings of the city ' s  deQis ive business 
leaders and politicians . 112.U 
The planning in Boston ' s  West End did involve a 
great deal of purpose even if it did not help the immedi-
ate poor . Boston, like many other cities , was be�oming 
poorer as the middle class residents and industry contin­
ually migrated to the suburbs . By replacing low-income 
and tax-exempt residents and institutions with high-income 
hous ing it was hoped that the city tax base could be 
lifted . There were motives of sheer beautification along 
with the desire of central businesses to attract people 
with more money to spend in their stores . Last and most 
likely, not least as a determining factor, " o  • • Massa-
96Ibid . ,  p .  298 . 
-98-
chusetts ' General Hospital was expanding rapidly, and 
it ' s  trustees had long been unhappy about being surrounded 
by low-income neighbors . "<£1./ By the s ummer of 1960, a 
9, 000 resident community had been totally wiped out and 
the citizens had nothing to do with it .  
Newark 
Newark was one of the few cities that did organize 
neighborhood participation rather effectively. Conse­
quently, they required and used more Federal funds than 
most other cities and when the Office of Economic Oppor­
tunity funds were cut, Newark sµffered more than most 
other cities . 
Blacks and whites were forced to polarize in 
Newark so that both might better protect their interests . 
Many of the redevelopment disputes added to the black-
whi te polarization such as the planning of a 185 acre medi­
cal school right in the middle of a black residential 
ghetto. Hallman s uggests that disputes s uch as this were 
key variables in the setting off of the explosive five 
days of civil disorder beginning July 13 , 1967 . There is 
little question that the medical school dispute, along with 
others such as the appointment of a white councilman with-
97Ibid . ,  p .  286 . 
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out a college degree over a black councilman with a 
masters degree, had added to the tension and distrust 
already existing between blacks and whites just prior 
to the July break-outs . 2.§/  Though Newark in the late 
sixties may be considered somewhat of a success story 
as far as citizen participation is concerne d ,  there is 
a possible underlying variable which should be consid-
ered .  Hallman made the claim that certain disputes were 
the cause of certain outbursts of violence . It seems 
perfectly suggestable, however, that the general atmos-
phere in Newark during that time was one of much tension 
and emotional involvement due to the overall nationwide 
conditi6n of the black man . The true facts about the 
black populous in this country were just at that time 
being brought out into the open under the national in­
fluence of Martin Luther King . Other -cities with a 
large and rapidly growing black central city population 
were having s imilar outbursts . It is entirely possible 
that the ill-timed planning disputes that arose in Newark 
simply gave ammunition to an already cocked gun. The 
unusual high pitch involvement in this case was not 
simply economic or political . but also racial which when 
98Howard W .  Hallman, Nei�hborhood Control of 
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effectively actuated as a caus e ,  demands cohesive in-
volvement from all of the group members being discrim­
inated against .  The question then arises : Had there 
not been racial tension could there have been the mass -
ive resistance in Newark that gave the residents a 
voice in the de�ision-making of renewal? If the major­
ity of the case studies surveyed by this researcher is 
a sufficient basis for answering that question, one would 
be inclined to say no; it is rare that extreme poverty 
neighborhoods rally in a mass ive effort to resist clear­
ance . In fact, prior to the late s ixties movement , 
"The role of grass roots opposition 
in Newark ' s  redevelopment program has 
been insignificant . Not once between 
1949 and 1960 did a neighborhood com-
mittee succeed in alterin��
OF delaying NHA ' s  plans for an area. "2.2/ 
* * * 
"Newark ' s  urban redevelopment policies 
are products of the interaction of two 
elements : the goals of NHA ' s  profes­
sional staff and the demands of certain 
nonlocal participants , like the Urban 
Renewal Administration, the Federal 
Housing Administration, and the private 
redevelopers . • • •  NHA ' s  clearance poli­
cies have not been the result of open 
conflict among local interest groups . 
Such conflict over s lum clearance has 
99Harold Kaplan, Urban Renewal Politics : Slum 
Clearance in Newark, (New York, I963), p .  13 5 .  
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been rare and has not effected the 
substance of NHA ' s  decis ions . NHA 
has provided the initiative for all 
clearance projects . "100/ 
There are , of course ,  s ources that are biased 
for obvious reasons . One s uch s ource is a book written 
by Leo Adde, a membe� of the Urban Land Institute which 
played active roles in the planning discussed within 
Adde ' s  book. Adde emphas izes the importance of citizen 
participation and yet fails to mention any actual inci­
dents of citizen participation in the planning the ULI 
was involved in. 
Philadel£hia 
Philadelphia appears to have been a very unusual 
case in terms of redevelopment . The city itself was al-
lowed to degenerate by a mass ive wave of political cor-
ruption and neglect . 
"Its payroll was loaded with employees too 
lazy to clean even the grimy grandiose City 
Hall.  City budgets were thrown together 
year by year to meet the requirements of 
the Republican City Committee,  as expressed 
through the Mayor and City Council . Munici­
pal appointments and pos itions depended on 
a nod from ward chairmen.  Political leaders 
often s old city jobs . But the ruling class 
tolerated all this . They did not live �n 
lOOHarold Kaplan, "Urban Renewal in Newark, "  in 
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the city, and did not have to drink its 
water. They just wanted to maintain the 
status quo • • •  Indus try, too, fled because 
(it was said) of the crushing city tax 
burden. "101/ · 
What eventually took . place was that Philadelphia 
became so decrepit that the people who wanted to  remain 
in the city had no choice but to organize to  get things 
done . The question in this case is : Can this be cons id-
ered a poverty level participation s uccess story? 
"The new direction was not imposed from 
the top ;  it emerged from many s ources ,  
and progres s  has been infused with the 
critical viewpoints and talents of middle­
class civic leaders , university professors , 
urban designers , political administrator� , 
as well as the dynamic leadership of City 
Hall and top business . "102/ 
The coalition started with young intellectuals 
organizing and planning because of their discontent with 
the way in which the city was being run. It would appear, 
therefore , that what took place in Philadelphia was not 
the poor creating plans to  redevelop . their neighborhoods 
by implementing urban renewal, nor the politicians trying 
to beautify their city or revive the central city business 
district . It was , rather, a massive effort on the part 
of the most able Philadelphia residents to clean up their 
town. The first coalition d�dn ' t  cons ist of the dire poor 
101Jeanne R .  Lowe,  Cities in a Race With Time, 
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who had nothing to loose and who saw little possibility 
of anything to gain; but was made up of the middle and 
upper-middle class residents who had a great deal to 
loose unless s omething positive happened in Philadelphia ' s  
planning game . 
The City Policy Committee was the first organi­
zation that began steps toward reform. They presented 
a proposal to Mayor Samuels for a planning commission, 
but Samuels 
" • • •  worried about the oppos ition of 
special interests in the city to  the pro­
posed reorganization of the planning com­
mission, sat on the necessary ordinance 
for a year. "103/ 
The City Policy Committee then collected more forces 
from the community and eventually had the ordinance passed .  
The coalition, not taking any chances ,  hired one of the 
best planners in the country to be the Commission ' s  direc-
tor of planning. Other measures were also taken to assure 
the success of their reform programs . This all took place 
in the early 1940 ' s  and did not maintain a great deal of 
momentum. In September of 1947, a $400, 000 display was 
put together,  "to dramatize city planning--to gain the 
confidence of a public made cynical by utopian futuramas 
and the inertia of local politicians . "104/ Philadelphia 
l03Ibid . ,  p .  322 . 
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became one of the leading cities in the area of redevel­
opment, housing rehabilitation and neighborhood conser­
vationo Long range planning was practiced to a certain 
extent by trying to  attract the rich back into the cen-
tral city area . The Washington Square project ; 1 ,000 
acres southwest of Independence Hal l ,  an area which formed 
about one-fourth of the entire central city was s uggested 
to be certified for urban renewal .  Mayor Dilworth liked 
the idea and .began with the Society Hill area, also known 
as 11Washington Square East " .  There is no mention of citi­
zen participation or resistence to clearance b ut it appears 
that the period following the reform movement of the forties 
was one of redevelopment minded ,  but nonetheless centra­
lized power . "Mayor Dilworth was enthus iastic about the 
ambitious proposal . His first public act in office was 
to issue a directive to the city planning department to  
proceed with detailed plans for the renewal of the Society 
Hill area • • •  11105/ From this , and previous comments ,  one 
can readily deduce that the poor are pretty much out of 
the picture in Philadelphia o The reader should be remind ­
ed that in order for decentralized decision-making to be 
s uccessful,  in terms of offering a systematic way of solv­
ing urban problems , it must reach the bottom rung of the 
l05Ibid . ,  p .  343 . 
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ladder where the greatest  need is . Philadelphia ' s  
activities involved first mobilization b y  middle and 
upper middle class citizens and intellectuals to reform 
the city ' s  planning followed by perhaps more trustworthy, 
but also very powerful political leadership. Regardless 
of how straight-forward a city mayor might be , his fore­
most obligation, as he realizes it ,  is to the city as a 
whole and the people who put him in office . He is the 
mayor of the majority, not the minority, and usually acts 
accordingly. Even though Philadelphia , more than any 
other city, emphasized low-rent hous ing in renewal areas , 
it apparently did not do it as effectively as it should 
have . By the mid 1960 ' s  a great deal of dissatisfaction 
was building among the poor and those concerned about 
them. 
"University critics charged that the local 
• renaissance ' was a facade which hid the 
city ' s  teeming, neglected s lums . It was 
asserted that the welfare mandate of the 
1949 National Housing Policy-- ' a  decent 
home and a suitable living environment for 
every American family ' --had lost out to 
economic development ; that phys ical plan­
ning had been overemphasized and human 
needs ignored ;  that urban renewal had done 
too little in creating j obs and better 
housing for the poor . "106/ 
Indeed the coalition did get a great deal done to save 
t he city as a whole from further degeneration as did the 
l06Ibid . ,  p .  397. 
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Pittsburgh coalition which will be discussed later in 
this chapter . But as the city began to move , the hard 
core poor were left behind anq many began to  realize 
that the s lum dwellers were just being shoved around for 
renewal purposes . When dissatis faction began to be ex-
pressed, it became apparent that the greatest renewal 
attempt made to that time was not a s uccess in terms of 
providing for the poor or involving the poor in the de-
cis ion-making process . An inner-city slum covering 
eleven square miles of the city housed 377 , 000 families . 
Eighty percent of these families were nonwhite and the 
density of the area was 34, 300 to  a square mile . Only 
fifty-eight percent lived in housing that contained all  
necessary facilities and was what could generally be 
evaluated as "sound " .  
"Of the labor force there in 1960, 13 
percent were unemployed (the number 
was no doubt much higher,  s ince the 
statistics only classify those seeking 
work ) ,  84 percent were unskilled or 
semiskilled . Fifty-four percent of 
the families had incomes below $4, ooo . "107/ 
It was pointed out that at the time this particular case 
study was being published , city officials were considering 
the possibility of adopting a planning program that would 
include the profess ional expertise of s ociologists , an-
l07Ibid . ,  p .  398 .  
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thropologist s ,  psychologists ,  educators , economists , 
as well as welfare, physical planning, and redevelopment 
experts . 
"But these s ophisticated new techniques 
and approaches must earn acceptance in 
the local political market place, and 
s uccess depends ultimately on the abil­
ity and willingnes s  of the e lected po­
litical leaders t?�� O}'Ward and use the planners ' ideas . "lQ§/ 
Not unlike most cities , Philadelphia would have a great 
deal of difficult� in attaining adequate cooperation from 
its elected leaders . This proved to  be especially true 
of Mayor Tate who was noted for his slowing down of already 
existing programs . 
Leo Adde also did a study of Philadelphia and 
his research, though quite unintentionally, verifies what 
has been stated above, i . e . ,  citizen participation did 
not involve the poor but the mos t  abl� Philadelphia re-
sidents . Adde mentions the major local organizations 
and quotes brief descriptions of them. One such quote is , 
"Later, the West Philadelphia Corporation, 
also made up of our best citizens , prepated 
a planned program for the redevelopment of 
West Philadelphia around the University 
area . "109/ 
It might also be pointed out that Adde ' s  evaluation of 
urban renewal in terms of s uccess and failure is s ome-
108 Ibid . ,  p. 400. 
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what divergent from the stated aims and goals of the 
Urban Renewal program as it has continually been re-
stated throughout the years . His evaluation of local 
participation, as indicated from his selected quote 
above , appears to be based on how many of the well re­
spected so-called important people can be drawn into 
the planning game and not how effective the poorest 
residents have been in determining their own fate . Also, 
rather than evaluating the overall s uccess in terms of 
how adequately the poor have been housed and cared for, 
Adde makes the following evaluative statement : 
''Renewal projects have taken about $100 
million in assessed valuation off the tax 
rolls . The measure of renewal ' s  success is 
guaged by the fact that some $350 million 
in tax ratable has gone back into the tax 
rolls as a direct result of ranewal . The 
indirect benefits are not precisely calcu­
lable , but they are massive . Land at the 
south end of the Triangle, which was valued 
at $10 a square foot in the early l/50 ' s ,  
now goes for $50 a square foot . 11 llO 
Housing the poor is not even mentioned as an indirect 
possibility. Instead, the fact that land has increased 
in value from $10 a square foot to  $50 a square foot is 
given special attention even though it took place over 
a 19 year span in which case inflation and the usual city 
land value increases could be credited with a great per-
centage of the 10 to 50 dollar difference . 
110 Ibid . ,  p .  41 .  
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Howard Hallman in his book , NeiGhborhood Control 
of Public Programs , cites various attempts at neighbor­
hood involvement which failed .  He also gives credit to 
a few instances of actual neighborhood resident involve-
ment , e . g . ,  Germantown where a s ubstantial amount of par-
ticipation did take place . Hallman demonstrates , however ,  
that for the most part neighborhood resident participation 
is dealt with as an obstacle and not an instrument as it 
was intended .  In the mid 50 ' s ,  citizen participation was 
the topic of concern at the area planning conference . 
After a year of discussing the matter, it was decided that 
private organizat ions should be res�onsible for involving 
the neighborhood res idents in the Urban Reriewal planning . 
In regards to the result of this decision, Hallman makes 
the following s tatement : 
"In a study of educational efforts re­
lated to urban renewa l ,  I took a look at 
the resident involvement process and found 
that two years after the Area Planning Con­
ference had recommended ind�pendent commu­
nity organization, s carcely none was being 
performed in connection with the urban re­
newal program. In a city of 2 million, · 
there were less than 30 privately paid com­
munity organizers working with neighborhoods 
to  do a combination of community organiza­
tion and community relations , the latter 
. being more a matter of selling residents on the agency ' s  program rather than informing 
citizens about what they could do. "111/ 
lllttoward W .  Hallman, Neighborhood Control of 
Public Programs , (New York, 1970), p .  !6b .  
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Pittstu rsh 
Pittsburgh ' s  story on redevelopment is almost 
identical to Philadelphia ' s ,  mainly because Pittsburgh 
was used as a success model by Philadelphia as well as 
other dying cities . Prior to the late 1940 ' s ,  Pittsburgh 
was rapidly decayinz . Bus inesses could no longer attract 
top managerial employees because of the undesirable phy-
s ical and financial conditions of the city. Indus tries 
began moving out a�d those intending to stay considered 
providing accommodations for their top managerlal person-
nel in a more attractive city. The city had reached a 
point where it was in danger of massive outward migration 
when many of the people who had too much to loose decided 
to do s omething about it . Hence, the late 1940 ' s  marked 
the beginnin.; of what became known as "Pittsburgh ' s  Action 
Formula " .  Certain people who had too much to  loose took 
it upon themselves to act . 
"The Pittsburgh formula seemed simple 
enough : firs t ,  bring together the top 
industrial-business leaders of the commu­
nity in an organization to  s upport a gen­
eral program for overall community im­
provement ; second , es tablish a cooperative 
working relationship between them and the 
political and 3overnment leaders to ad­
vance specific projects . " 112/ 
112Jeanne R .  Lowe , Cities in a Race With Time , 
(New York, 1967 ) , p • .  115 . 
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The "quasimunici.pal organizations " that the businessmen 
" • • •  s ponsored were generally not de­
s igned to fo��ard programs and projects 
behefiting the community as a �hole or 
its residents . Indeed , these �roups 
helped promote the city to outside in­
dustry or protect local business interests  
and to  turn �ublic spending to the ' effi­
cient ' minimum. S ome bus inessmen backed 
regional planning organizations , but these 
private bodies wanted power. Up to now , 
the bus inessmen had lacked a device or 
even a desire for constructive civic de­
velopment action . " 113/ 
Pittsburgh, similar to modern day Chicago, is a 
good example bf how effective power can be when it is cen­
tralized . It is also a good example , however, of how in-
effective power is ,  in any form as a means of bringing 
about adequate social change when social and human factors 
are disregarded to attain physical and economic change . 
Pittsburgh was considered one of the most miraculously 
saved cities in the country. Yet when examining the sta­
tistics one might wonder if  the city had been saved at all .  
"By 1960, there were 70, 000 .fewer young arults , the base of the working population, 
in Allegheny County than in 1950--a 29 per­
cent crop . The city ' s  total pooulation fell 
by 9 percent , from 676 , 0JJ to s�me 6o4 , 0 JJ .  
This was the fourth highest central city ee­
cline �uring that �eca�e in the nation , an� 
this in spite of its Renaissance . An< at the 
same time , sixty-five plants anc1 35, 000 jobs 
.were los t ,  while almost no new infustry came 
in.  Those which remainef sharply re(uce� em­
ployment by aciopting automa ter pro('uction 
processes ; steel was far below capacity. 
l13Ib1d . ,  p .  115. 
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Meanwhile , the inv�ntory of �eteri6rate� 
housing was changer' only s lightly. "114/ 
Cre�it must not be taken away from P ittsburgh ' s  
coalit ion for at least rebuilring many o f  the phys ical 
<eteriorations of the city. The ability to mobilize 
power an� proruce constructive chan�e of any type may 
certainly be considere< a form of s uccess as long as it 
is kept in its proper perspective . Physical anr bus iness 
imp�ovements �o not necessarily mean the poor are being 
houser anr provifef with jobs . The same must be kept in 
mind when evaluating the planning process itself .  The 
fact that ne ighborhood an� resident sroups have mobilize� 
to initiate action or stop action roes not necessarily 
mean that �rass roots remocracy is working at its lowest 
level of participation . In Pittsburgh, as in many other 
cities , the poor were only cealt w ith to  the extent .neces-
sary to create other changes .  Housing became a major issue 
only after it became a threat to  the in�ustrial-bus inessman . 
"During the 1930 ' s ,  government s urveys 
hac found that one-quarter of the city ' s  
awellin� units were substanoarc anr re­
quirec clearance ; but little ha� been 
c'lone about them since . "115/ 
During a luncheon it  was brought to Mayor Richarr Mellon ' s  
( 
attention " • • •  that 18, 000 families wou ln have to  move 
114Ibir . ,  pp . 116-117 .  
115rbid . ,  p .  153 . 
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for ind us trial re.develo�ment . " 116/ Their moving into 
already cro�ded areas could create more slums and de­
terioration a� a quicker than ever pace . "Mellon was 
shocked .  He recognized that these f�cts would s care 
off the conpanies he and others were endeavoring to 
attract to the Pittsburgh area o "ll7/ A conference was 
put together which was closely ass ociated with the ci-
tize n ' s  interests . It was intended t o  be in  charge of 
the hous ing program. Mellon did not like the idea of 
the conference handling the housing program. He felt 
that the businessmen should be the decis ive element in 
the housinr; proposals . There were objections that "the 
people"  would be totally ·alienated from the source of 
change of which they were the primary targe t .  The ob-
jections produced no avail and a new group was formed 
called ACTION-Housin3, Inc . and was headed by Mellon ' s  
assistant . Certain steps were taken to  provide housing 
for lower-middle income :?;roups but success was extremely 
l imited because of ACTION ' s  inability to deal with over-
riding s ocial issues : 
" .  • • amens them housing intesra t :ton , 
changing neir;hborhoods and the ci t�r '  s 
grm-1ing number of low-income , unskilled 
and unemployable Negroes--that �ould 
ll6Ibid . ,  p .  153 . 
l l7Ibid . ,  p .  153 . 
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not be resolved or . treated as rapi�ly 
as putting up some new builoings down­
town • "!l§,7 
San Francisco 
William Taylor , in his book HunG_ing Together: 
�ualiti in an Urban Natioq, blames federal legislators 
for the failure of federal programs , claiming that it is 
they who cater to the special interest groups . Though 
Taylor ' s  accusation may be legitimate ,  he does not ade­
quately support his argument . He cites as examples cases 
of local decision-making negligence:  
"Not untypical ,  for example , was the 
testimony of Jack Tuggle,  deputy director 
of the San Francisco office of the Federal 
Hous ing Administration and the official 
re·sponsible for carrying out in the Bay 
Area the provisions of President Kennedy ' s  
executive order requiring nondiscrimination 
in federally assisted housing. Replying to 
questions designed to  ascertain why almost · 
five years after the issuance of the order 
very few Negroes lived in new subaivis ions 
insured by FHA , Tuggle revealed a very nar­
row conception of his �esponsibilities . He 
said that when builders apply for mortgage 
insurance with the FHA , he ' calls their 
attention ' to the fact that they have signec 
a nonciscrimination agreement. But he aid 
not require them to seek to reach the Negro 
market,  or to advertise the equal opportun­
ity policy, or even to  make known to  poten­
tial buyers that they were bound by the 
executive order . "119/ 
ll8Ibid . ,  p. 155. 
1 19william L.  Taylor , Hanging Together:  F;guality in a.n Urban Nation , (New York, 19 fIJ, p . I42 . 
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Taylor goes on to explain that Tuggle felt that builders 
should not have to be required to pursue equal opportun­
ity just because they were uncter an FHA program s ince 
they still had to compete with other builders . 
Since the program states the necess ity for a non-
discrimination agre.ement , this cannot be identified as a 
Federal legislative error as clearly as it can a local 
executive error. It is the responsibility of the local 
authorities to see to it that . the Federal program agree-
. . 
ments are enforced .  Granted,  existing Federal programs 
leave a great deal to be desired, but it is the local au-
thorities ' inability to adequately implement the programs 
we do  have that accounts for the abuse of allocate0 re-
sources . 
on : 
To discre.di t his point even further, Taylor goes 
"It  may be a measure of relative influence 
that , al though top officials. of FHA and HUD made special efforts after the San Francisco 
hearings t o  inform regional staff that they 
expected the executive order to be enforced 
vigorously, Tuggle nevertheless felt free 
months later to  restate to  the press the 
views he had expressed at the hearing . "120/ 
Hence, we have a clear case  of federal forces trying to  
assure the enforcement of equal opportunity while local 
120 Ibic'! . ,  p .  148. 
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authorities buckle to the P.ressures of the _ more powerful 
local interest groups . Taylor cites even more evidence 
toward proving the inadequacy of local officials when he 
states that very few of the local officials he encount-
ered were able to elaborate on the long-term goals of the 
programs they were involved in. They knew the laws and 
regulations of the program inside and out many times but 
could not state its overall purpose as a social plan. 
Reference to another case study source points out 
the slowness of Sari Francisco ' s  planning--particularly 
for the elaerly. Most activity for the agec in San Fran-
cisco was undertaken by the Social Planning Department of 
the United Communi.ty · Fund . The Social Planning Department 
is divicef into various councils , committees, anc several 
subcommittees which are dominated by members of wealthy, 
conservative, old line families . In 1959 several of the 
committees pushed for uniting the various committees into 
one organization with its own professional staff . From 
this came the Ford sponsored "San Francisco Program for 
the Aging" which had one full time social worker and one 
full time secretary for a professional staff . 
"The project was directed in the tra­
ditional style of social planning in San 
Francisco, with heavy rel iance upon vol­
unteer committees . The SPA generaten 
more than twenty-five special committees 
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ruring the course of the Ford remon­
s tration • • •  Out of each of these ,  
in turnA came a variety of s ubcommit ­
tees . "�/ 
Though interest in unifying the commit tees initiater �n 
overall program, it 0id not suffice to bring about any 
notable amount of cohesiveness . What is more, out of 
the 24� members involved in the project,  very few re­
presenter the hara core neers of the elcerly . Mos t of 
the members were lea0ing churchmen and reco3nizec men-
bers of the com�unity such as rectors anr attorneys . 
These people all hac various private interests which suc­
ceeder in stimulating a great ceal of wasted energy anc 
inaction. 
"For example , one of the projects ' pro­
�osals , involving an expenriture of only $40, JOO over a two-year perior , was sub-
jectec to the scrutiny of ten separate com-
mi ttees--six committees of SPA anc four 
committees of the American Rea Cross,  the 
agency which would acminis ter the service 
in question. Ana the proposal was s till 
subject to review by the board of the Unitea 
Fund even though the money was to be pro-
vided by some source other than the Func . "122/ 
The application for the Fora grant starte0 out by 
setting three general goals which were later broken �own 
into several more specific goals thro�ghout the planning 
procedure for the project . The goals that evolvec from 
121Robert Morris snr Robert H.  Binstock , Feasible 
Planning for Social Ch3nge ,  (New York, 1966 ) ,  p .  39. 
122rbir . , p .  4o . 
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th� Ford application efforts in San Francisco are iistec 
in Appendix B along w ith the goals from a Forr. Founcation 
project in Denver, Worcester, and West Contra Cos ta,  all 
of which are taken from Morris and Binstock ' s  Feasible 
Planning for Social Change . One might question the pur­
pose of lis ting these goals within the confines of this . 
study s ince they have no intrinsic value toward contrib­
uting to the decision-making process �nvolver.. The value 
of these goals for the rea0er does not lie specifically 
in what is sai� but in the mere fact that there is s o  
much said . The questions that confront the rearer at 
this point are : "How realist ic are these goals in terms 
of being attaineG within the limitation of the Forr pro­
ject anc allocate0 resources ? "  anri "Why, if the goals 
are not realistic , were not fewer, more attainable goals 
set for the project ? "  as pointer. out by Morris anc Bin­
stock, though the goals " • • •  seem to  follow a logical 
course of systematic revelopment , in fact,  they developed 
erratically, in response to various pressures , interests , 
and events . "123/  The main reason for s o  many goals being 
produced was the existence of s o  many committees anc sub­
committees , all of which developed their own set of plan­
ning ob jectives . Each s ubcommittee was usually mafe up 
123rbid . , p .  4o . 
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of people from one specifiG area which they were affil-
iated with in some way during the course of their every­
day lives o As might be expected, each subcommittee and 
each member of each subcommittee wanted to take advantage 
of the opportunity to better their area of interest for 
themselves or the group they represented o A good ex�mple 
of this point can be taken from the manner in which re­
creation was handled o 
"As the Ford project be�an, the SPA 
formed a special com�ittee of repre­
sentatives ·fr om several senior cit izens ' 
centers and recreation groups serving 
the aged , which were primarily interested 
in provid ins limited recreational pro­
grams for their own members and in builo
/ ing up their respective me�nberships . " 124 
Since only 3 perce·nt · of the elderly in downtown Sun ?'ran­
cisco came in contact with the existing senior citizens ' 
centers , the SPA proposed expansion in the volume , clien-
tele , and service areas in an attempt to reach more ·el-
derly people in need of such facilitie s .  The SPA ' s  re-
creation committee was against this idea because of the 
pos s ibility of detractin� patronage from their own already 
existing facilities . The recreation committee claimed 
that elderly people prefer to travel to centers that they 
find attractive to them personally rather than s imply at­
tend the center mos t conveniently located . Available 
124Ibid . ,  p .  42 .  
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ev.idence on the matter, however, inricater. that those 
facilities that were being user were only user by people 
in the nearby community anr. not by people who woulr have 
to  travel a si3nificant �istance . 
Many of the people who ric have access to cen­
ters 0.ir not have a regular family phys ician.  It is for 
this reason that a health screening proposal was mare 
that woulr provife the elrerly with the proper me<ical 
attention. 
"The chairman an� the other members of 
the merical s ociety who eventually GO­
minate( committee activity prove� to be 
unrelentin�ly oppose� to the original 
health proposal ,  fearing that it woulr 
r.etract from the accustome0 responsibility 
of the private phys ician . "125/ 
It appeared that the medical s ociety was not recept ive to 
any proposal that was not profitable to the medical pro-
fess ion and its members . 
The only real example of citizen participation 
that had any significant results came about when the State 
cut the reimbursement rates to  nursing homes . Again one 
must question whether or not this can be consi0ere 0 a 
case of succes sful citizen participation since it occurre0 
at a much higher level than that of the har� core poor. 
When the reimbursement rates were cut , it was not the pa-
125Ibic1 . ,  p. 46.  
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tients who brought about a reconsiceration of the act, 
but the nursing home owners and influential relatives of 
the patients .  Had the patients themselves been the only 
victims of the cut rate, there most . likely woul� not have 
been anything done about it .  It was the owners and pay­
ing relatives of the patients , however, who had to make 
up the cost difference , and their protests were sufficient 
to reestablish higher rates ninety days after they were 
cut . 126/ 
San Francisco ' s  Hunters Point 
"Mr . Justin Herman, executive airector 
of the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency, 
refers to the pro.cess that occurred in 
Hunters Point -Bayview as ' c ollaborative 
planning ' .  In his view , the most important 
feature of the relationship is an attitude 
of trust on both sine s .  Some local critics 
say that he has the Joint Housing Committee 
' in his pocket ' ,  but incividuals who have 
provioed civic leadership in the project 
area over many years are generally satisfied 
w ith the relationship and believe that they 
have had an honest ana important role in 
shaping the plant . It happeriea that the 
goals of the citizen leaders were s imilar, 
so details could be worked out within a 
mutual framework . " 12 7/  
The above rather lengthy quote by Howard Hallman 
presents some interesting poss ibilities when evaluating 
the planning game . Justin Herman points out the impor-
l26rb�a . ,  pp. 4o-48 .  
l2 7Howard W .  Hallman, Neiehborhood Control of 
Public Programs , (New York, l976J, pp. f72 -173 . 
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tance of trust on both sides of the bargaining table . 
One must ask whether the "trus t "  being referred to is 
what led to the successful collaboration or perhaps the 
result of mutual interests at the onset of the planning, 
as Hallman points out , whereby agreements were ·eas ily 
made without fear of compromising ones own interest s .  
Throughout the writer 's  research, other similar cases of 
collaborative planning were found and in each instance 
the success was attributable to  nonconflicting interests 
among all concerned participants in the program. This 
type of planning does not come about very often because 
of the rare balance that is needed between the various 
interest groups . What sometimes sets the stage for this 
type of situation, as appeared to be the case in Hunters 
Point, is that the poor in their attempt to obtain a de­
cisive voice over city hall ,  put their trust and resources 
behind existing neighborhood organizations that though 
significantly respected by city hall and local auth�rities 
offer very conservative demands in terms of change for the 
poor. Also to  be pointed out is that even if neighborhood 
organizations are able to  attain a position whereby they 
have a voice in choosing n?ighborhood s taff members,  many 
times (as in Hunters Point ) the neighborhood s taff members 
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are uncer the central payroll of the local authority . 123/ 
Hence, Hunters Point was a success in terms of activating 
federal funds but leaves room for quest ion in terms of 
active citizen participation by the poor resi oents . 
Granted,  they took the power from city hal l  but the sig­
nificant question to be answered was , "Did they maintain 
that power in such a way so  as to actively and directly 
serve their needs ? "  
A perhaps more common type of planning used in 
San Francisco at the same . time is what Hallman refers to 
as "advocacy planning " .  This type of planning involved 
simply each interest group having its own planning afvo­
cate to represent a program that fits that particular 
group ' s  interests in the decision-making process . This 
type of planning can be effective anc has been on rare 
occasions when residents happen upon a leader who can 
forcefully and earnestly represent them. While the Joint 
Housing Committee was supposedly representing the resi­
dents in the major Urban Renewal program, Marshall Kaplan 
was a planning advocate who refused to be a part of the 
overall collaborative effort . When re jected as the prime 
consultant to the Redevelopment Agenct, he dropped out of 
the formal planning proceedings . Instead , Kaplan s ubmit­
ted a report calling for immediate construction of new 
128 
Ibid . ,  pp. 172-180 
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housing on ten acres of mostly vacant lanct · that would be 
split off from the 127 acre urban renewal projec t .  The 
plan went through, but Kaplan was s uppressed from further 
activity when he became " • • •  a public spokesman for the 
residents , not merely their professional advis or . " 129/ 
Though Kaplan ' s  organization eventually became 
very weak, it was respected by the members of the Joint 
Housing Commit tee . 
" • • •  they felt that at least it belonged 
to  the community and that with its own funds 
for consultants it had a kind of incepen­
dence which they lacked .  They did  not want 
a professional advocate, but they could see 
the advantage of having funds of their own 
to hire s taff and consultants and thereby 
enhance their role in collaborative planning . "130/ 
In evaluating the collaborative planning efforts ,  
Hallman s tates that the residents did not have the tech-
nical capacity necessary to initiate their own propqsals 
or perhaps play a more aggress ive role in the planning 
procedures . 
129Ibic . ,  p.  176 . 
130 6 Ibid . ,  p .  17 • 
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Washington, D . C .  
Southwest :  In 1953 , one of the Nation ' s  worst 
slums was Washington, D . C . ' s  550 acre Southwest sice.  For 
some time there was a great deal of conflict between au­
thorities over whether the area should be reaevelopea for 
the residents already living there or rebuilt for " • •  high-
er-income groups who would bring a greater tax return to  
the District • • "131/ 
From Low e ' s  report it appears that there was vir­
tually no conflict between citizens and the redevelopment 
authorities nor any citizen decision-making participation. 
Any conflict that existed was between the authorities 
· themse lves and since the area was s o  close to the Capitol, 
it was decided that it wquld be totally rebuilt and up-
graded. The people were moved out and middle and upper­
middle income housing was built . 
"By the enn of 1965, the redeveloped 
s ite was emerging as an attractive , ra-
cially integrated �ommunity of 5 , 700 
resident s ,  among them Congressmen and 
Senators , living in new private high-
rise apartments and townhouses  • • •  "132/ 
Southwest Washington did involve a more planned 
approach to  relocating the residents of the condemned area 
than have most city projects and was subsequently more 
131Jeanne R .  Lowe , Cities in a Race With Time, 
(New York, 1967 ) ,  p. 173 . 
l32Ib1d . ,  p. 172 . 
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successful than most .  One need only look at D . C .  today, 
however, to realize that its relocation and recevelopment 
planning was far from a total success . Between 1949 and 
1966, Title I projects have cisplacea 194 ,000 families 
and the District of Columbia has without question har. its 
share. 133/ 
n . c .  Planning in General : The overall planning 
game in Washington is not as smooth as a quick look at 
the Southwest might lead one to believe . The poor, lack­
ing the organization and resources to act independently 
were manipulated and abused by the various organizations 
seeking power. In 1962 four private organizations came 
together to form the United Planning Organization (UPO) . 
Later, in 1964 , i� also absorbed the Washington Action 
for Youth (WAY) ; originally initiated by Robert Kennecy. 
OEO required UPO to add representatives of the poor to 
its board of directors . UPO formed a Metropolitan Citi­
zens Advisory Council which consisted of four represen­
tatives from each neighborhood committee who were to 
choose the representatives for the central board .  What 
understan0ably resulted was the wide range of represen­
tatives allower. for too divers ified a group to come to a 
consensus about any specific issue. Representatives with 
133Ibia . ,  p. 172. 
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common interests acted as a bloc for the total board on 
proposals that were not geared toward benefiting them. 
. . 
UPO then tried t o  focus citizen action on specific issues  
by forming city-wide, issue-oriented committees . These 
committees seemingly had very little,  if any, formal cte-
cision-making power.. Their primary means of making their 
separate demands was to use various types of communication 
and meoia pressure (e .g . , picketing Senator Robert Byrd ' s  
home ) thereby initiating counterpressures from District 
. . 
officials and OEO onto UPo. 134/ 
In late 1965 the Community Improvement Corporation 
(CIC) was formed and a ye�r later contracted with UPO. 
. . . 
"However , the citizens a<ivis ory committee 
first organizec by UPO stayed in exis tence , 
s eparate from CIC ' s  board of directors , and 
since it was larBer, it had more poor people 
participating than the 40-man corporation 
board .  So there continued to be division 
and lack of. community cohesivenes s .  A s urvey 
made for the Senate Subcommittee on E.�ployment , 
Manpower and Poverty . in the s pring of 1967 
found the following: ' Facti.ons have formed to  vie for power within the corporat ion. 
These have formed around personalities . And 
one of the issues they fight over is whether 
to  bring in more hard core poor . As poor are 
brought in leaders of factions compete t o  win 
them to  their side . • "135/ 
134Howard w .  Hallman, Nei$hborhood Control of 
Public Programs , (New York, 1976), pp. 4o-5b. 
135rb.id . ,  p .  49.  
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Uniter Factions : A more specific and perhaps 
rather s uccess ful example of plannin8 in Washington, D . C .  
involved an old Junior High School . This particular case 
was a s ituation s imilar t o  that of Hunters Point in San 
Francisco, i . e . ,  both D . C .  City School officials and 
neighborhood res idents had a common goal and united to 
attain it . The just mentioned goal was to  replace the old 
school with new developments .  Proceedings involved in the 
planning for this area bear more evidence toward illustra­
ting the importance of centralized power in decision-making 
than decentralized power. If it  had not been for the unity 
of factions to centralize legitimate authority and the ex­
istence of a strong leacership figure (Reverand Fauntroy ) 
there would have most likely not been any s ignificant ac­
tion taken toward redeveloping this area . Reverand Faun­
troy had acces s t o  several profes sionals and businessmen 
who coul� provide the neighborhood with s ignificant re­
sources for power, e . g . , know-how and influence . UndeI' 
the title of ''Model Inner City Community Organization " ,  
Fauntroy and his people held 25 meetings with residents 
and a hearing which involved about 700 citizens . MICCO 
then developed a program and won the endorsements of 150 
local organizations to demons trate its acceptance . One 
hundred and fifty organizations , however, proved to  be 
too few to steer clear of opposition. Consequently, MICCO 
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had to  enlarge its membership to provide seats for an 
additional 37  representatives of various interest groups . 
Since most of the opposition was against the fact that 
MICCO dominated the program and not against the program 
itself, this strategy of token membership proved effec­
tive. One can easily see the potentialities for a stale­
mate had not all of the participating organizations main­
tained unilateral agreement on the needs for their neigh­
borhood. Hence , the physical planning and approval was 
a success in large part due to  the unity an0 know-how 
behind it . The same could not be said, however, of the 
social planning--of which there was little or none. An 
emphasis on social planning through the Model Cities pro­
gram showed how little local organizations were capable 
of doing in terms of solving problems that pure physical 
planning completely overlooked .  Even in the just mention­
ed area above, where a great amount of unity was attained, 
social planning brought to s urface enough new interests  
and factions to  cause subsequent planning efforts to fail .  
From what this writer has read concerning Washing­
ton, D . C . , there does not appear to  be anything definite 
or exciting that can be said about the city ' s  renewal 
planning . The main purpose behind including D.C. in this 
Chapter is to suggest with the first and last planning ex­
amples cited above, two very s ignificant points that will 
be hinted at time and time again throughout this stuoy . 
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First,  when massive change was desired, the 
residents had little, if anything, to  do with �t . Second, 
in the situation that did not involve social change , ano 
where there was unilateral agreement on the issues , citi­
zen participation was s ucces sfully utilized through re­
presentative organizations, but not without a great deal 
of'  politicking and compromise as to who maintains the 
power. So we have two examples of s uccess in terms of 
utilizing allocated Federal funds and creating change ; 
but in the first where s ocial factors were definitely in­
volved, citizens were avoided; and in the second which was 
not massive and which did not involve s ocial issues , re­
presentative citizen organizations were extensively used. 
Success was not attained, however, without great diffi­
culty even with the aid of strong leadership and unilateral 
agreement on the proposal .  
The middle section of  this very brief report on 
Washington , D .C . ' s  renewal planning a0ds additional in­
sight to h�� the poor are many t imes exploited when they 
cannot be avoided. 
-131-
Chicago ' s  Hyde Park 
Depending on what point a particular author is 
trying to  emphasize, one might find sources using Hyde 
Park as a plus for decentralized decision-making or 
sources using Hyde Park as a minus for decentralized 
decision-making . This rather clas s ic example of Urban 
Renewal seems to  be a favorite referent of many socio-
logists and political scientists . The inherent contra­
diction within Hyde Park ' s  planning game which gives it 
a seemingly paradoxical elast icity is not diss imilar to 
renewal projects in other cities . The neighborhood under 
consideration for redevelopment did succeed in having ef­
fective res ident participation. The irregular nature of 
the neighborhood itself, however, leads one to ask which 
residents in particular participated and which did not ;  
and whether those who did participate were truly repre­
sentative of the overall neighborhood . North West Hyne 
Park is an area one-fourth of a square mile near the 
University of Chicago with about 17,000 people--mostly 
black. 
"In the center ·or the neighborhood are 
clustered large , well maintained brick 
and frame single-family homes , similar 
in quality to those in Kenwood. These 
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have always been occupied by whites , 
many employed at the University of _ 
Chicago and George Williams College . "13o/ 
As one might expect from other similar cases of renewal, 
the well-to-do minority of white upper-middle class re-
sidents in the center of the community took an extremely 
active role in the redevelopment effort · of that area. 
They maintained control of both resident and mediating 
conference representation. A contr�st can be made with 
South West Hyde Park where the community conference, in­
tended to mediate between the officials and residents ,  
gave very little if any consideration to the wants of the 
citizens . Eventually the conference was cut off com-
pletely from the residents . In North West Hyde Park, the 
upper-middle class residents controlled both resident and 
conference positions , rendering the two as virtually syn-
onymous .  
"In February, 1954 ,  Maynard Kreuger-­
Professor of Economics at the University 
of Chicago, charter member of the Con­
ference, and a North West resident for 
more than twenty years--presentea a pro­
posal for creation of the North West Hyde 
Park Neighborhood Redevelopment Corpora­
tion to a committee of neighborh999 ;ead­ers assembled for this purpose . "rrI! 
136Peter H .  Rossi  and Robert A .  Dentler, The 
Politics of Urban Renewal :  The Chicago Findings , --­
(New 1orK, I961), p.  r§2 .  
137 6 Ibid . ,  p .  19 • 
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Hence, technically North West Hyde Park did maintain a 
high level of citizen participation. It appears safe 
to infer, however, that the black poor were not part of 
the citizen initiative and that the proposals made by 
the corporation did not involve the well-being of the 
black population. 
As already mentioned,  the South West Hyde Park 
project was different . There was no successful citizen 
participation at all ; the , entire plan was developed by 
the Univ.ersity of Chicago and appeared to be s trictly for 
the University ' s  benefit even though it involved the 
neighboring community area. The community protested the 
project on two major accounts : 
11 (1 ) The entire area to be cleared 
will be used for University utilization-­
with not.hing for the community. (2 ) Since the area is predominantly Negro, the op­
eration is seen as antiNegro c learance . "� 
A Neighborhood Association was developed by the residents 
and worked rigorously against the program, but it was pas ­
sed anyway, in spite o f  its obvious popular defeat within 
the overall community. 
North West and South West Hyde Park are two more 
examples of success in terms of attaining and using Feder­
al funds for renewal purposes but failure in terms of at-
138 6 Ibid . ,  p. 1 7.  
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taining genuine citizen participation, i . e . ,  participa­
tion by those most directly affected by the renewal .  
Though not necessarily as a result o f  the lack o f  parti­
cipation, there was very little done to help the poor re­
sidents of Hyde Park. 
Since the main purpose of this Chapter is to learn 
whether or not citizen participation is genuinely attained 
in urban renewal ,  a great deal concerning these .case stud­
ies is left unsaid . There are numerous closely related 
suggestable generalizations distinguished by the literature 
in this area which are not clearly inferable from this 
study. The reader is encouraged by this writer to delve 
into the case studies mentioned in this manuscript as a 
check to any conclusion he might be inclined . to make from 
the interpretations given within this work. For the pur­
pose of this study , however, the author must ask the 
reader to be aware of the following possible propositions 
that are not dealt with significantly in this study, but 
which add a great deal to cases such as Chicago 's  Hyde 
Park: 1 )  That genuine citizen participation occurs, does 
not necessarily mean that the residents have made the 
proper decisions to best utilize the program toward ser­
ving their needs . (Since there appears to be very few 
cases of genuine citizen participation in urban renewal 
this would be very difficult to prove . ) 2 )  From number 
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one above it logically follows that : Urban renewal 
that does not help the directly affected residents is 
not necessarily a result of lack of citizen participation. 
Citizen participation in Chicago ' s  Hyde Park was 
not genuine, in the way that 11genuine 11 has been used 
throughout this work; so one cannot claim that this was 
a case of genuine citizen participation failing to pro-
duce the most desirable changes . This is not what was in-
tended to be inferred from statement number one above . 
Statement number one above was made simply to point out 
the possibility of statement number two which does apply 
to  Hyde Park and many other studies covered by this research. 
Change very definitely took place through the urban renewal 
' 
proces s  which was not geared toward helping the poor res1-
dents of Hyde Park. Genuine citizen participation did not 
take place as it does not in many s imilar cases ; and yet ,  
there is not necessarily a direct association between the 
two .  A great many public officials , political scientists 
and sociologists continue to make the mistake of assuming 
that more citizen participation means more of the best 
possible decisions made for helping the poor when in ac­
tuality, there is very little positive evidence with which 
v-
to base this assumption. 
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So as not to detract from the ma jor purpose of 
the Chapter,  i .e . ,  determining whether or not citizen 
. . 
participation has been significantly attained in urban 
renewal ,  let us continue with the r�maining case studies . 
S t .  Louis 
S t .  Louis ' s  largest urban renewal project covered 
460 acres of blighted, apparently residential area called 
"Mill Creek Valley " .  
" •
.
• ·• 99 percent of the 2 , 100 structures 
needed major repairs ; 80 percent of the 
dwelling units had no bath or toile t ,  and 
more than two-thirds lacked even running 
water. 
"The City - had plans for redevelopment . 
A t  the late 1964 s tage of this planning, 
the area was parceled out among a variety 
of uses :  residential,  commercial,  indus­
t rial , expressway rights-of-way, and a 22-
acre expansion area for St . Louis Univer-s ity . 11 13.2/ . . 
Plans were made , the area was cleared , and Adde,  
the author of the above does not mention what part the re -
sidents played or even what became of the residents once 
the land was cleared.  Some indication is given later in the 
case s tudy when Adde states : "St . Louis ' s  present-day prob­
lems concern minority groups and poverty • • •  11 140/ "About 
of Downtown 139Leo Adde,  Nine Citie s :  The Anatom 
Renewal , (Washington , -D�.-c-.-,--9-0...,,9--,-p-.-2-o-o-· -. ---------
140 . Ibid . ,  p .  214. 
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25 percent of the residential sections of S t .  Louis are 
rated as s lums • • •  "141/ If the earlier planning; in 
S t .  Louis had involved at least adequate relocation pro­
cedures ,  there may not have been such an overwhelming 
problem of s lums in later years . 
As in other cities , the Mayor ordered the organ­
ization of a citizen ' s  committee called "Civic Progress ,  
Inc . "  which was " • • •  a loosely knit coalition of the 
business community ' s  elite . "142/ As might be expected , 
its main function �as to pull businessmen together to 
attack the possibility of revitalizing the central busi­
ness district . When the real problem of poverty hit home , 
Civic Progress ,  Inc. was still "representing" the people . 
Though it tried various means of approaching the problem, 
as one of its members ,  Harry Wilson,  put it ,  the commit­
tee had no competence in that field . 
Another curicus example of resident neglect can 
be . found in the not-too-distant history of East S t .  Louis -­
the effects of which still remain. Proposal after pro­
posal was presented by professional planners who apparently 
were under the illus ion that they would eventually be given 
the go-ahead . Public agencies and the legitimate govern­
mental powers were not working together and therefore in-
141 Ibid . ,  p .  215. 
142rb1d . ,  p .  212. 
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action was the inevitable r.es ult regardless of the hope-
less condition of the East S t .  Louis Waterfront . 
"St .  Louis development has meant little 
to  East S t .  Louis except that the view of 
the S t .  Louis skyline has become magnificent 
from the Illinois side of the river.  Ea.st 
S t .  Louis has also received more plans fur 
its riverfrcnt--no operating programs , but 
plenty of dis cus sion and meetings . New pro­
posals and riverfront improvement committees 
have kindled temporary fires of excitement , 
and planners and development consultants have 
come and gene . Nothing has happened.  While 
the St . Louis riverfront acquired a $37 mil­
lion memorial and a spin-off in addit ional 
development, the East St .  Louis riverfront 
became the home of a writhing, spaghetti 
shaped interstate highway system which dis ­
placed hundreds of families and which became 
a high-speed raceway through des irable river-
front property and through the city as a whole . "lli/ 
Model Cities 
Concerning the organization , Action for Boston 
Community Development , Stephen Thornstrom, author of a 
case study in Boston ' s  redevelopment notes : 
"The A .B .C .D.  experience does indeed suggest 
that the community-action model ,  in which 
national sponsors lay down only broad pro­
gram guidelines to insure that local creat­
ivity can find full expression, is difficult 
to realize in practice . "144/ 
143Robert c .  Mendelson, East S t .  Loui s :  The 
Riverfront Charade, (Edwards ville , igro), . p .  3 .  
144stephen Thornstrom, Povert�, Planning, and 
Politics in the New Bos ton: The Origin of A . B.C .D ., 
(New. York, 1909), p .  16b . 
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The amount of restrictions placed upon local 
public authorities eventually becomes recognized as the 
major reason for failure of the urban renewal programs . 
Unfortunately, Thornstrom and anyone else wh? drew the 
same conclusion was slightly off in his assessment of 
the procedural deficiencies . Thornstrom was correct in 
deducing that the broad guideline approach was ineffec­
tive but was wrong if he intended to infer that a more 
restricted procedure would suffice . 
The Department of Housing and Urban Development 
d�d draw the conclusion that the answer to achieving suc­
cess in urban renewal programs was in tighter res tric­
tions and a more rigid enforcement of the decentralized 
procedure . They incorporated their conclusion into the 
supposedly more comprehensive program of Model Cities . 
Though this program is relatively new (1968) and the phy­
sical results cannot actually be evaluated,  the proposal 
procedures for three of the major cities have been s tudied 
and published in a book by Marshall Kaplan called The Model 
Cities Program. The reports in these cities seem to be 
objective but avoid detail as to  what actual compromises 
were made in order to reach agreements . The reports most ly 
emphasize the s truggle of the cities to  meet the deadlines 
and regulations put forth by H.U.D . ,  and seems to measure 
the success of the proposals in terms of the abi lity of the 
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�ity t� meet th� one year deadline and not the intrinsic 
value of the proposals themselves . The importance of 
meeting the restrictions can be emphasized by the follow­
ing quote taken from a Model Cities . question and answer 
pamphlet :  "What happens if citizens and the city cannot 
agree on the ways residents will participate in the pro­
gram? " The answer was , "If residents and the city cannot 
agree to a way that will permit the city to meet the citi-
zen participation performance standards of the program, 
the city c�nn�t participat e . "145/ One· might be led to be­
lieve that the one year deadline and additional res tric-
tions would call for an even greater necess ity to short 
change the citizen. · It would seem that more cover-up ac­
tivities would have to be developed s imilar to  the A . B . C . D .  
in Boston t o  give the records an appearance of citizen 
participation where no actual citizen participa�ion took 
place o One could be right in making these assumptions be­
cause it appears that this is . actually what has taken place . 
S t .  Louis , now halfway through its  five-year pro-
gram has been exposed as a prime example of H .U .D . ' s  fail-
ure to control local authorities through Model Cities .  
"The multimillion-dollar federal program 
· that began with the promise o f  improving 
the quality of life for the urban poor 
has funneled contract awards totaling at 
145M�del Cities Pro�ram, Questions and Answers , 
(December, 1963) . 
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least $991 , 000 in the last two and a half 
years for architectural , engineering, ac­
counting and consultant services , a Post­
Dispatch study shows o " l4o/ 
* * * 
"Neighborhood resident evaluation workers, 
who are paid less than a third of the pro­
fessional fees , were angered to dis cover 
that their efforts were being duplicated • •  " 14 7/ 
Aside from needlessly contracting consultants at ridiculous 
prices,  St .  Louis officials have been guilty of reckless 
rec0rd-keeping and possibly the displacement of $800 ,000 . 
Atlanta, Dayton and Seattle 
Atlanta, Dayton and Seattle are dealt with as one 
case in this s tudy b�cause they had only completed the plan­
ning stage of the program when Kaplan did his studies of 
them. Even at the present time no s ignificant conclusion 
can be drawn as to whether the final product of these three 
programs will be a s uccess or failure . For the purpose of 
this s tudy, however, enough information is available to 
make brief but decisive s tatements concerning the decision-
making in these cities . 
Dayton: Howard Hallman cites Dayton as an example 
of a city that has succeeded in attaining citizen partici-
146Louis J .  Rose and Connie Rosenbaum, "Model City 
Consulting Cost $991 ,000 Here , "  St . Louis Post -Dispatch, 
(May 14, 1972 ) ,  p. 1 .  
1471b1a . ,  p. 28 . 
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pation through the Model Cities program. 148/ As des cribed 
by Kaplan and as evidenced indirectly by much of what Hal l ­
man s tates in his study , the c itizens were "involved" in 
the planning of the model neighborhood but t�ey were work-
ing virtually outside of the Model City program . The re-
sidents seemingly were used as a voting group which had 
little choice but t o  give approval ;  for if they didn ' t  they 
would be without a program entirely . 
"The Planning Council functioned well as 
a policy review and approval 8roup. It 
and the seven functional committees were 
not able , however , to effectively parti-
cipate in final drafting of Parts I ,  II,  
and III .  This task was completed by the 
city technicians and the Antioch team. "149/ 
Kaplan suggests  that the reason residents were not 
instrumental in planning the model program is because of 
the seemingly typical inability of neighborhood citizens 
to solidify toward common goals . Each subgroup tends to  
think that its  goals are most important and deserve top 
priority . 
"Accordingly, the citizen participation 
process followed the time-honored tradition 
of individualized and largely unrelated 
priorities .  This had little relevance to 
the rational approach posited by HUD. "150/ 
148Howard w .  Hallman, Neizhborhood Control of 
Public Pro�rams , (New York, 19 70) . 
149Kaplan,  Marshall ,  Gans anf Kohn , The Model 
Cities Pro�ram, (New York, 1970 ) ,  pp. 96-97 . 
l50ibid . ,  p .  97 . 
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Seattle : · Seattle ' s  citizen involvement was sim-
ilar to Dayton ' s .  The residents were seemingly kept busy 
with token .assignments to more or less keep them satisfied 
while the real planning was done by technicians . As Kap­
lan put it,  "Though citizens played a rather small  part 
in the preparation of Seattle ' s  plan, they were given a 
strong role in the planning process . "151/ As in Dayton, 
the citizens had approval power over proposals prior to 
their being presented to the Mayor which apparent ly was 
more of a gesture type of formality than a means of putting 
a pheck on the program. 
It seems that the Model City program introduced a 
new strategy for handling· the residents --keep them busy-­
make them feel like part of the program so they can ' t  be 
against it and yet work around them. The proof of this 
lies in the mere fact that in. Seattle,  as in Dayton, "The 
task of drafting the final s ubmittals was assumed by tech-
nicians . 11!.2.Y 
Atlanta:  Atlanta ' s  planning even more clearly 
than the other two cities just mentioned, neglected the 
genuine participation of citizens . Perhaps the main dif­
ference �ies in the fact that Atlanta didn ' t  try to hide 
1511b1a . ,  p. 63 . 
l52Ibid . ,  p .  63 . 
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the fact that it avoided the citizens as did Seattle and 
Dayton. The follo�ing quote quite accurately sums up the 
attitude existing at that t ime toward citizen participa ­
tion and how it was dealt with by the authorities . 
"Direct s ustained citizen involvement 
in Atlanta ' s  planning program was minimal.  
Whatever meaningful continuous involvement 
did exist resulted from the review and s ign­
off powers granted the Executive Board and 
its s ix Model Neighborhood res ident members . 
Neighborhood meetings were used by s taff to 
present their reports and to elucidate a re ­
sponse to these reports .  In effect they were 
sensitivity sess ions . The limited degree of 
citizen participation was the result of a 
conscious decision on the part of the CDA , 
a decision apparently acquiesced in by the 
community. This decision was { according to  the CDA s taff , dictated by (l J the need to 
meet • tough ' one-year planning requirements ; 
(2 ) the need to carry out reasonably diffi­
cult analytical proces ses ; (3 ) the need to 
choose between often competing HUD planning 
objectives 1· (4 ) Atlanta ' s  traditional way of planning . "  53/ · 
The Model City program, s upposedly intended as a 
get tough on local authorit ies policy, apparently left cit­
izen involvement "open-ended " ,  as Kaplan put it,  as a safe-
ty valve for the additional limited t ime pressure . HUD 
requirements s tate that ,  " • • •  means must be developed 
permitting residents of the Model Neighborhood to be fully 
involved in planning and · execution • • .• "15o/ but never 
l53�bid . , p .  35 .  
154rbid . ,  p .  35 .  
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s tate ho� or to  what extent . Hence, though some degree 
of citizen involvement may be found in the "planning pro­
cess " ,  i . e . ,  busy work such as " • • •  initiating and de­
veloping problem s tatements and program approaches • •  "155/ 
there might not be any citizen participation in the actual 
program planning . Kaplan makes the following conclus ive 
s tatement in regards to  the application of Seattle , Dayton , 
and Atlanta : 
"To a very real extent,  the application 
was the product of a small group of ' insid­
ers ' • • •  Primarily respons ibility for the 
context of the application grant res ted 
variously wtth professionals , officials , 
and community leaders . "156/ 
When evaluating the implications of the above given 
results ,  one must keep in mind that the entire decentralized 
approach to solving urban problems revolves around the in-
. . tention to have the poor creating their own program. If 
the program fails to be a direct product of the people, 
then the primary function of decentr·alization has failed 
and though change may take place, needed urban change as 
defined at the outset of this paper is denied . 
The A . C . I .R .  (Advisory Commis sion on Intergovern­
mental �elations ) has to a great extent occupied itself 
155Ibid . ,  p .  63 . 
l56Ibid . ,  p .  99. 
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with the problem of decentralized government and its con-
t1nued failures in dealing with urban problems . The Com-
mission ' s  conclusions show a great deal of inconsistency 
varying from publication to publication. In realization 
that the more recent restriction-oriented approach to 
making decentalization work is not effective , the Commis­
sion advised as follows : 
"The Federal Government has been too spe ­
c ific and too detailed in many of its s tand­
ards and requirements . Federal categorical 
and program requirements seem all too often 
to  imply that officials at other levels of 
government cannot or should not be trus ted 
to exercise good judgment . "157/ 
The naivete and oversimplification of this statement seems 
hardly excusable coming from a commis sion dedicated to sol-
ving intergovernmental problems . The fact that s ixteen 
of the twenty-eight members on the Committee are Governors, 
Mayors , Members of State legislative bodies and elected 
county officials may, however , bear some explanation of the 
Commission ' s  conclusions at that time . 
By now it must be realized that the failure of de­
centralization to produce effective results does not lie 
in the degree of enforcement of the rules but within the 
nature of the local commun�ty. Numerous studies of citie s ,  
including those discussed above , have shown that in reality 
157state· Aid to Local Government, A . C . I .R . , 
Report A-34 , (April, 1969) , p .  17 . 
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the local public authoritie� are not in a position to 
cater to the wants and needs of the poor . The local pub-
lie authorities are for the mos t part professional poli-
ticians who wish to remain as s uch . They realize their 
need for the support of the influentials--the people with 
money, the people who will get them reelected . 
" • • •  elected officials serve the interests 
of certain groups rather than some hypothet­
ical overall public interest • • •  In practice , 
in a democracy, the needs and preferences of 
unponular , and powerless  groups are neglec­
ted . '' 1 5 �/ 
158Martin Rein, "Social Planning: The Search for 
Legitimacy u�  in Toward a National Urban Policy, ed . Daniel 
P .  Moynihan, (New York, 19 70), pp.  209-210. 
CHAPTER V :  PO',�ER :  A THEORETICAL 
---·------------
INTS..qf.RETATION OF URBAN RSNE'.<!AL FAILURE --------------
'!Wo of the major theories of community power 
structures are represented by the opposing views of c .  w .  
Mills and David Riesman. Mills saw community power a s  a 
three layer pyramid :  the top layer represents the power 
elite, the middle level represents the influential inter-
est groups and the bottom layer represents the masses of 
society. Riesman saw the top layer as essentially diffu­
sed into the middle layer and referred to this layer �s 
the "veto groups " .  Essentially little difference can be 
detected in the bottom layer, i . e . ,  Mills saw the masses 
as being controlled by those above them and Riesman saw 
the masses as an uno�ganized public s ought after by the 
.interest groups as an ally. 159/ To say that one is right 
and the other is wrong would be to admit that all commu­
nities are the same . There are various degrees of both 
of these types of community s tructures . Two extreme ex­
amples are probably New York City during the time of Lind-
say ' s  election as mayor and Chicago, Illinois . New York 
City had so many interest groups pulling in different di-
rections toward their own private interests that very lit­
tle was ever accomplished in terms �f �hange . 
159va111am Dornhauser, "Power Elite " or "Veto 
Groups ? "  in ·c .  Wright Mills and the Power Elite , ed . 
G .  William Damfiorr and Hoyt E. Ballard, (EosEon, 1969) , 
pp .  35-59. 
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"The city was regarded as a collection of 
separate disparate interest groups ,  each 
of which had nothing to do with the others . 
The goal was to keep the city afloat by 
ministering first to one group, satisfying 
it,  and then turning to the next group wbose 
dissatisfaction was at a crisis sta3e . "lbO/ 
Chicago adds a point to Mill ' s  pyramid in Mayor 
Daley, Chicago also has its interest groups and Daley, 
being the shrewd politician that he is ,  knows that it is 
downtown businessmen that are the paying. customers and it 
is to them that he must cater . 
The important point to be made is that both feel 
·the weight of the interest groups ; whether it be diffusion 
to the point of a ·standstill or whether it be the more 
powerful interest ·groups implemented through a strong cen­
tral authority s uch as Daley . 161/ 
C .  w .  Mills points out in his book, The Power Elite ,  
a balance of power implies equality of  power. In reality 
this seldom, if ever, takes place .  The more powerful con-
demn the less powerful as disturbers . The theory of bal­
ance depends on the idea of rational harmony of interests 
which does not exis t .  Mills goes on to say that "pressure 
groups " especially those of rural and urban businesses have 
l60John V.  Lindsay, The Citu, (New York , 1969) , 
p .  75. 
161Mike Royko, Boss : Richard J .  Daley of Chicago , 
(Chicago, 1971 ) .  
-150-
" • • •  become the instruments of small and ·powerful cliques , 
which sometimes include their nominal leaders but often do 
not • 11 162/ 
Marvin Olsen purports the elitist theory to be a 
reaction to Marxism, i . e . ,  the elitist theory of the major 
figures . Marx, given credit by Olsen as the principal in­
tellectual of contemporary political sociology, argued that 
power is a result of economic production. Economic produc-
tion maintains social stratification whereby the government 
is forced to serve the dominant class . 
"Marx thus expanded the concept of power 
from a specifically political phenomenon 
to a ubiquitous social process and offered 
a theory of societal dey� ! O,Pment based on the exerclse of power . "l§j; 
Elitist theorists maintained that a concentration 
of a powerful few was both necessary and inevitable for a 
society to be socially organized.  This is in direct oppo­
sition to Marx ' s  belief that the social process of change 
was evolutionary in nature whereby s ociety moved closer t o  
classlessness and an equal power distribution . 164/ 
p .  247 .  
162wright Mills , The Power El ite , (New York, 1956 ) ,  
163Marvin E. Olsen, "Marx as a Power Theorist " ,  
in Power in Societies , ed .  Marvin E .  Olsen, (New York, 1970 ) ,  
p .  10 . 
164Marvin E .  Olsen, "Elitist Theory as a Response 
to Marx"·, in Power in Societies , e <" .  Marvin E. Olsen, (New 
York,. 1970 ) ,  p .  Io6. 
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Pareto and other elitist theorists were convin-
ced that social change is a cyclical process with no 
foreseeable deviation from the existing pattern. Marx 
saw a pattern in social change , but it was more of a spiral 
type of effect rather than cyclical,  i . e o ,  society goes 
through three phases : thesis,  antithesis and synthesis 
of which the end prcduct (or narrowest possible point of 
the spiral )  is the above mentioned state of classlessness .  
There are of course many theorists who re ject both 
Marxism and Elitist theory such as the social pluralists . . ' 
who uphold political democracy or decentralization as the 
ultimate d:i.stribution of social power . Decentral ization 
might, quite loosely, be described as the inverse of elit-
. . 
1st theory whereby the power flows in the opposite direc-
tion, i . e . ,  from the masses to a few selected 11representa -
tives" of the masses . A .  de Tocqueville warned of the pos­
sible dangers of the pluralistic societal model �hich , in 
spite of the fact that Tocqueville ' s  suggested alternative 
is being attempted , have become serious realities of our 
time . 
"Tocqueville sa'll mass equality, cr�ated by 
the breakdown or absence of tradit ional 
bureaucracies of feudal authority, as pro­
vidin3 fertile sround for the emercence or 
. a  ' tyranny of the ma jority ' that would be 
totally destructive of indi victual freedom . ''165/ 
165i�a.rvin E. Olson , "Social Pluralism as a Basis for Democracy" ,  in Prn·1er in Societ ies ,  e d .  Marvin E. Olsen,  
(New York, 1970 ) ,  p .  I83. 
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As an anitdote to this pos sibility, Tocqueville proposed 
that intermediate levels of organization in the form of 
autonomous , private , voluntary and special-interest as-
sociations be  developed thereby providing a more personal 
link bet�een the individual and the national level of gov -
ernment . Today s uch a level of organization has become 
a s ignificant political and s ocial reality in countries 
such as the United States where decentralized power is fe r­
vently cherished . 166/ Though various special interest or-
ganizations do exist ,  they do not maintain equal amounts 
of power; for poorer, lower s tatus organizations can not 
enjoy the same overall representation or decision-making 
.voice �s the wealthy upper class organizations . Hence , 
Tocqueville ' s  proposed alternative , though beneficial to  
many, does not prevent what he so adequately labeled as 
the "tyranny of the majority" .  
Theodore Lowi,  in The Politics of Disorder, offers 
a very enlightening unders tanding of s ome of the short­
comings of a decentralized power distribution as a means 
of attaining needed s ocial change . The following s igni-
ficant quote by Lewi is extremely relevant to  the Urban 
Cris is : 
"Decentralization has become a fashion­
able mode of response . Yet there is little 
assessment of the methods and consequences 
lf?�Ibid . 
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of decentral ization. If there were , there 
might be less propens ity to favor it . Though 
it is understandable that Americans find the 
notion of decentralization attractive , there 
are stron6 reasons for beine skittish about 
i t .  The most important of these i s  that de­
centralization tends to plug government into 
the interest -group system . · Thus , during a 
t ime of great chan6e l ike the present, decen­
tralization, in effect ,  commits government 
to  system maintenance just when it is trying 
to  be , or at least trying to appear to be , 
on the s ide of chanse . To the many movement 
leaders who were educated to favor decentral­
ization, the outcome of decentralized policies 
ultimately be�r! ins to look lik� a gigantic s tab . in the back . ".!.§11 
&lward c .  Banfield , appointed to the Advisory Com-
mission on Intergovernmental Relations during the s ummer 
of 1971,  recognizes not only that interest groups are a 
s ignificant determinant of the decisions made by local 
public authorities , but also that as long as the commu-
nity is comprised of various influential interest groups , 
decentralization will never be an honest representative 
of participatory democracy when it comes to aiding those 
in the greatest need .  
"The presence of  the influential on the 
American civic s cene is to  be accounted 
for on several Grounds . The mos t impor­
tant of these ,  perhaps , is the decentral­
ization of authority that is a character­
istic of the American political system. • 
Accordingly, the businessman (or anyone 
else)  finds it easy to 'ge t  in on the act � .  
167Theodore J .  Lowi ,  The Politics of Disorder, 
(New York, 1971 ) ,  p .  65 . 
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Because he can check the_ public official , 
- he can also bar�ain with him ; as it  is 
usually expressed � the official ' needs his cooperation ' .  •160/ 
Wentworth Eldridee strongly emphasizes that there 
are many obstacles to participatory .democracy on the urban 
redevelopment leve l :  
" • • •  We fail to recognize in our plu­
ralistic s ociety that not only do the 
three tiered governments govern, but also 
that in addition �overnment corporations , 
government bureaus , private foundations , 
quasi-private corporRtions , quasi-public 
corporations , foundations , universities , 
labor· unions , private ·cooperatives , free 
associations including even s .7. s . --all 
play a part in government . "169 
As pointed out by Frederic Cleveland, even if an 
interest group since�ely �ants to  do what is best for the 
city its perspectives will be from a very limited point 
of view. The best example of this (and most pertinent to  
our discussion) is  the city planner.  The city planner is 
usually a bricks and mortor specialist without the s light-
est inclination toward social or �omprehensive planning. 
His lack of awareness of the s ocio-psychological needs of  
man limit his planning to physical and functional programs . 
168Eclward c .  Banfield and James Q .  Wilson ,  "Power 
Structure and Civic Leadership '' , in Metropolis in Crisis , 
ed .  Jeffrey K. Hadden, Louis H .  Maso€fa, Caivfn J. tarsen, 
{Itasca, Illinois ,  1967 ) ,  p .  419. 
l69wentworth H .  Eldridge , "Toward a National Policy 
for Planning" in Urban Planning in Trans ition, ed .  Ernes t  
Erber, {New York, 1970}, p .  5. 
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There has been an overwhelming amount of empiri­
cal s tudies done on community power . An excellent biblio­
graphy of the major s tudies done s ince Floyd Hunter ' s  '�e­
gional City" can be found in a study by John. Walton entit­
led "A Systematic Survey of Community Power Research " .  An 
essay on the particular study is available in a book edited 
by Aiken and Mott--The Structure of Community Power. 
Walton ' s  findings are very s ignificant for our purposes . 
In his comparison of the various power s tudies ,  Walton 
found two basic types --reputational and decisional . De -
pending on which of these two methods is used ,  one ' s  find-
ings will systematically vary accordingly, 1 . e . ,  if one 
employs the reputational method he is more likely to come 
up with certain findings than if he employs the decisional 
method and vice versa.  One s uch finding of variance ac-
cording to the method used was that the reputational · showed 
a more elitist type of power structure , and the decis ional,  
a more pluralistic type of power structure . 170/ This phen­
omenon adds to the already difficult task of making compre-
hensive generalizations from the various empirical power 
studies that have been done . As Walton points out, 
'�ince the type of power structure identified 
by studies which re1y on a single method may 
170John Walton, "A Systematic Survey of Community 
Power Research" ,  in The Structure of Community Power, ed .  
Michael Aiken, Paul E. MotE, (New YorK,  1970), pp . ij43 -464. 
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well be an artifact of that method, futur-e 
research should simultaneously employ sev­
eral techniques and continue to compare tbI/ 
characteristics of each with the other. 111'{ 
Our main concern here is not developing a new instrument 
for future power studies but in the credibility of those 
already made . As pointed out earlier when referring to 
Mills and Riesman, whether an elitist power or an amorphous 
power exists in a particular city or community is not s ig­
nificant in terms of evaluating whether or not the most 
knolwedgeable people in· the area of planning were instru-
mental in the decis ion-making or whether or not the citi­
zens actually participated , which is a central issue of 
this study. In referring to his own findings and perhaps 
the findings of other authors such as Walton, Michael 
Aiken concludes the following : 
"It seems clear . from these findings that 
the nature of community power structure 
is by no means the most important or only 
factor affecting community mobilization 
and, therefore , is probably not the most 
e ffective or appropriate theoretical frame­
work for trying to understand these phenom­
ena • • • perhaps a framework that considers 
all communities to be decentralized , that 
is made up of diverse and competing cenlers 
of power, would be more productive . "172 
171 4 Ibid . ,  p .  53 . 
172Michael Aiken , "The Distribution of Community 
Power:  Structural Bases and Social Consequences " ,  in 
The Structure of Community Power,  ed.  Michael Aiken and 
Paul E. iviott, (New YorI<, I970), pp. 487-525.  
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The point that Aiken seems to be making her·e and 
the significant finding of nearly all community power 
studies regardless of methodology used or label given to 
the power structure studied , is  that interest groups do 
exis t .  While this statement does not overflow with pro­
fundity in itself,  it adds a very si3nificant link between 
the study at hand and empirical community power studies . 
Floyd Hunter ' s  study of Bennington demonstrated, 
through the use of tables ,  who the town leaders were and 
the amounts of cohesian among these leaders concerning 
different issues . The results indicated that the leaders 
were those who represented the most interest groups and 
their greatest cohesian was on small iss ues where com­
promise and tokenism could be afforde a . 173/ One might 
infer from these results 'that decisions are made in con-
. junction with various interest groups and that interest 
groups maintain certain checks on each other which inhibit 
changes {let alone adequate change ) from taking place. 
In communities where there exists what James Coleman re-
fers to,  in Community Conflict , as an "interlocking of 
memberships"  whereby a community has its important mem-
bers in more than one organization or interest group, 
change is quite pass ively s lowed down. The reason . for 
l73Morris Janowitz , Community Political Systems , 
(Illinois , 1961 ) ,  pp. 11 7-123 . 
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this ph�nomenon is s imply that if comm�nity leafers have 
their hands in various interests , it is  very difficult 
for them to cater to their right hand without risking 
cutting off their left--except perhaps on minor issues .  
Subsequently, the safest road to  take is  down the middle 
to inaction. If a community has isolated interest groups , 
however, it  will be factionalized and the members will be 
in constant conflict . 174/ This is exemplified in a case 
study by Warner E. Mills and Harry R. Davis called "The 
Case of th� Crowded Corral " .  In this particular example, 
a .restaurant owner wanted to have a zone changed so that 
he could build a parking lot in a residential area. The 
people with decision-makin5 authority were not influenced 
by whether or not a parking lot should be built in that 
particular area or whether or not it would be right to 
change . the zoning for one isolated resident, but were in-
fluenced in main by whether or not they or their influen­
tial friends lived in that pa�ticular area . Those who liv-
ed in that area were against the changing of the zoning 
restriction and those who did not live in that area were 
in favor of it  because the restaurant in questi on was one 
of the biggest  in town, the owner was very influential and 
the parking lot would allow for more street parking space 
1 957 ) . 
174James s .  Coleman, Community Conflict, (New York, 
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�hich w9uld improve business and ' parking facilities for 
the downtown area . How the case turned out is , of course ,  
not· inportint because either way , the final decision was 
based on who could use his influenc� and the power of his 
interest group to  the best of his advantage rather than 
on what was best for the people of the community . In cases 
such as this , people are sometimes forced to clearly · de-
fine their position since they are going to be directly 
affected by a decision not i� their favor . Subsequent to 
forced actfvlsm, conflicts som�times develop into stale-
mates which go many times for years before they are re-
solved . 
Herbert Gans ' stu�y of Levittown is an excellent 
illustration of the ineffect iveness  of the pluralistic 
model , i . e . ,  interest group decision-making procedure in 
terms of serving the needs of the less powerful minority 
groups . The just mentioned study is an analysis of the 
political and decis ion-making process in Levittown, Penn-· 
sylvania (also Levittown, New Jersey ) where Gans lived as 
a participant observer for two years . Gans found the de­
cision-making proces s  ruled by four criteria; 
"First , governr.ient is normally passive ; it 
waits for issues to come to its attention . 
"Second, government avoids or pos tpones 
decisions that cannot be resolved without 
conflict or that expose the gap between 
the a�tual and the performing government . 
• • 
• • 
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"Third, government ·gravitates toward de­
cis ions with immediate payoffs , "  avoiding 
those which produce mainly long-run ef­
fects o • •  
"Fourth, the decision-making process is 
s tructured so that , whenever possible , every 
elected official is free--or feels he is 
free--to reach the decis ion dictated by his 
conscien�e and by his des ire to benefit the 
community. Whether or not he is ever really 
free is debatable , but the feeling of being 
s o  allows him to claim that he is not re-
quired to pay attention to citizen pressure,  
to include his own values in his . decisions , 
and to identify these as the public interest .  
Feeling fr8e to  vote ' according to his con­
s cience ' al1ows him to make decisions that 
will please his reference groups and ·the· con·- ·. · 
s tituents from whom he gets the most votes . 11175/ 
* * * 
"The application of these criteria re­
sulted in decisions which : (1 )  maintained 
Levittown ' s  governmental bureaucracy and 
municipal service up to voter exoectations ; 
(2 ) aided the party in power;  (3) benefited 
large or otherwise influential voter blocs 
and satisfied interest groups that were 
either in constant contact with the 80vern­
ment , could apply pressure on it,  or had 
campaign funds to contribute (or withhold ) ;  
(4 ) represented pet pro jects or vested
11
i:i� 
teres ts of individual decision-makers . 1 70/ 
The two major interest groups were the Levitt or­
ganization (Mr . Levitt himself)  and a group of businessmen 
who bought land in the downtown section to build stores 
and shopping areas . The municipal government was eager to 
l75Herbert J. Gans , The Levittowners , (New York, 
1 967 ) ,  pp. 333-334 . 
176Ibid . ,  pp. 33L�-335 .  
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pl�ase the businessmen but would not make decis ions· with­
out consulting Levitt . Within whatever means afforded 
them, the politicians served each other ' s  private inter­
ests,  most of which were geared toward reelection tactics . 
"Even when beset by internal s trife , the decis ion-making 
bodies always united to defend members against attack from 
citizens . 11111/ 
Of particular significance was the effect that 
Levittown ' s  just described network of interests had on mi­
norities s uch as the blacks . Gans points out that minor­
ities could only effect change by resorting to "political 
schemes " or appealing to forces outside of the city itself 
such as in the case of Levittown ' s  racial desegregation. 
William Levitt owned the building company in Levittown and 
made it a practice not to sell homes to blacks . When ap­
proached by the press ,  Levitt openly admitted that he had 
no intention of desegregating the town. Shortly after , 
two black people brought suit against him in the State 
courts . Levitt stalled for as long as he could so that 
most of the homes would be bought by white people but even­
tually the State and Federal courts forced enforcement of 
the desegregation laws and Levittown was integrated . 
Why didn ' t  local officials and administrators see  
to it  that desegregation laws were being enforced without 
l77Ibid . ,  p .  336 . 
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blacks having to resort to ·lawsuits? T�e answer appears 
to be all too clear--any politician who acted against the 
interests of the larger blocs and/or Levitt himself would 
not have been a politician very long. 
There are many community power s tudies among vrhich 
there are many types of power structures found to be in 
existence . As has previously been indicated, however,  the 
significance of these studies does not 11e in what parti-
cular type of power structure pretlominates among communi-
ties but the fact that interest groups always exis t .  Whether 
there are only a few powerful interest groups which are 
representative of an elite or several powerful interest 
groups representatlv� of a more amorphous power structure , 
makes l ittle difference to interest groups that have no 
po;"1er at all .  The power that is distributed within a com­
munity varies in terms of being centralized or decentrali-
zed, but each community ' s  power structure is only a small 
part of an overall decentralized national structure , The 
e ffects of a more centralized community power structure 
cannot be generalized from s ince its power is part of an 
overall decentralized system. Only the effectiveness can 
be generalized from. "Effectiveness " is used here in re-
, 
ference to ability to initiate change and "effects " is  
used in reference to the characteris tics of the change 
m�de . Hence, effects are the result of the particular 
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interests of the group mai�taining the mos� power and 
effectiveness is the result of the balance of power it-
self, i . e . ,  if one or a small number of groups have a 
disproportionate amount of power they will �e more ef­
fective in brinsing about change . This says nothing 
about what the effects of the changes will be except that 
they will most likely be to win s upport of a majority bloc 
or benefit the particular group or groups initiating the 
change . 
From the example of Levittown one can see the ef­
fectiveness of a power s tructure that has or.ly a couple 
of very powerful interest groups and be reasonably assured 
that the same effectiveness will exist in s imilar power 
settings . Many of the Urban Renewal case studies dis -
cussed in Chapter IV bore evidence to this fact , e . g . , 
New York under Moses and Boston under Logue . Olsen ·pur­
ports what is being referred to here as "effectiveness " to 
be the balance between the resources committed toward a 
goal and the res istance met by these committed resources . 
Essentially this appears to be a rough formula which can 
be applied with relative consistency. 178/ The question 
then arises , "Given a certain amount of effectiveness ,  can 
the effects of a particular community power structure be 
178r.iarvin E. Olsen, "Power as a Social Process , "  in 
Power in Societies ,  ed. Marvin E.  Olsen, (New York, 1970 ) ,  
pp. �-Id. 
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predetermined? "  The answer must be "No, they cannot . "  
At the community level of the total decentralized struc­
ture, the level where people ' s  private lives , property, 
and desires are immersed into almost every decis ion they 
make , the effects of change depend on what the more power­
ful groups have to gain or lose in each specific cas e .  
Hence there can be no systematic means o f  ass uring s ocial 
justice unless it is composed from fo�ces beyond the local 
power structure . Again Levittown serves as a case in point . 
This is not to say that there are no powerful local decis­
ion makers who will adhere to altruistic values and work 
toward social justice; for our survey of the renewal case 
studies bore o�t the ·fact that there are . It is to say, 
however ,  that where more tangible rewards are at stake , it 
seems reas onable to assume that altruism will seldom pro­
vide s ufficient stimulus toward determining action . 
As Marvin Olsen suggests,  social power is depen­
dent upon resources ,  i . e . ,  money, land, material possess ­
ions , organizational members or intangibles such as know­
ledge , skills , legitimacy, and organizational unity. 179/ 
If an individual ' s  power is dependent upon tan3ible re­
sources, (either directly or indirectly) he mus t use his 
power to defend those resources ;  for if the resources are 
179Ibid . 
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threatened in any way so is his power. Hence we have 
effectiveness for the purpose of maintaining effective­
ness rather than bringing about s ocially desirable ef­
fects . If an individual ' s  power is dependent upon intan­
gible resources s uch as knowledge and/or skill and once 
established not indirectly dependent upon tangible re­
sources ;  he must use his power to bring about desirable 
effects .  Desirable effects are the only means of assert­
ing the knowledge _or skill representing the resources upon 
which the power is based . Without des irable effects there 
is no recognizable evidence of knowledge or skill and sub­
sequently nothing from which the individual can maintain 
his power . 
What does all of this mean in terms of the urban 
renewal case studies that were discussed in Chapter IV? 
It is apparent from these studies that the urban poor, 
who are extremely lacking in both tangible and intangible 
resources , have very little power. They don ' t  have the 
power to assure their own active participation, nor ef­
fectiveness if participation is by some means granted . 
Our decentralized national policy dictates that legiti ­
mate authority should be granted all the way down t o  the 
bottom rung of the social ladder s o  that the poor can de­
termine their own des tiny . What many fail to realize is 
that the poor lack the necessary resources to overcome the 
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"Force" and "Dominance "l80/ exerted by groups that do have 
resources . Hence, legitimate power afforded the poor is 
never actualized . As Alvin Schorr quite accurately de­
scribes the s ituation: 
"The terms ' citizen participation ' or , more 
recently, ' indigenous leadership ' ,  are used 
variously.  One meaning of these terms is 
s imple--that poor people who are touched by 
a public decision (a housin� decision, in 
particular) have techniques and a measure 
of power which they exercise to influence 
the decision in what they resara · as their 
own interests.  It is peculiarly difficult 
to discuss the matter at this particular 
moment . Everyone approves of indigenous 
leadership, but never has more respect been 
paid to so  little reality. Citizen parti­
cipation has never been a conspicuous s uccess 
in housing programs , even though it is a 
legal requirement . Accounts of genuine , 
lasting success �1al_/digenous leaders are hard to come by. 
What is needed is people with effectiveness (decis­
ion-making power) who are reinforced only in accordance with 
their ability to bring about socially desirable effects . 
The poor obviously do not have the res ources and s ubsequent 
power to bring about needed social effects and the people 
presently assuming this responsibility are for the most 
part using their effectiveness for the sole purpose of re­
inforcing their own effectiveness . At t imes this process 
may involve a compromise that will in some small w�y bene-
180Ibid . ,  p .  7 .  
181Alvin L. Schorr, Exploration in Social Policy, 
(New York, 1968 ) ,  p. 281 . 
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fit the poor but by no means does this process come close 
to systematically bringing about needed changes .  Empha­
sizing the importance of desired social effects as an 
integral part of the overall reinforcement schedule does 
not necessitate implementing a total "one for all" phil-
osophy . As Marvin Olsen s uggests : 
" • • •  autonomy and responsibility do not 
confront mankind with a dilemma to be re­
solved through compromise , as is commonly 
assume d .  On the contrary, we . should speak 
of them as a paradox. Personal autonomy 
and social respons ibility can be mutually 
reinforcing, so that an increase in one 
condition may also produce an increase in 
the other . " � 
Our present urban rene�al and model cities programs 
are such that local public authorities are induced to use 
trickery and deceit to attain government funds . We dangle 
the money before the eyes of the local public authorities 
and dare them to devise ways of obtaining it . This proces s  
forces public authorities t o  act in a socially irresponsible 
manner because their self-mai.11tenance is dependent upon 
their ability to please dominant interest groups while at 
the same time fulfilling Federal obligations . 
By realizing the results of the renewal s tudies in 
Chapter IV and by applying these results to general power 
182 . · Marvin E. Olsen, "The Mature Society: Personal 
Autonomy and Social Respons ibility" ,  in Vital Problems for 
American Society, ed . Winter, Robow , and Chesler, (New York ,  
r968J ,  pp . �I8-�19. 
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theory discussed in this chapter, one can see how decen-
tralization, though appealin6 in its ideal form, cannot 
be realistically implemented on the empirical leve l ,  i .e . ,  
in attaining needed urban change . 
The following flow diagram offers a pictorial il-
lustration of the relationship between the major areas cov-
ered in this study. 
DIAGRAM E 
Urban problems 
. (poverty) 
��+�_ 7 National policy 
�Decentralization 
� 1  
Local decis ion-making authority 
-� · Urban social ""' Community 
change interest groups 
Hence:  Local community interest groups inhibit the effect­
iveness of decentralized federal policy in implementing pro-
grams of urban social change . 
A quote from Malcolm Rivkin clearly leads us onto 
the next chapter; 
"The game of grantmanship which communities 
must play with the federal establishment are 
a national disgrace . So are the fragmented 
patterns of metropolitan government • • •  "183/ 
183Malcolm D.  Rivkin, "Structural Change Needs 
National Committment " ,  in Urban Planning in Transition , 
ed . Ernest  Erber, (New YorK, . 1970), p .  'd7. 
CHAPTER VI : COMP.REHENSIVS PLANNING FOlt A .  
COMPREHENSIVE PROBLEM : A NATIONAL CONCERN 
"The urban condition has steadily worsened, 
and the once proud municipalities can no 
long�r cope with their grave and incredibly 
complex difficulties , which . for a number of 
reasons lie beyond the impact of any one 
city to control . "134/ 
Most social planners today realize the importance of a 
more centralized approach to attacking the many ills of 
our metropolitan areas . The main discrepancies seem to 
lie in just how centralized our planning system should be 
and subsequently what major changes should be focused upon. 
First,  let us start at the question of how centralized 
should our planning be? The three most common possibili­
ties are presented arid rit ionalized by Dick Netzer in the 
following quote :  
"Voters in  a community are unlikely to  be 
willing to tax themselves heavily to pro­
vide services whose benefits are largely 
realized by others . I f  the decis ions were 
made at a regiona l ,  state , or national 
leve l ,  voters in those larger areas might 
be entirely willing to do so, since the 
area in which the taxes are collected would 
coincide . But when the decisions on ser­
vices with heavy spillovers are made by 
small units of government, thii is not the 
case . "135/ 
· l:34Rita D .  Kaunitz ,  "The Emergence of the States 
in Urban Affairs " ,  in Urban Plannin� in Transition, ed .  
Ernest  Erber, (New YorK, I970), p.  Iuj. 
lB5D1.ck Netzer, Economics and Urban Problems , 
(New York, 1970 ) ,  p .  116. 
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Many social planner·s are advocates · of the res;ional 
government whereby cities come together under one massive 
metropolis . The regional government approach would most 
likely be a very effective means of solving ·many of our 
service problems such as education and sanitation. It is 
questionable, however, as to the effectiveness of a region­
al government in achieving comprehensive long-range plan­
ning. Though revenue would be more evenly distributed 
throughout the metropolitan areas , there is little reason 
to believe that the regional government would employ a 
planning system that would be able to �ive priorities to 
the areas of the region most in need . The planners , coming 
from and being employed by the re3ional government , would 
be subjected to the power distribution of that re3ion and , 
though there could no lonzer be formal boundaries ,  inter­
ests (which would now include the interest groups of the 
entire regional area ) would be more diffuse than ever. 
When it came time for appropriating funds for redevelopment 
programs this diffusion would express itself in a fury of 
cross purposes . The major setback in puttin� high hopes 
into the re�ional government, however , is that it is becom­
ing less and less likely t�at the regional government could 
ever come into existence . Oliver Williams� in his book 
Metropolitan Polit ical Analys is , indicates that rather than 
regional areas becoming more unified, they are becoming 
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more complex every year . When cities began to realize 
that they were losing people to the surrounding areas , 
most beean an intensive program of annexation. Through 
annexation , the city was continually extending its bound-
aries to encompass the urban spira l .  With transportation 
systems rapidly improving, howeve r,  the city could not 
keep pace with the rate of expansion and eventually sepa­
rate municipalities were formed.  '' (Between 1963 and 1968 
the number of S.M.S . A . ' s  increased from 212 to 233 . ) "186/ 
Williams ' argument is simply that with each additional 
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area , the average of 
which contains an additional eighty-seven local govern-
· ments , there is a tremendous decrease in the chances of 
any type of union between them. The reasoning is that no 
community or city once it has established its independence 
is going to want to relinquish that independence by sub­
mitting its authority to a more powerful body. Hence,  the 
greater the number of separate areas that come into ex-
1stence , the greater the number of local political systems 
the regionalists have to negotiate with . 
" • • •  there is probably no metropolitan 
area in the country in which there have 
not been several e fforts to start metropo� 
litan consolidation • • •  Thus , after four 
l86011ver P .  Williams , Metropolitan Political 
Analysi s ,  (New York, 197 1 ) , Po 83. 
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decades bf self-conscious promotion of 
the metropolitan idea , five or six met­
ropolitan areas have achieved s ome kind 
of _ general �overnmental centralization 
through consolidation . " 1S7/ 
It a� pears that re�ion3l go�ernment , thoueh having 
numerous advanta;es over our present more diversified sys -
tern of many small municipalities , is still dependent i.;.pon 
a somewhat decentralized authority structure . The author-
ity structure of a re3ional area would most likely not be 
much different than that of our present cities . The power 
of the public authority such as the mayor or mayors may 
even be more diffuse because of the cumulation of inter-
ests to be simultaneously satisfied . 
"The perennial ho·pe that new metropolitan 
agencies ; most recently the councils of 
government , 1/lfi l l  ·oecome the instruments 
for urtan change and metropolitan govern­
ance , falls short of the political real­ity. ' l ·3g/ 
. . 
To clinG to the re�ional sovernment approach to solving 
our urban problems is extrenely optimis tic , somewhat uto-
pian and most likely futile . Lewis Mumford is such an op­
timist .  Mumford sees hope for community life in .the de-
velopment of regional governments . By his conception of 
community, however, comt':'lunity life is difficult to realize 
l.37Ibid . ,  p .  33 . 
138Rita D.  Kaunitz , "The Emergence of the States 
in Urban Affa"irs " ,  in Urban Plannin.:; in Transition, ed . 
Ernest  Erber, (Ne·,.,, York, I976J, p .  103. 
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within the realm of regional polit ics . For "Ml_.lmfoz:-d holds 
that a community is formed when moral law takes precedence 
over private . desires or individual whims . "189/ What he is  
calling for here is  practically a total reordering of the 
social systemo To think that anything close to this could 
come about in time to save our rapidly degenerating urban 
areas and in the process help those that need help now is 
unrealistic to say the leas t o  
This writer i s  inclined to agree w ith Williams 
when he says , "It is evident that if the metropolitan 
' settlement ' is to be abridged by s ociety, intervention 
must come from some jurisdiction larger than that control­
led by the actors in ·a specific urban complex. "190/ There 
are cases where the "rugged individualism",  that this coun-
try prides itself _ of s imply will not work and urban poverty 
and the �roblems that go w ith. it is clearly one 6f these 
exceptions . Since "rugged individualism" and competitive­
ness are deeply engrained into· the American system, a force 
outside of the area of concern is  needed in order to  achieve 
l89Marvin D o  Kownegzs berg, "Urban Development : An 
Introduction to the Theories of Lewis  Mumford'' , in Urbanism 
in World Perspective : A Reader , ed .  Sylvia Fleis Fava, 
(New YorK, I97IJ, P o  94. 
190oliver P .  Williams , Metrooolitan Political  
Analysis , {New York, 1971 ) ,  p .  94. -
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in that area some sense of balance . For as rapidly · as 
we have progressed and continue to progress,  anyone who 
ls starting out at the bottom of our socioeconomic system 
without education or training simply does not have a 
chance to improve himself let alone catch up with those 
that have a family history of education and success . 
Clearly, mos t social planners of today recognize 
the urgency of a national planning policy; a policy that 
will be able to  deal with the problems of today and plan 
for the prevention of future urban chaos . Eldridge writes 
in_ his essa�l, "Toward a National Policy for Planning the 
Environment " ,  
"No one disputes that immediate remedial 
action is needed, but it should be obvious 
to  even the most ' gung-ho ' administrator 
that imposing with visible ills on an ad 
hoc basis i s  not remotely connected with 
the planning ethics of strategic as well 
as tactical schemes for clearly delineated 
goals , based on the careful selection of 
options and a recognition of realistic, 
actual , and potential resource allocation 
possibilities . "191/ 
What Eldridge j_s saying, just as many of the social 
planners are saying, is that our national government must 
take the responsibility of our urban crisis upon itself if 
the neglected situations are to be cor�ected . We must deal 
with the problems of today, not in the piecemeal ,  handout 
19lwentworth H.  Eldridge, "Toward a National Policy 
for Planning the Environment " ,  in Urban Planning in Tran­
sition, e d .  Ernest Erber, (New YorK, I970), p .  4. 
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patchwork manner that is presently going on but in a man-
ner that will encompass all the problems simultaneously--
a manner that �ill not create new problems while s olving 
another. Our policy toward _ urban redevelopm�nt should not 
only include correcting cur present problems but should 
also have a definite concern for the future, taking into 
consideration as many variables as pos sible, for it is 
better to be prepared for s omething that may never occur 
than to overlook consequences that are not only damaeing 
to groups of certain iridividuals but in the long run to 
s�ciety as a whole . In the words of Daniel P .  Moynihan : 
"Hence the issue occurs as to  whether the 
demands of the time are not to  be met in  
terms of policy, as well  as  program. It  
has been said of urban planners that they 
have been traumatized by the realization 
that everything relates to everything. But 
this is so,  and the perception of it can 
provide a powerful analytic tool . "192/ 
Martin Rein, in his essay "Social . Planning" ,  places 
great emphasis on the fact that planners should have the 
right to implement change o He believes that it can be ac-
complished within the realm of our present political sys-
tern by making planners an active part of the bureaucratic 
structure . Others believe that planners should be a fourth 
independent power in themse lve s .  Whatever precise _ form our 
192Daniel P .  Moynihan, "Toward a National Urban 
Policy'' , in Toward a National Urban Policy, ed .  Daniel P .  
Moynihan, (New YorR, 1970), p .  5. 
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future plannin0 policies take , they must be centra�ized 
in all of their phases except physical construction and 
most definitely must be the product of highly trained pro-
fess ional planners . 
DIAGRAM F 
Urban problems + 
(poverty ) ��� National policy �entralized 
. p:ajning 
Urban social 
change 
A national policy of professional planners will bypass the 
network of cross interests that are an inevitable barrier 
to the · decentralized approach , and will be placing the re-
sponsibility of comprehensive planning upon the most qual-
ified people available . Eldr�dge points out that even if 
decentralization had succeeded in reaching the people of 
the slums , there is a 800d poss ibility that they would not 
have known what was necessary to correct their own s itua-
tion in a preventive fashion. Aeain this phenomena re­
lates back to Olsen ' s  theory of power whereby the resource 
of legitimacy is not only overshadowed by dominance and 
force as stat€d earlier but also rendered ineffective by 
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a lack of such power resources as skill and knowledge . 
As Eldridge puts i t :  
"Can alienated little people in a world 
they never made and do not really under-
stand, play a meaningful part in running 
a society which is seemingly becomin� 
daily less understandable in its ch�otic 
complexity--even to the so-called experts . "ill/ 
In order for a national policy to be a dynamic force 
in creating needed urban change, our present national bud-
get must experience a massive shift in priorities . This 
does not mean necessarily a total restructuring of our pre-
sent social system as Mumford suggests , which would take 
an unimaginable amount of time (though I agree that our 
present system of social organization does need to be chan­
ged) . It means that our leaders and representatives must 
be responsible enough to realize the urgency in reappor-
tioning our present budget in a fashion suitable to current 
needs . Many social planners realize th� futility behind 
any type of national policy unless sufficient funds are 
provided for appropriation. Chester Hartman points out the 
disproportionate amount of money spent in defense when he 
says, " • • •  as a nation we just don ' t  seem to want to spend 
. 
big money these days for anything but killing Vietnamese ." "194/ 
. 193wentworth H .  Eldridge , "Toward a National Policy 
for Plannin2: the Environment " ,  in Urban Planning in· Trans i­
tion,  ed .  Ernest  Erber, (New York, -r:rr<J), p .  5. 
194ches ter W .  Hartman, "The Poli tics of Housi.ng" ,  
in Poli tical Power and the Urban Cris is ,  ed . Alan Shank, 
(Boston, I9b9), p .  �34. 
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Rivkin suggests that 50 per.cent of our Vietnam budget be 
spent in dealing directly with social problems at home . 195) 
Little needs to be said about the wast.efulness of our pre­
sent military system . Regardless of one ' s  ideological be-
lief concerning the Vietnam War,  candid films and documents 
of military procedures demonstrate excessive waste in near-
ly all dimensions of military procedure s .  Yet ,  the gap 
between Federal aid authorizations and appropriations con­
tinuas to grow annually . Statistical records tend to sug-
gest that perhaps pbliticians are using their power to 
authorize funds to gain public esteem. For when it comes 
to appropriating programs , proposals are repeatedly turned 
down, with appropriation funds many times never coming 
close to the annual amount authorized . The increasing gap 
between authorization and appropriation made to the De­
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare illustrates my 
point : 
Yeat' : 
Gap : 
1966 
19 .1% 
1967 
2 2 . 8% 
1968 1969 
50 . 8% 
1970 
49 . 5% 
"The 1970 appropriation figures for H . E .w . are passed by 
Congress but vetoed by President Nixono "l96/ 
l95Malcolm D .  Rivkin, "Structural Chan6e Needs 
National Commitment " ,  in Urban Planning in Transition , ed.  
Ernest  Erber, (New York, !976J, pp . 83-37. . 
196The Gap Between Federal Aid Authorization and 
Appropriations , FiscaI Years I96o - 1970, K.C.I.R. Report 
M-5�, (June , I970 ) ,  p .  10 . 
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Hans Blumenfeld states that, 
"No other s ingle measures of naticnal 
policy could do more for the rational 
use of urban space than the replacement 
of this tax (property tax) by allocation 
of a share of centrally collected revenue, 
such as a per caoita share of the federal 
income tax . " 1.2Lf . 
Blumenfeld ' s  dream is close to coming true in the 
form of Revenue Sharing. Revenue Sharing is simply put -
ting portions of the federal income t�x revenue under the 
jurisdiction of state and local authorities on a no-strings­
attached basis . As the A . C . I .R .  stated, Revenue Sharing 
is " • • •  essential to the cause of decentralized govern­
ment . " 19W Revenue Sharing r.my fulfill Blumenfeld �  s re­
quest as stated above but I do not believe it will fulfill 
his overall intentions . If the Revenue Sharing Act is pass-
ed ,  the results could not only fail to be  beneficial in 
· creating needed urban change but could be detrimental to 
our national interests by giving the influentials already 
in control of local affairs a free hand in the pot , hence 
factionalizin3 even more our ability to appropriate govern-
mental aids . 
197Hans Blumenfeld, "The Rational Use of Urban 
Space as National Policy " ,  in Urban Planning in Trans i­
tion, ed . Ernest Erber, (New Yor�, I97u), p .  I9o .  
198Revenue Sharing - An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 
A . C . I .R .  Report M-54, (Uecemoer ,  I97CJ, p .  III. 
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If the money is there to be given (and appa�ently 
President Nixon, who is the prime advocator of Revenue 
Sharing, thinks that it is ) then it seems logical to chan-
nel it in the direction where it will do the most good 
for those in the greatest need, i . e . ,  urban planning . 
Just as planning without funds is useless,  the converse 
is also true ; funds without planning are useless o  By the 
time the funds are filtered through the bureaucratic 
structure , little if anything will be left to direct to-
ward the poor. It is significant to include , at this point, 
the following quote taken from an Advis ory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations report on Revenue Sharing: 
"Chairman Robert z. Merriam recently summed 
up t�e need for early enactment of the 
revenue sharing principle Nhen he stated 
before a Congressional Committee : ' The 
greatest value of revenue sharing, however, 
may be psychological .  The enactment of 
revenue sharing, after all ,  �ould provide 
the most oersuasive evidence that national 
policymak�rs have confidence in our system 
of federalism, in general , and in state 
and local government , in particular • • •  • "199/ 
Chairman Merriam went on to say that he hoped a national 
urban policy could eventually be established but that Reve­
nue Sharing was essential at this time . It appears that 
the logical sequence of events has oeen ·reversed . The more 
reasonable approach in terms of positive productive change 
1991 1 b d . ,  p .  22 . 
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would be  t o  firs t develcp a n.a tional urban policy a·nd 
then prov ide the necessary funds in that spec ifi c d ire c-
tion. 
It is s i�nificant to note , however, that the Ad-
visory ComMis� ion on Intergovern�ental Relat ions d oe s  rec-
ognize the importance of a national urban p o l i cy . The 
following s t a tement was taken from an A . C . I . R .  Report : 
"Finally , and most centra l of the statutory 
respons i b i l i t i e s  of the commiss ion, we be­
l ieve that a national policy dealing w i t h  
urban growth i� necessary and des irable in 
preserving and s t � engtheni�� the American 
fede ral s y s t e m .  The problems aris ing from 
anj surroundinz the drift of urbanization 
and eco�n�ic gro�th are among the most cri­
tical and difficult dome s t ic problems of _ 
our t ime . If the federal system does not 
move to meet . them, it�
A
xe,;ry usefulness is  
brought to q u.es t i  on . "SQ2; 
Though the A . C . I .R .  reports tend , at times t o  be 
contradictory i t  is encouraging that a commission of the 
nature of A . C . I .R .  would o�enly admit to the need for a 
national urban policy--a policy that deviates s omewhat from 
the traditicnal American pattern of 3overning . It is also 
encouraging to know that the A . C . I .R .  has recently added 
to its commiss ion Edward c. Banfield,  a s trong advocate of 
social planning. What is dis couragin�, however, is the 
rtature of Merriam ' s  address to the Congress ional Committee 
on Revenue Sharingo He speaks of local public authority as 
200urban and Rural America : P o l i c ies for Future 
Growth, Acm Report �-32, (J\priI, !96-�j, p .  I�9. 
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a parent would s peak of a c.hild. Merriam �s advocating 
something s imilar to  what is known as reverse psychology, 
i . e . ,  by giving the local authorities unconditional funds 
and showing complete trust in them, they wi�l s uddenly 
cas t off all personal interests and direct the given funds 
toward the greatest need.  To even s uggest  this as a pos ­
s ibil ity is outrageous when considering all the revenue 
that is goine to  be misdirected if revenue sharing in its 
present form becomes a reality. 
The greatest strides in centralizing planning today 
ar.e being made at the state leve 1 in controlling land use . 
Though land use control does not involve urban problems , 
per �' a more centralized control of land use can defin­
itely affect the general urbanization patterns of the fu­
ture , e .g . ,  migration and suburbanization. More important­
ly, however, is the fact that the efforts made in this di­
rection have been relatively s uccessful and might adequately 
serve as models for more centralized planning in other areas 
such as the urban environment itself.  It is not entirely 
inconceivable that the centralized procedures adopted by 
some states today in controlling land use could be useful 
in the development of a national urban policy or perhaps 
the initiation of state urban policies . 
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"In the twentieth century we are s o  
accustomed t o  thinkin5 of the national 
government as the foc�s of centralized 
power in society that it may require 
more than a moments reflection to rea­
lize that this need not always be so . "201/ 
* * * 
" • • •  each type of activity in the 
society might be coordinated by a 
separate azency that dealt onli with a 
limited sphere of eventsA thus permitting numerous foci of power. "'='.02 . · 
What Olsen is saying here is rather s ignificant 
toward realizing the value of the Bosselman Report which 
we will shortly be discuss ing and toward realizing the 
positive possibilities involved in a national urban pol-
·icy. The main reason for centalizing power is not to give 
one or a few people some �minous type of absolute control 
but to coordinate planning from a jurisdiction outside 
the specific areas of concern. In discus s ing two of the 
biggest obstacles for city planners Dennis Poplin state s :  
"First the city planner must constantly 
deal with vested interest �roups . In 
most cities there are at leas t a few in­
dividuals who stand to lose if the master 
plan is implemented fully. "203/ 
201Marvin E. Olsen, "Power Centralization as a 
Social Proces s '' ,  in Power in Societies , ed .  Marvin · E.  
Olsen, (New York, 1970), p .  229. 
202Ibid . ,  p .  232 . 
203nennis E. Poplin, Communities : A survey of 
Theories and Methods of Researcfi, (New YorI<, I97'2:J, p. 228 . 
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"An even e;reater problem lies in the 
fact that the area over which the city 
planner has authority is frequently 
smaller than the area which requires 
unified planning .  In short , the city 
planner ' s  authority usually ends at 
the city limits , whereas the city as a 
physical entity does not . "204/ 
Some city governments have had partial success in 
dealing with cross boundary problems by initiating such 
things as commuter taxe s .  Though this type of approach 
helps keep up with the problems to a certain extent finan-
cially, it does not · help solve the problems in a future 
oriented manner .  For example , obtaining a few extra tax 
dollars to put t oward fixing a few more broken school house 
windows is quite d�s�ant from long-range urban planning 
that is geared toward equalizing educational opportunity. 
Problems that involve coordination of various interacting 
parts can only bes t  be dealt with at a macro level from 
outside of the "whole " .  To use an analogy, if one chooses 
to make a pottery vase ,  one must constantly be turning 
that vase to  assure total symmetry on all sides . If one 
individual has a personal investment in only one s ide of' 
the vase and other individuals with less ability (skill as 
a form of power ) have investments in other areas of the 
vase ,  what are the chances ' of having an end product that 
is even functional let alone attractive ? This is not to  
204Ib1d . ,  p .  229. 
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infer that one person should shape the entire urban · com-
plex as if it were a ball of clay--not at all . The in-
tention is to emphasize the need for a coordination of 
parts . Taking the same analogy of the vase--supposing a 
committee of people who had nothing invested in any one 
part of that vase,  but were reinforced only in accordance 
with the quality of the end product , were chosen to see t o  
i t  that no one aspect became disproportionate with the 
other aspects of the total ob ject : With no authority to 
touch the vase themselves the committee could see to it 
that each individual was afforded every possible oppor­
tunity to perfect his particular design or contribution 
' 
as long as it did not interfere with the overall coordi-� 
nation of the produc t .  
Perhaps a brief inquiry into the findings of the 
· Bosselman Report followed by a concluding chapter will 
clarify the significance of the above analysis . 
The_Bosselm�n ��port:  The Quiet 
Revolution in Land Use Control 
Fred Bosselman and David Callies were commission-
ed by the Council on Environmental Quality to report on 
the recent innovations of several states in controlling 
their land use . The report includes nine case studies : 
1 }  Ha\·1aiian Land Use Law 
2 )  Vermont Environmental Control Law 
3 )  San Francisco Bay Conservation and 
Development Commission 
4) 'l.Win Cities Metropolitan Council 
5 )  Massachusetts Zoning Appeals Law 
6 )  Main Cite Location Law 
7 )  Massachusetts Wetlands Protection Program 
8 )  Wisconsin Shoreland Protection Program 
9) New England River Basins Commission 
For the purposes of this s t udy only two of the nine 
will be discussed : Hawaiian I.and Use Law , because it was 
the first and Twin Cities Metropolitan Council because it 
was initiated to solve urban problems . 
" • • •  efforts are underway in widely 
separated areas of the country to broaden 
the community makip3 decis ions with re-
spect to certain land use issues . Un­
doubtedly, matters of purely local interest-­
for example,  where to allow a gas station--
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should remain under local control . 
Probably the sreat majority of land 
use decis ions made by government _are 
properly local in effect . 
"However, as our society has become 
more complex it has . become clear that some land use determinations of one 
locality cften have very important con­
sequences for citizens in other areas . "205/ 
Hawaii : The first Statewide Land Use Law was 
passed in 1961 in Hawaii .  Hawaii is a small state with a 
very limited amount of .agricultural land (approximately 
400 , 000 acres ) .  When Hawaii became a state, Honolulu be­
gan to expand very rapidly. It was soon realized that in 
order to · prevent over-urban expansion into prime agricul-
·tural areas s ome regulation would have to be made . To 
expect officials of Honol.ulu to  restrict their own bound-
aries would be like ask�ng Mayor Daley to  exclude Bridge­
port as part of Chicago . The restriction had to  come from 
an exclusive jurisdiction which meant the state level of 
government . Prior to being made a state , Hawaii had a 
history of centralized control . Hence , it was less diffi­
cult for Hawaiians to accept the Land Use Law than it would 
have been for most mainland Americans . 
The Land Use Commission consists of seven private 
205Fred Bosselman and David Callies , The Quiet 
Revolution in Land Use Control , prepared for fne Council 
·on EnvironmenfaI Quality, 1Washington, D . C . ,  197 1 ) , p .  ii .  
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citizens , the Director of the Dep�rtment of Land and 
Natural Resources and the Director of the Department of 
Planning and Economic Development .  The State has been 
divided into four major categories : urban, . rural , agri­
cultura l ,  and conservation. Each category serves as a 
regulatory basis for maintainine a balance of land use 
throughout the State . Urban districts are existing high 
density areas and specified land for the sole use of urban 
expans ion--supposedly to accommodate ten years of growth. 
Rural districts are low density residential areas . 
New zoning of this type is rare in agricultural areas . Ag­
ricultural districts are crop and graze lands based on the 
quality of land, rainfall,  etc .  
Prior to  the Land Use  Law the State owned a certain 
amount of land for water and forest conservation . Since 
the law the Commission has been given the right to zone 
private land for conservation purposes so that as of 1969 
one-third of the land in conservation districts is privately 
owned . 
Zoning changes are made by application to the Com­
mission. Though there is a great deal of argument between 
vested interest groups , over whose interests the Commission 
is catering to, after ten years of decision-making it ap­
pears the following three policies are used to best .inter­
pret the Land Use Law : 
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" (1 )  Fri!T:e agricultural land should be 
preserved for agricultural use . 
" (2 )  Tourist-::ittracting deve lopment should 
be encouraged without disturbin� the 
attractions of the natural landscape.  
" (3 )  Compact and efficient urban areas 
should be provided where oeQple can 
live at reasonable cost . "20b/ 
The decisions made so far by the Commission seem 
to be as ob ject ive as possible considering the constant 
pressure from the various public sect6rs . Of the 100: 000 
acres requested for rezoning to urban use only 30,000 have 
been approved of which only 3 , 500 acres was prime agricul-
tural land . Much of the 3 , 500 acres was already within a 
highly urbanized district . 
" • • •  There is also evidence that as a 
result of the state ' s  strong land use 
law , its plantation management has been 
given incehtive and assurance to plan 
for long-term stability ��.� ;;rowth in agriculture operations . "s.Ql; 
Though the prime motive behind organizing the Com-
mission was to protect agricultural lands , this does not 
mean that all land owners want this protect ion . In fact,  
a great percentage of  the land in Hawaii belongs to  a few 
very powerful land owners who realize quite clearly the 
profits to be made in development . 
206Ibid . ,  p .  13 . 
207Ibid . ,  p .  17 . 
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"Each of the large landowners looks 
enviously at the temptin3 profits made 
by those who are able to  sell or lease 
their land for hotels or condominiums o "203/ 
Hence, it seems that the Commiss ion has managed to  es cape 
existing pressure groups and has made its decis ions on a 
nonpartisan bas is . 
Nonpartisanship and jurisdiction over overlapping 
areas represent the core value of  centralized decision-
making. Without nonpartisanship, however, an overlapping 
jurisdiction cannot genuinely come about because one area 
will be given more decision-makin3 power than the other 
areas .  Though any 3roup that i s  made up of  human individ-
uals can fall prey to pressure tactics in one form or anoth-
er, even if  they have no personal investment toward their 
power involved ; it is much more feasible to assure non­
partisa�ship by selecting choice representatives than by 
letting all the people with various amounts of power and 
vested interests fend for themselves . The effectiveness of 
the Land Use Commission can only be measured in terms of 
their ability to maintain a healthy balance between the 
four designated districts . Whatever legitimate power fs 
afforded them is maintained by their ability to resist  temp­
tation by any one particular part and favor only the whole 
environmental balanc e .  
°20Bibid . ,· p .  15.  
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Minnesota : In 1961 the State of Minnes ota re­
sponded to the rapidly growing problems of its Twin Cities 
area by creating a Metropolitan Council.  Rapid population 
increases in the Minneapol is-S t .  Paul region brought about 
problems such as inadequate sewage disposal and t�anspor­
tation which the local government could not handle .  The 
purpose of the council was to  initiate a comprehensive 
plan for the entire region and implement this plan by 
ste&ring local agencies into making the �roper decis ions 
that would lead tow·ard fulfillment of the overall compre­
h�nsive plan. The Council consisted of fifteen members , 
all appointed by the Governor. Even thoueh the Council 
" .  o • proved itself . by formulating a plan for alleviat­
ing the sewage and water crisis which were the catalyst 
that brought it into beinz • • •  "g_Q2/ there still arose 
a great deal of conflict between the Council and local 
authorities over just how much power the Council should 
have . 
A result of the existing conflicts is a more than 
equal share of failures to  successes in terms of gett ing 
legislation passed.  The legis lation that has passed has 
been success ful , i . e . ,  it has helped solve some problems 
that otherwise may not have been s olve d .  The conflict 
arises when defining the power potential for the Council 
209 Ibid . ,  p .  138. 
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it�elf.  There are a great many areas which the Cou�cil , 
and only the Council (with its comprehensive framework ) , 
could be of even a greater service than it has by initia­
tin� sewage planning, e . � . ;  . "heal th and criminal jus tics . "  
Unfortunately the Council has yet to be able to pursue 
these areas because of the tough resis tance of local auth­
orities who are fearful of loosing their own power . It 
is being realized by more and more State and Federal poli­
ticians that the various powers of local authorities are 
self-defeating in terms of initiating long-range compre­
hensive plans . Seemingly the Twin Cities Council is over­
coming its difficulties by more accurately defining its 
duties . There is the question, however , of why there was 
as much s uccess ful resis tance as there was while other 
States with similar programs have had comparatively littl e .  
· A  possible s ug3estion might be the regional nature of the 
Council itself .  It was stated that fourteen of the fif­
teen members of the Council had to be from the Twin Cities 
Region which could affect the ability of the members to 
remain ob jective . It could a ls o  affect the ability of 
the local agencies to look upon the Council as an objective 
group; especially if an agency identifies one or more of 
the Council members with a faction to which he is opposed . 
There is also . the possibility that the regional agencies 
might feel they are being picked on s ince the Council is 
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specific to their area and not Statewide . Though the 
. Regional Council as a more centralized form or dec1s 1on­
mak1ng and planning has been more successful than the lo­
cal agencies , there is also a great deal of ev1rtence to 
s upport Owen W illiams ' argument against regional govern­
ments . Had the State not appointed the Re gional Counc i l 1  
it is very unlikely that the Council would have coma into 
existence . For various possible reasons , s ome of which 
were just mentioned above, the Council was met with a 
great deal o r  active partisanism that �oes not take place 
as · readily when decisions are enforced from the State or 
Federal leve l .  
The Bosselman Report has clearly demonstrated that 
notwithstanding certain inevitable difficulties a great 
deal more can be accomplished t oward s olving overlapping 
problems in a comprehensive manner through centralized 
planning and decis ion-making than could ever be hoped for 
through piecemeal local partisanship. 
Precedence has been set by a few States that have 
put the welfare of their State before tradition and have 
succeeded 1n br1ns1ng about constructive changes . Hope­
fully an increas ing number of people will realize the sig­
nificance of these breakthroughs and encourage their own 
States to adopt similar programs .· One possible form of a 
national urban policy might be to simply enforce the init-
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iation of Statewide programs for regulating land use and 
urban growth. This enforcement could be in such a way s o  
as to maintain basic requirements in areas of common con­
cern and yet allow for each State to handle its own pec­
uliar problems as well .  Local authorities would then go 
about their more specific services without diverting their 
skills and energy toward the macro problems which they 
have little or no ability to s olve . 
CHAPTER VII :  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Summary 
By showing that decentralized decision-making has 
failed to  eliminate housing problems this study has also 
demonstrated that the decentralized process has failed to 
eliminate poverty. The reasoning behind this is that hous -
ing is primarily a problem re la ti ve to people not. being 
able to  afford a "decent " home . Urban renewal case studies 
show that community power s tructures in the form of inter-
est groups are the intervening variable preventing decen-
tralization from be ing an effective . policy tov1ard elimin-
ating poverty. Also, empirical community power studies 
point out that there �re interest groups involved in nearly 
all major community decisions . Reference to the Bosselman 
report provided a means of controlling the intervening var-
iable, 1 . e . ,  bypassing. the local interes t  groups by develop-
ing more centralized controls over comprehensive decision-
making . It follows,  therefore , that any time decentralized 
decision-making is applied to poverty elimination community 
interest groups are going to  be a necessary intervening var-
iable preventing the decis ions from being in favor of the 
poor. The reason this is most pertinent to the poor is ex-
. . plained in Olsen ' s  power theory in that poor people, having 
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the fewest resources , also have the least amount of power 
and, therefore, the least chance of having decis ions made 
in their favor when competing with other more powerful in­
terest groups . This has been demonstrated in several of 
the case histories where urban renewal programs , basically 
intended to help the poor, were controlled by middle and 
upper middle class organizat ions and interest groups .  The 
results of these more powerful interest groups controllinz 
the urban renewal decision-making have been that the poor, 
the citizens most effected by the programs , have had little 
if any voice in the decis ions and are many times harmed 
rather than helped by them. Two very good examples of this 
are Chicago ' s  Northwest  Hyde Park and St . Louis ' "Mill 
Creek Valley" . 
Northwest Hyde Park had a small elite community 
living in the center of a large run do�'ln neighborhood . The 
elite members who were predominantly University of Chicago 
professors certainly were not representatives of the ma­
jority population. However, because they represented great­
er resources ; money, knowledge, influence,  etc.  and had 
definite vested interests at stake , the changes that took 
place were in fact non-beneficial to the majority of the 
residence of that community, i . e . ,  the poor . 
St o  Louis represents another excellent case in 
point where a 460 acre residential area was cleared . The 
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area wa� badly blighted with the greatest percentage of 
housing having no baths , toilet or even running water . 
The citizen ' s  committee was made up of a coalition of elite 
businessmen who were naturally in favor of the cities plan 
to divide a once residential area into a variety of uses . 
Some residential building took place , but the bulk of the 
area was used for the following purposes : commerc�al,  in­
dustrial , expressway right-of-way, and a 22 acre S t .  Louis 
University expansion area . The overall result was that the 
thousands of poor people displaced by the redevelopment had 
no decisive power over its taking place.  Quite clearly the 
area seems to have been parceled out among the most power­
ful interest groups , those with the most resources initially . 
The displacement of people into already overcrowded areas 
and the lack of emphasis on social planning became apparent 
when it was realized that twenty-five percent of the resi­
dential sections of  S t .  Louis were rated s lums . 
Hence, it appears that as long as there are poor 
people at the base of the decentralized system who have 
less power (resources )  than other existing groups which 
are interested in attaining federal funds for their own 
purposes , the decentralized federal policy cannot be im­
plemented effectively in terms of creatin3 change geared 
toward urban social problems , i . e . ,  deliberate and adequate 
attack on the poverty cycle . The fact that poverty is the 
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core of  many interrelating factors of which none can be 
dealt with separately allows for reference to a concept 
more inclusive than just poverty .  An analogy might be 
that the circulatory system is useless without the heart 
and yet we still need the term "circulatory system11 to 
describe the entire interdependent process between blood, 
arteries , and the various other parts as well as the hear t .  
I t  is within this context that the term "urban s ocial change " 
is referred to as the dependent variable of the guidine hy­
pothesis of this study . Urban s ocial change refers not 
only to poverty elimination but to all factors directly 
or indirectly related to :poverty elimination as well .  
Hence, we have a situatidn where adequate urban s ocial 
change cannot take place without dealing with poverty and 
at the same time poverty cannot be dealt with apart from 
consideration of all the other completely interrelated 
s ocial and environmental factors . 
It appears , therefore , that our guiding hypothesis : 
"Local community interest groups inhibit the effectiveness 
of decentralized federal policy in implementing programs 
of urban s ocial change " has been supported by the data 
presented herein. The nature of this study, however, makes 
it very difficult to determine to  what degree the guiding 
hypothesis has been s ubstantiated . When considering the 
extent of s ubstantiation one must bear in mind that this 
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is not a quantitative study and therefore cannot render 
empirical validity. Though the case s tudies herein were 
not purposely selected, but selected on the basis of avail­
ability within time and monetary limits, the study does 
not involve statistical codin0 nor scientifically recorded 
lon�itudinal data. There is longitudinal information with­
in many of the case histories in that "before urban renew­
al" and "after urban renewal" conditions are compared but 
these do not render scientific validity to the study itself . 
Substantiation at this point is not s cientifically indu-
ced but merely lO�ically inferred by the author through an 
effort to ascertain whether or not information exists which 
s uppo�ts certain sociological as sumptions . 
Within this context, it can be said that the 3reat­
est amount of substantiation attributable to this study is 
derived from the fact that out of the many urban renewal 
case studies covered by the author none indicated adequate 
chan�e for helping the poor as a result of citizen parti­
cipation by the poor . Though a couple poor communities 
came close to controlling the decis ion-making in their area 
it was mainly in the form of bloc tactics and not produc­
tive reconstruction. One partial success story involving 
Newark was the result of racial tens ions whereby at the 
time renewal proposals were being made black emotional 
solidarity was at its peak. Power resulting from this type 
of collective activism was very rare throughout the case 
etu�1es that were enc�untered and 1n none did there exist 
anything close to the 1ntena1ty level or Newark in terms 
or urban renewal control. The . power that resulted in 
Newark was to a great extent a result or the great poten­
tial for violence that the black community displayed aa . 
a group. 
There were. a few other partial success s tories 
where the poor were led by people from the middle or upper 
middle clas3 groups hence giving suggestable credance to 
Marxian conflict theory, 1 . e . ,  the masses must be led by 
members . or the. middle class . Such cases were tew, however, 
and dependent upon spurious s 1tuationa rather than a sys­
tematic policy where high predictab�lity or results 1� in­
terred . The tindings of this study can best be discredited 
or substantiated further through additional research. The 
author sugges ts that more emp1r1cal · techn1que·s be employed 
t o  deal w1th the various interrelationships herein, thereby 
affording one more exact interpretation or results 1n · terma 
or substantiation or t1nd1nga . 
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Conclus ion : · Plannin::; Our Ur.ban Environment 
. "No c ity in the country makes a lons­
ranse estim:ite of a l l  its hou.sin:; needs 
in order to plan to meet them in some 0 1h 1 reasonable period--10, 15,  Qr 20 years . " � 
One of the most significant s tatis tics in the 
book New Homes and Poor People is the fact that there is 
an inverse relationship between the sequences position of 
a home and its  distance from the central city: i . e . , as 
a sequence gets longer ,  those furthest in the sequence 
are the homes closest to the center of the city. The mean 
distance from the center of the city to new dwelling units 
was found to be 18.2 miles (also the median ) . The mean 
distance for the last dwe1ling units was found t o  be 12 . 7  
miles (median 10 . 9 ) ; nearly half were under ten miles .211/ 
One can also see a correlation between these statist ics 
and th� figures given in Chart C where it was illustrated 
that during the 1960 ' s  when moderate income s ubsidies were 
provided, there was a gradual .decrease in the number of 
whites in the central c it ies . In comparison to the entire 
urban population, twenty-six percent of the whites are in 
the central city as compared t o  fifty-five percent of the 
210Alvin L. Schorr, Slums and Social Insecurity, 
0vashington, D . c . ,  1963 ) , p .  b�. 
211John B. Lansing, Charles Wade Clifton, James N .  
Mor3an, New Homes and Poor People , (Michigan, 1969 ) , pp. 19-20 . 
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non-whites . 212/ From this one can deduce that most of 
the non-white population are in the lower income brackets 
since it was the middle income people that were s�bsidized 
to the s uburbs . Hence minority Groups such as the blacks 
are dis criminated against not only because they are black 
(which is evidenced by the fact that thirty percent fewer 
blacks can find homes in their perspective income bracket 
than whites ) but also quite obviously because they are 
poor . 213/ As Bayard Ru$tin points out : 
"The black slum proletariat has been gro:i'J' ­
in� in numbers and density • • •  As a�ri­
cultural mechanization and other factors 
continue pus�ing N93roes out of the south, 
the urban zhe t t o s  expand each year by half 
a million; only 40, 000 Negroes annually 
find their way into the suburbs . "2ll.�/ 
Poor people are forced to  s tay in the inner city 
because it is the only place they can find housing close 
to their income . Black people are forced to remain in 
the inner · cities because they are discriminated against 
for being black as well as for being poor . Just as the 
poor cannot s upply themselves with adequate jobs and ade-
212The Pres ident ' s  Committee on Urban Housing, A 
Decent Home , (Washington, D . c . ,  1969 ) ,  p .  40 . -
213John B. Lansin£; , Charles Wade Clifton, James N .  
Mor�an, New Homes and Poor People , (Michisan, 1969} ,  p .  4 8 .  
214BJ.yard F.ustin,  11A111ay Out of the Exploding 
Ghetto" ,  in Cities in Trouble , ed .  Nathan Glazer, (Chicago, 
1970 ) ,  p .  20� . � 
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qu�te housing, they cannot supply themselves with the 
needed services such as education to break the poverty 
cycle for succeeding generations . 
Many urbanologists today believe that the only 
feasible way of dealing with poverty is by planning an 
urban policy that will balance the suburbs and central 
city both racially and economically . Since most blue 
collar jobs have moved to the s uburban areas , it seems 
logical that low income housing should be provided in 
the same areas . As Herbert Gans s uggested several years 
ago ,  
"The solution, then, is not to repeal 
urban renewal, but to transform it from 
a program of ·slums clearance and rehab­
ilitation into a program of urban re­
housing. This means , firs t ,  buildinz 
low- and moderate�cost housing on vacant 
land in cities , suburbs , and new towns 
beyond the suburbs and also helping s lum 
dwellers to move into exis ting housing 
outside the s l ums ; and then, after a por­
tion of the urban low-income population 
has left the· slums , clearing and rehab­
ilitating them through urban renewal . 11215/ 
This writer is of the opinion that the best long-term re-
sults would be attained if a s imilar movement to that of 
the 1960 ' s  �as induced whereby this time it would be the 
poor who were subsidized to the suburbs . To make the pro-
gram effective ; the loans would have t o  be geared specifi-
cally t oward meeting the demands of the bottom economic 
215tterbert Gans , People and Plans : Essays on 
Urban Problems and Solutions ; (New York, 1�68}, p .  �67 . 
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sec_tor of the urban poi;ulation. It would als o  be w
ise 
t o  have research teams assess the job capacity for all 
of the s uburban areas until  the j ob capacity is filled. 
This would have to take into ac6ount the changing di-
mensions of the community, i.e. , its natural rate of grow th 
and the additional increase in jobs due to the migration 
itself.  The long-term benefits of s uch a pro3ram would 
be that the lower income people could have adequate homes 
that they could be proud of, the educational benefits and 
other community services of the middle and upper middle 
· class families and an overall better chance of breaking 
the poverty cycle . At the same time , our economy would 
be s timulated by havihg the poor working as productive 
forces in the economic system. 
Following s t i l l  the suggestions of Gans ; t o  up-
·grade the city tax base and comnunity services , it would 
also be necessary to induce an influx of white middle class 
suburbanites back into the central city . This point can 
be supported by a quote from Robert c .  Weaver : 
'�egardless of any socia l ,  politica l ,  
or moral consideration, the economics of 
the situation require concern for reten­
t ion of white middle-class families in 
central cities because their numbers far 
. exceed those ar.iong non-white s 9  In any given locality the problem has three 
manifes tations : creation of new areas 
in which middle-class families will es­
tablish s table communitie s ,  rehabilita-
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tion or partial renewal of areas which will 
attract and hold middle -class families , and 
the arresting or preventing the desertion 
of middle -class families from existing areas 
of residence . 11216/ 
One of the most overlooked but important conse-
quences of a policy based on balancing all metropolitan 
areas would be that a greater percentage of people would 
be closer to their jobs whereby public transit systems 
could be the major means of transportation for all.  A 
great deal of money could be saved by de-emphasizing the 
massive expansion of expressway systems that is presently 
occurring o There could also be a considerable decrease 
in pollution as a result of less rush hour traffic and 
the accompanying exhaus t s .  As pointed out by A lvin Schorr, 
many poor people do not want to move . These people would 
b�nefit by the presence of the middle class whites who 
would demand quality education and community services . 
The middle class whites would benefit by being closer to 
their jobs and the many entertainment activities of the 
central city such as museums and theaters . 
There is little question that these policies would 
demand a budget many times more than what most politicians 
would consider feasible o If  we are, however, making a 
transition from a war t o  peace time economy as some of 
216Robert c. Weaver, "Class ,  Race, and Urban Renew­
a l " ,  in Urban Sociolocy, e d .  Faud Baali, Joseph s .  Vandiver, 
(New York, Ig70), p p .  333-403 . 
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our lead ing politicians have s uggeste d ,  there should be 
a considerable amount of funds that coul� be shifted from 
the military budget to the domestic urban problem of mak­
ing s�gnificant strategic subsidies for the poor and 
creating jobs geared toward improvine the quality of life . 
By jobs that improve the quality of life is meant a wider 
expansion of our educational system by way of construc­
tion and maintenance on the blue collar level and better 
trained , better equipped ,instructors with a lower student-
1nstructor ratio on the white collar leve l .  Other examp­
les might be jobs that result from an extensive expan-
sion of recreation and health services of which many people 
are presently deprive d .  I t  has been said that i n  times of 
"need" regard less of the magnitude, Americans have somehow 
always managed without hesitation, to finance i t .  With 
World Wars I and II the United States bas developed one 
of the large s t ,  most expensive military systems in the 
history of the world . Korea and Vietnam cost and are s t i l l  
costing the United States hoards of money .  �hen the. Rus s ­
ians were the first t o  put a satellite into space ,  the 
American people could not spend their money fast enough to 
see to it that we were adequately compet ing in the space 
race. The realization that the funds behind on� rocket 
to the moon could comfortably house thousands of poor peo­
ple is revolting. Gemini 3 a l one involved : two years of 
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preparat ion, the top talents of more than five thousand 
American corporations , cooperation of 3 , 196 subcontract­
ing companies which supplied $ 3 4 3 , 837 , 143 . 88 worth of 
parts and services for the capsule alone, a trip of 75 , 000 
. : ... � �r;·: . . . 
· miles that took less than five hours . 217/ It appears that 
many American people and their leaders have a warped in­
terpretation of the word "need " .  This writer is of the 
opinion, and I ' m  sure that most of the 7 . 8  poorly housed 
people in our metropolitan areas would agre e ,  that ade-
quate social planning is a tremendous need in our society 
and if it were recognized as  such by the right amount of 
the right people , i . e . ,  influentials and politicians , one 
. . . 
would be amazed at the amount of funds that would suddenly 
be available to meet the task.  Alvin Schorr states the 
following in regard to the expenses involved in adequatel� 
providins s ubs idies for the poor : 
"Such a program need not appear to be 
favoritism . On the contrary, aids that 
have s o  far been devised (in�ome tax ad­
vantage s ,  mortsage ins urance ) reach middle 
and upper income families with special ef­
fect . Res ources �nd techniques are avail� 
able to riGht the balance . "21-3/ 
As Schorr also points out , social workers , architects , 
bankers , _  politicians , builders , and anyone else that is in-
21 7Edward Higbee,  A Quest ion of Prioritie s ,  (New 
York, 1970 ) ,  RP· 28-2 9 .  
218Alvin L .  Schorr, Slums and Social Insecurity, 
(Washington, D . C . , 1963 ) ,  P o  137. 
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valved in a particular phase of planning, must unite to 
combine knowledge and resources into an effective , dy-
namic form of planned change . Again, I refer to an appro-
priate quote from Schorr ' s  book Slums and Social Insecurity : 
"Emphasis on social planning appears to 
be intended to encompass three distinct 
ideas : Firs t ,  that the needs of indivi­
duals --especially those �ho live in an 
affected area--should not be overloaded 
in a preoccupation with blueprints of 
officialdom. Second , that human atti­
tude s ,  prejudices , preferences , senti­
ments , and notions should be fed assump­
t ions into the thinking machine that 
eventually produces a city or neighborhood 
plan . Otherwise these intangibles turn 
up late on the scene to interfere with per­
fectly good physica� plans . Third , that 
some sense of unifyin� community purpose 
should pervade a city ' s  planning to repre­
sent a countervailing, if not overriding 
force to corm:ip,rcial and financial cons id­
erations . " 2 1:;<; 
The idea of planned social change raises not only 
polit ical and economic questions , but also a moral one : 
Is it  right to manipulate the lives of people? Planned 
social change as this writer perceives i t  should , if ef-
fectively implemented, be a perpetual chain of additional 
choices whereby old choices eventually become extinct with 
the constant rise of new, more attractive ones that are 
created in juxtaposition with a predetermined social pat -
. 
tern . This writer believes it  is wrong t o  control ind�vid-
ual behavior by limiting one ' s  ability to make certa�n 
219 Ibid . ,  p .  57 .  
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choices e . 3 . ,  pro3ra�min0 spe�ific individual behavio� 
patte�ns thr·oL;Ch the educational system. The idea behind 
social �lan�in� is to el�minate ,  on an as totally con­
s cious level as pos s ible , any des ire or need .to r.ake a 
choice d e t r iT.ental t o  o�eself o!' anyone else . The major 
dif fc rence a s  I s e e  it between the two approaches is that 
in one the individua l ' s  scope of choices is constant ly 
beins broadened whereas in the othe r ,  the i n d i v idual ' s  s c o�e 
of choices is b e ir.g thwarted or r e s tricted even t o  the 
pos s ible extent that a choice does not exist at all .  An 
ill ustrat ive example 1t1ill further clar:i,fy my point : E'!any 
poor people today are t otally immobilized in the centr�l 
cit ie s � Ey presentinz an a t t ract ive opportunity such as 
owning th� i !' own homes a.nd holding a s table j ob their scope 
of choices has teen broadened sonewhat . Doubtless many 
· would not choose to take advantage of s uch an op�ortunity 
in which case if a s trainin3 s ocial inbalance persisted 
new avenues o f  choice would have to be created . An indi­
vidual ' s  scope of choices should be broadened as much as 
poss ible on the secondary educational level and should be 
realis tically generalizable to his adult life . That is ,  
following s econdary education, one should be able t o  choose 
an area of interest ,  train for ,  and pursue it as his life ' s  
work and s till naintain the ability to cultivate the re­
maining interests  in the form of hobbie s ,  recreation, or 
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alternative occupat1or.s . On the other hand, to control 
one ' s  behavior pattern (assuming that it is possible ) t o  
the extent tha� h e  i s  conditioned into a specific occupa­
tion is to deny him the ability to become s e lf-actualized 
which Abraham Maslow purports as a basic need of man. 
Though not yet proven, it is the author ' s  qontention that 
men do have subtle genetic differences which in various 
ways , be it neurologically or phys 1olog1cally or s ome other 
means , allow for different adaptational capabilities to 
environmental st1mul1. The only way t o  afford one the 
capacity t o  assert his particular capabilities is to ex­
pose him t o  as wide a variety of stimuli as· possible wh1la 
at the same time controlling the environment from ave r - ­
s1ve stimuli that could inhibit one from fulfilling all 
of his needs . Though a psuedo-random1zed stimulus ap­
proach to human behavior in no way allows one a pure form 
of choice or anything close t o  1t , 1t does al low one t o  
·adopt a life style most compatible with his particular per­
a onali ty peculiarities , however s ignificant these pecul­
iarities might be. Hence , man could pres umably be afforded 
acceptable choices through effective social planning that 
does not involve strict behavioral controls . Herbert c. 
Kelman expresses this writers view on planned change when 
he states : 
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"Complete freedom of choice :ts ,  of 
· course ,  a meaningless concept .  But the 
purpose of education and of the arrange­
ment of the social order, as I see it,  
is - to enable men t o  live in  society while 
at the same time enhancing their freedom 
to choose and widening their areas of 
choice . "220_/ 
As an urban nation, we cannot afford to cling to 
the laissez -faire traditions of our early , rural,  American 
heritage . The s ocial organization of our urban areas is 
an overlapping interdependent fabrie of parts--not a 3roup 
of total, �ndependent, self-sµfficient families or clans 
which at one time made up the bulk of this nation. Our 
modern metropolitan problems are becoming so complexly 
interwoven that piecemeal · planning and decision-making 
only add to the already existing frustrations of concerned 
and/or involved individuals . 
The content and progress ion of this study demon­
strates that there is a great deal of evidence pointing 
to the contention that in order to attain effective planned 
ch�nge we must be committed td more comprehensive approaches 
which can only be initiated effectively from a more cen­
tralized sociopolitical viewpoint . 
220Herbert c .  Kelman, · "Manipulation of Human Be­
havior : An Ethical Dilemma for the Social Scientis t '' ,  in 
The Plannins of Change, e d .  Warren G. Benni s ,  Kenneth D. 
Benne, Robert Chin ,  pp . 552-618, (Chicago, 1961 ) ,  p.  585. 
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in other cases covered in Chapter IV . The . best examples 
or category 6 are found in the later Model Cities Programs 
such as in Dayton • .Examples of 7 ,  though very few, were 
also demonstrated in Chapter IV, e . g . ,  Newark. 
* * * 
Though there are cases of category 2 charted , one of the 
best examples is Philadelphia ·:-1here the entire flo11 of the 
decentralized process could be recognized except for in 
the lower class leve l .  
As demonstrated by the above rather crude des ign, the 
circulation of power went from officials and authorities 
to the middle c lass people who in turn reinforced the 
officials and authorities who have some legitimate author­
ity above them and so on . The flow of decisi0n-making 
power very seldom reaches the lowest level where the ef­
fects of decisions are felt the mos t .  
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223Linton c .  Freeman, Patterns of Local Community 
Leadership, (New York, 1968 ) ,  pp.  2C5-'21. 
224Robert Morris and Robert H .  Binstock, Feasible 
Plannin� for Social ChanBe � (New York, 1966 ) ,  pp . 98 and 53 . 
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APPENDIX B :  PLANNING GOf\LS FOR FOUR FORD FOUNDATION 
P.?.OGRAMS 
San Francisco : 
1 .  Improve�e�t o f  public and private progra�s 
2 .  Arousal of interest in the community to move it into 
action for improved services for the aged 
3 .  Creation of machinery for coordinating s e rvices for 
the e lderly 
More specific goals enerced in the course of the pr oject . 
While the s e  seem t o  follow a logical course o f  systematic 
development , in fac t ,  tbey deve loped erratica lly, in re­
s p onse to various pres s ure s ,  interes t s ,  and events : 
A .  Casework and Pers onal . Counseling Services 
1 .  Additional caseworkers to be employed or reas ­
signed for work with the elderly, especially by 
the department of public welfare , but a l s o  by 
hospita ls , the Family Service A s s ociation, and 
the Jewish Family Service 
2 .  The department of welfare to organize a special 
training program for its staff; a school o f  s ocial 
wcrk t o  organize a training program on the needs 
of the aged for a·11 agency staffs 
3 .  Discontinuance of joint case services provided 
by the voluntary family agencies to public a s s i s ­
tance recipients , in order t o  encourage s taff 
increases within the department of welfare 
4 .  The public welfare deparment t o  expend all funds 
annually appropriated to it through an increase 
in a l location for �rofe ssional s e rvices to clients 
5 .  The local chapter of the American Red Cross t o  
sponsor a program o f  friendly vis it ing t o  s upple­
ment profe s s i onal casework s e rvices ,  to be financed 
by a local foundation 
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B. Health, Medical Car e ,  and Rehabilitation 
1 .  Initiate a syste� o f  health examinati orts and 
referrals for the e lderly �ithout family 
a l · 'ro be located in s everal public health centers 
b To be administered by the local medical s ociety 
c To be financed from a srant by the Public Health 
S e rvice 
2 .  Persuade th� city health department to increase a ll 
of its public health s e rvices and to include auxi l ­
iary services ,  s uch as homemaking and home nursing 
for the aged 
3 .  Support adequate payment for public assis tance 
recipients in nursing homes 
c. Adult Education and Recreation 
l o  Bring leisure-time services within reach of res i ­
dents in all parts of the city by: 
a ) · Inducing agencies operating leisure -time pro­
grams under sectarian auspices t o  extend their 
s ervices to all nearby residents 
b ) Increasing the s c ope o f  respons ibility o f  the 
nonsecta rian s enior citizens ' center 
c ) Reallocat in� service-a rea respons ibilities among 
all cxistin� agencies 
2 .  Launch a training program about leisure - t ime needs 
of the aginz, conducted by a school of social work 
and d i rected both t o  sectarian and t o  nonsectarian 
3 .  
4 .  
5 . 
6 .  
agencies 
Persuade the municipal recreat i on department to 
. begin a ptogram of in-service training for its own 
staff · 
Influence the municipal library t o  adopt more fav­
orable policies in handling indieent older persons 
who use its facilities 
Induce the Canon Kip Community House t o  organize � 
special center for the socially is olated aged 
Arrange for agencies worting in the North Market 
area t o  cooperate in cas e referrals and t o  estab-
lish better liaison with the Hotel A s s ociation 
whose constituent members in this area house a 
large number of older pers ons . 
D .  Retirement Policies 
1 .  Encourage the s tate employment s e rvice t o  assign 
special vocational counselors t o  advise older 
· unemployed pers ons and t o  help them locate employ­
ment . 
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2 o  Organize, with the �ooperation of �he California 
department of employment and the u .  s .  Office of 
Manpower , Auto�ation, and Trainin3, a special 
retaining program for older une�ployed workers 
3 .  Stimulate adult education organizations t o  offer 
classes in retirement preparation 
E. Housing 
l .  Persuade the redevelopment authority to arrange 
for the construction of 300 units to house older 
persons soon to be displaced by downtown urban 
renewal projects 
2 .  Persuade the housin� authority t o  incorporate a s oc­
ial services and facilities in its  low-cost public 
housing projects 
3 .  Organize a housing information service 
* * * 
Contra Costa County: 
A .  Organization of Planning 
1 .  Es tablish the extent t o  which effective planning 
can be centralized on a county basis  or decentral­
ized to re8ional or local communities 
2 .  Develop and test both county-wide and local coor­
dinating committee s ,  requiring recruitment of 
leadership from other organizationn and the un­
covering of latent leaders hip not yet involved in 
community activity 
3 .  Merge the one s tron3 council in the west and the 
relatively weaker councils in the central and 
eastern parts of the county 
4 .  Engage the major county governmental agencies 
(health, welfare , housing, and recreation ) in the 
work of the new county council and smooth out 
relationships with the voluntary asency members 
5 .  S trengthen tha decis ion-making responsibilities 
of the Community Council ' s  board of directors for 
county-w.ide action 
B. Private and Public Agency Programs for Older People 
1 . Increase the volume of public lo�-cost housing 
through action of the relevant public housing 
authorities : 
a l In Richmond 
b In Martinez 
c Throughout the county 
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2 .  Improve the q u a l i t y  of public housing by pe�suad­
in� pub l i c  housin; author i t ie s  to introduce d r o p ­
in recrea t i on centers in ne�ly constructed publi c  
hnusin� p r o j e c t s  
a )  Persuade recraation departments of c i t i e s  and 
voluntary a�encies to help s t aff these cent e rs 
3 o  Es tablish a new cou0ty-wide s e rvice to provide 
homemaking and ho�e nursin3 s ervices to out-of­
hospi t a l  patients 
a )  Secure par t i c ipat ion of several agencies (county 
health department, county h o s p i t a l ,  v i s i t ihg 
nurses ' acenc i e s , heart and cancer a s s ocia t i o ns ,  
and the medical s oc i e t y )  t o  launch s uch a s er v i c e  
b )  S e c u r e  a demonstrat ion grant for i n i t i a l  financ­
ing from the u .  s .  Public Health S e rvice or the 
s ta t e  health depart�ent 
c )  Incorporate a new independent agency t o  provide 
this service, w i t h  approval from the above a�en­
c ie s  and from .the board of the County Council of 
Community S e rv i c e s  
4 .  Con s o l idate various friend l y -v i s i t ing pro�rams int o 
one s trong county s e r v i ce , t o  b e  administered by 
the l ocal chapter of the American Red C r o s s  
5 .  Enlarge recreation o�portunities for the aged through­
out the county 
a )  S t imulate town recreation departments and v o l ­
untary group s ,  such as churches and women ' s  club s , 
t o  open drop-in centers for the e lderly 
Worcester : 
A .  Organi z a t i on of Mult i s er v i c e  Center for the Elderly 
1 .  Pers uade the Golden Rule (Unite d ) Fund a nd the 
Community S e rvices of Greater Worcester t o  sup­
port and sponsor s u ch a center--later converted 
into an effort t o  e s tablish an independent cor­
poration without t i e s  to the Fund 
2 .  P e r s uade any of s e veral agencies (YW C A ,  housing 
authority, department of parks � t o  provide space 
for the center 
3 .  Secure initial financing from any of the following: 
United Fund ; department of public heal t h ,  p r i v a t e  
d onor s ; o r ,  in the l a s t  r e s o r t ,  as t h e  contr i b u t i on 
o f  volunteer staff t ime 
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B. Medical Care 
1 .  Introduce a recreational therapy, as a first step 
in rehabilitation, into s everal proprietary nursing 
homes 
2 .  Secure a s ponsoring agency to administer recrea­
tional therapy--e ither the Comm�nity Services of 
Greater Worcester,  �he YNCA, or the Eay State Re­
habilitation Society 
3 .  Secure the cooperation of five nnrsin.:; home owners 
4 .  Secure initial financing from the public health 
�ervice or from the nursing home o�erators them­
selves 
5 .  Increase the s tate welfare department ' s  reimburse ­
ments t o  nursing homes for patients on public 
welfare 
c. Casework and Personal Counseling 
1 .  Persuade the Family Service Ass ociation t o  assign 
casework s taff to work with older clients and train 
the rest of the s taff to recognize the needs of such 
clients 
2 .  Continue the volunteer work of the Information Ser­
vice for the Aging by securin3 new volunteers 
3 . Incorporate the information service in the proposed 
multi-purpose center 
4 .  Train volunteers for a friendly visit ing service 
D. Housing 
1 .  Persuade the housing authority to construct low­
cos t housing in a downtown location s uitable for 
the most needy jged pers ons 
2 .  Induce the housing authority to include a center 
for recreation for the aged in a new, low-rent 
apartment house project 
* * * 
Denve r :  
A .  Arrangements for Central Planning for the Aged in Denver 
1 .  Improve the relationship between the MCCS and the 
sec 
a ) 
b )  
Appoint the pres ident of the SCC a s  vice-chairman 
of the MPPOP 
Coordinate the activities of the SCC and the 
MP POP 
Merge the SCC and the MPPOP 
Secure the appointment of the president of the 
sec as the next chairman of the merged planning 
unit 
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e )  Secure an MCCS commitment to provide full-time 
staff service for the aging after the termina­
t i on of the demons t rat ion 
2 o  Improve rela t i onships bet�een the United Fund and 
and the MCCS . 
B .  Rela tionships a�ong Direct-Serv ice Agencies 
1 .  Or3anize a conference o f  nonprofit homes for the 
elderly 
2 .  Organize a conference Group of agencies s e rvicing 
the chronically i l l  a6ed 
3 .  Es tablish a friendly working relati onship between 
the Denver housing authority and the MCCS 
4 .  Encourage closer cooperation among Jewis h-spons ored 
s ocial acencies 
c .  Quality of Existing Pro�rams for the Elderly 
1 .  Enrich the programs of nonprofit housing corpor�­
tions s erving the a5ed 
a )  Secure part icipat ion of housing manaeers in 
trainin3 institutes , s tres sing the s ocial needs 
of residents 
b )  Provide various technical aides to enhance oc­
cupancy of such home s by needy aged persons 
2 .  Persuade the Denver hotts ing a uthority t q  build more 
uni t s  of l ow -c o s t  public housing and to introduce 
social services in their management 
3 .  Induce s e lected agencies t o  initiate an organized 
home medical care pro�ram 
4 .  Induce certain health agencies t o  initiete a pro­
gram of prevent ive ,serv ice3 
5 .  Persuade s imilar agencies to introduce comprehens ive 
rehabilitation programs into commercial nursing 
homes 
6 .  Expand preret irement educational programs through 
selected indus tries and the Adult Education Assoc i­
a t i on 
7 .  Persuade the family serv ice agencies t o  increase 
their allocation of caseworkers for counseling the 
aged 
8 .  Pers uade the Denver recreation department t o  ser­
vice a federation of senior citizen clubs 
9 .  Per s uade the A llied JeNish Council to s upport family 
counseling for older clients 
· 
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